• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.93
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• pp.121-148
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• 2011

The uncodifiability thesis in anti-theory argument is the typical claim for the impossibility of ethical theorizing. Based on this thesis reflecting particularism strongly, contemporary anti-theorists in ethics argue that individual decisions in particular situations cannot be codified into moral principles. The uncodifiability thesis needs to be examined by the following two issues: a theoretical issue of whether the object of codification is moral practices or not; and a practical one of whether moral principles present the decision procedure of moral reasoning or not. The characteristics of practical reasoning show that the object of codification in ethics, as moral theorists insist, is not moral practices but morality itself. Also moral theorists, contrary to the criticisms of anti-theorists, insist that moral reasoning is comprised of not only moral principles but also moral judgments with contextual knowledge and moral wisdom. In brief, moral theorists make a persuasive response to the uncodifiability thesis when they do neither intend to codify moral practices into moral principles nor to deduce the moral reasoning from moral principles. For them moral judgments should be examined by the moral principles which present universal and idealistic morality.

• Korean Journal of Cognitive Science
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• v.29 no.2
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• pp.137-160
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• 2018

The present article reviews recent arguments on the moral-conventional distinction in moral judgment and discusses the implications for moral psychology research. Traditional research on moral judgment has considered both the evaluation of transgressive actions of others and the categorization of the norms on the moral-conventional dimension. Kohlberg, Piaget, and Turiel (1983) regard moral principles to be clearly distinguished from social-conventional norms and suggested criteria for the moral-conventional distinction. They assume that the moral domain should be specifically related to the value of care and justice, and the judgment for the moral transgression should be universal and objective. The cognitive developmental approach or social domain theory, which has been generally accepted by moral psychology researchers, is recently being challenged. In this article, we introduce three different approaches that criticize the assumptions for the moral-conventional distinction, namely, moral sentimentalism, moral parochialism, and moral pluralism. Moral sentimentalism emphasizes the role of emotion in moral judgment and suggests that moral and conventional norms can be continuously distributed on an affective-nonaffective dimension. Moral parochialism, based on the evidence from anthropology and cross-cultural psychology, asserts that norm transgression can be the object of moral judgment only when the action is relevant to the survival and reproduction of a group and the individuals within the group; judgment for moral transgression can be as relative as that for conventional transgression. Moral pluralism suggests multiple moral intuitions that vary with culture and individual, and questions the assumption of the social domain theory that morality is confined to care and justice. These new perspectives imply that the moral-conventional distinction may not properly tap into the nature of moral judgment and that further research is needed.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.9-17
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• 2021

This study test a situational action theory for explaining online download and upload digital piracy and examines the moderating effect of self-control and punishment. Then it tests the moderating effect of self-control in high morality and low moral rule environments and tests the moderating effect of perceived punishment in low morality and high moral rule environments. Using data from 317 college students in Seoul, In case of download, results show that self-control does not control the effects of high morality and low moral rule on it. In addition, it is found that perceived punishment does not control the effects of low morality and high moral rule on it. In case of upload, results show that self-control does not control but increase the effects of high morality and low moral rule on it, while perceived punishment controls the effects of high morality and low moral rule on it.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.32
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• pp.395-432
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• 2011

The purpose of this study is (i) to explore arguments of post-kohlbergian approach in moral psychology and; (ii) to analyze Blasi's and Lapsley's positions regarding the relationship between moral philosophy and psychology in terms of reflective reasoning and; (ⅲ) to suggest their's implication concerning the future development of moral identity theory. Moral identity theory has emerged as an alternative approach of the Kohlberg's moral development theory. Theorists of moral identity theory commonly criticize Kohlberg's theory as a philosophical psychology and insist the autonomy of moral psychology. However, one can find different positions within this trend, especially concerning he meaning and role of the reflection in moral functioning. Blasi emphasizes the importance of the reflective reasoning of moral agent, while Lapsley supports moral automacy contrary to Kohlberg's phenomenalism. Although Blasi had been negative about building moral psychology based on the moral philosophy, he has articulated the moral identity theory based on the concept of free will by Frankfurt. However, recently he criticizes intuitionist theory of Haidit and suggests the notion of the moral agent with the skill of reflective reasoning, or post-conventional thinking in Kohlberg's terms. Blasi's perspective of moral identity has two version. The one emphasizes the moral understanding which means strong evaluation, while the other refers to reasoning with weak evaluation. This leads to an inevitable inner contradiction within his theory of moral identity. Lapsley considers moral identity as a heuristic idea and suggests moral chronic as a new model of moral identity. This model is based on the social cognitive theory. His social cognitive model of moral personality provides the account for implicit, tacit, and automatic of moral functioning, while reflecting the core of moral identity. Lapsley suggests that moral function involves conscious and unconscious processes. The former occurs in normal situations of life, while the latter in rare and unusual situations. He does not highlight reasoning in moral functioning as Blasi do. In consequence, I will argue the notion of the moral agent with the skill of reflective reasoning, or post conventional thinking in Kohlberg's terms in the moral functioning like Gibbs and Turiel positions in the Journal of Moral Education' s 2008 special issue. Moral philosophy and psychology should be in complementary relations. It means we explore not only more interdisciplinary researches on the moral functioning, but also researches based on the moral philosophy.

