• Title/Summary/Keyword: the military of north korea

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An Analysis of North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Strategy through the Clausewitzian Framework (클라우제비츠의 전쟁이론으로 본 냉전 이후 북한의 핵.미사일전략에 관한 연구)

  • Park, Ji-Sun;Lee, Sang-Ho
    • Journal of National Security and Military Science
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    • s.8
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    • pp.271-309
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    • 2010
  • The main theme of this study is about North Korea's contemporary military strategy which remained a blind spot in the 21st century. Indeed, Pyongyang's contemporary military strategy is evolved from the logic of War. On the basis of this logic, this study examined North Korea's contemporary military strategy with three analytical frameworks. The first is the discovery of Clausewitz's dictums and application of the Trinitarian analysis on the Korean cases. During the course of applying Clausewitzian main dictum--War as continuation of politics, the methodological analysis on war played a important role generalizing the pattern and matrix of North Korea's strategic thinking and military strategy. In particular, Clausewitz's Trinitarian framework on war -Government (reason), Army (chance), People (passion)- was a universal framework to scrutinize the North Korean missile and nuclear strategy. The second is about the matrix of North Korea's military strategy, The study suggested the genealogical feature of Pyongyang's military strategy. In principle, the dictum of 'Military-First Politics' 1S the combination of the political philosophy, Chuch'e (self-reliance) of Kim Il Sung and Kin Jong Il reflected in the military readiness. As a result this analysis was able to equate Clausewitz's dictums to explain Pyongyang's idea of the nature of war in that North Korea's military strategy is the central instrument of delivery to achieve political objectives. The third is about the theoretical encounter of 'Clausewitz's Wonderful Trinity' and 'Remarkable Trinity on North Korea's contemporary strategy'. On the basis, three elements are connected to one of three groups in society; the people, the military, and the government. In order to apply the Clausewitz's Trinitarian analysis into Kim Jong Il's 'Military-First' strategy, two case studies (Missile and Nuclear strategy) were examined. The finding of this study is that Clausewitzian dictum in the 19th century is still valid in the 21st century as it provided plausible theoretical framework to explain the North Korean contemporary military strategy with a reminder that the nature and logic of war are fixed in the socially constructed state.

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The lesson From Korean War (한국전쟁의 교훈과 대비 -병력수(兵力數) 및 부대수(部隊數)를 중심으로-)

  • Yoon, Il-Young
    • Journal of National Security and Military Science
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    • s.8
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    • pp.49-168
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    • 2010
  • Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.

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Comparison of North Korea's Military Strategy before and after Nuclear Arming (핵무장 전.후 북한의 대남 군사전략 비교)

  • Nam, Man-Kwon
    • Journal of National Security and Military Science
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    • s.5
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    • pp.173-202
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    • 2007
  • After successful nuclear tests Pakistan launched a more severe surprise attack toward India than before. It is highly possible that North Korea will adopt this Pakistan military strategy if it is armed with nuclear weapons. The North Korean forces armed, with nuclear bombs could make double its war capability through strengthening aggressive force structure and come into effect on blocking reinforcement of the US forces at the initial phase of war time. Therefore we may regard that Pyongyang's nuclear arming is a major one of various factors which increase possibility of waging a conventional warfare or a nuclear war. North Korea's high self-confidence after nuclear arming will heighten tension on the Korean Peninsula via aggressive military threat or terror toward South Korea, and endeavor to accomplish its political purpose via low-intensity conflicts. For instance, nuclear arming of the Pyongyang regime enforces the North Korean forces to invade the Northern Limit Line(NLL), provoke naval battles at the West Sea, and occupy one or two among the Five Islands at the West Sea. In that case, the South Korean forces will be faced with a serious dilemma. In order to recapture the islands, Seoul should be ready for escalating a war. However it is hard to imagine that South Korea fights with North Korea armed with nuclear weapons. This paper concludes that the Pyongyang regime after nuclear arming strongly tends to occupy superiority of military strategy and wage military provocations on the Korean Peninsula.

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A Study on Military Use of Infrastructure in North Korea (Focused on Road, Railroad, and Electricity) (북한지역 기반시설의 군사적 활용방안에 관한 연구(도로, 철도, 전력을 중심으로))

  • Son, Kiyoung;Kim, Heung Bin;Kim, Sang Ho;Park, Young Jun
    • Journal of the Korea Institute of Military Science and Technology
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    • v.17 no.6
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    • pp.836-843
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    • 2014
  • The infrastructure of North Korea has serious problems such as stability, usability, and durability because the facilities were built a long time ago. In recent years, the infrastructure improvement of North Korea has emerged as the important issue to preparing for reunification. However, there are no research institutions about the infrastructure in South Korea as well as the experts for operating or constructing the infrastructure. Therefore, the objective of this study is to propose the military use of infrastructure in North Korea by analyzing various data. The facilities such as road, railroad and electricity has been focused in this study. In the future, if the more specific data regarding condition and problems in each facility are collected, the more detailed military use of the infrastructure of North Korea can be suggested.

Military Load Classification (MLC) on Concrete Bridges in North Korea (북한 콘크리트 교량의 군용하중급수 평가)

  • Park, Hyo Bum;Kwak, Hyo Gyoung
    • KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
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    • v.37 no.3
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    • pp.513-520
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    • 2017
  • For the last 60years, North Korea has constructed a lot of roadway bridges with different standard from that used in South Korea, and since North Korea prefer to take advantage of train more than truck for long distance transport, the construction and maintenance of roadway bridges have not been constructed effectively. Upon these situations, an exact evaluation of the resisting capacity for bridges in North Korea has been required to check of any bridge can be used in time of war. This paper introduces an evaluation of bridges in North Korea on the basis of Military Load Classification (MLC). Three different types of concrete bridges are considered, and the numerical analysis and design calculation give the military loadings which can pass through the bridges in North Korea.

The role of the People's Liberation Army during the Korean War and Prospect of China's Role in the event of Contingency in North Korea (6.25 전쟁 시 중공군의 역할과 북한 유사시 중국의 역할 전망)

  • Choi, Kyung-Sik
    • Journal of National Security and Military Science
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    • s.8
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    • pp.169-238
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    • 2010
  • The year 2010 is the 60th anniversary commemorating the Korean War. China intervened in the Korean War with the logics such as "To Resist the U.S.