• Journal of Christian Education in Korea
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• v.64
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• pp.145-171
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• 2020

Christian communities have long sought to find what type of moral judgment is appropriate and what the Christian behavior is, by taking the church's ethical norms and behavior patterns as objects of reflection. In the same context, Christian education also tried to base the psychological rationalism of J. Piaget and L. Kohlberg, but the reason-centered structural development theory was not the answer. In fact, the structural development theory, which emphasized autonomy while excluding emotions from the moral judgment process, over-emphasizing cognition or reason, eventually led to moral relativism, unlike what was intended. In addition, it was criticized for not being able to adequately elucidate the gap between human moral reasoning and behavior, and for attempting to interpret morality excessively within the context of social culture. Recently, these limitations of structural developmental theory have been reinterpreted by neuroethics, especially moral psychology theories, which claim that moral judgment ability is physically wired in the brain and relies heavily on networks between cortical and limbic system. The purpose of this paper is to review some of the newly emerged research themes of neuroethics, and then to discuss two main theories that explain morality in the perspective of neuroethics and the implications that Christian education should pay attention to.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.54
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• pp.221-242
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• 2017

How can Selfish people choose moral behaviors. Xunzi thought it can be done with Human reason. For him, people move for their own interest. So they must follow Yi(禮), if they understand the life that following Yi is better than following x?ngq?ng(性情). Xunzi' theory is going to meet following two problems. One, people do not choose Yi because heir selfish is the only power to do. Second, there is nothing to blame or punishment for violators because it is not the duty. I tried to explain with two solutions for Xunzi.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.116
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• pp.1-28
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• 2017

Axel Honneth's recognition-theoretical conception of morality is most often characterized as a teleological or ethical foundation of morality and understood in simple consequentialist sense. Besides teleological or consequentialist components, however, there are obviously Kantian deontological ones too in his moral conception of Recognition. This study is intended to provide a consistent and coherent interpreta-tion of it, which is largely adopting main features of the moral philosophy of Kant. This interpretation makes a deontological restructuring of Honneth's moral conception of recognition necessary. It is in this way that the moral aspect of recognition will be able to satisfy the intention and whole project of Honneth's theory of recognition.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.137
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• pp.131-149
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• 2016

The main purpose of this paper is to inquire into Johnson's defence of naturalistic ethics, and show how it could escape the intractable conundrum that has bothered moral philosophy ever since the early 20th century. Johnson shares the deconstructivist stance in claiming that moral theories are largely metaphorical constructs, and thus their claim to absoluteness is ungrounded. However, Johnson breaks with deconstructivist philosophers by offering a need for a constructive inquiry into "moral understanding." Then, Johnson's recent discussions are more concerned with moral fundamentalism in which he argues, is not only cognitively incorrect but immoral. It is incorrect in that it relies on the false assumptions on human cognition, and is immoral in that it shuts off any moral discussions. Instead, Johnson sees moral experience as a matter of moral deliberation in which we attempt "dramatic rehearsals" in Dewey's terms. Johnson's constructive offer in moral philosophy reminds us of "the size of moral theory," which fits human moral understanding as an embodied being, and this presents a third constructive way over the dichotomous conundrum of moral philosophy between traditional absolutism and nihilistic deconstructivism.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.11 no.11
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• pp.1-13
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• 2013

Every big online security breach seems to end in a big lecture. Thus, although a predominant weakness in properly securing information assets is the individual user within an organization, much of the focus of extant security research is on technical issues. The purpose of this study is to explain why insiders breach security policy by applying the moral disengagement theory. There are no consistent, widely accepted theories or theoretical frameworks in the literatures as to why insiders breach of information security, and therefore no clear, effective guidance on what to do to prevent employees from violating information security policy in organization. To do this, we theorize that moral disengagement may play a mediating role connecting stable individual differences to intention to breach security policy, because of some of the individual differences. We found that policy awareness and perceived punishment have a negatively significant effect on moral disengagement. However, negative affectivity has a positively significant influence on moral disengagement. Furthermore, moral disengagement has a positive effect on intention to breach security policy. Conclusions and implications are discussed.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Landscape Architecture Conference
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• 2015.03a
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• pp.27-29
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• 2015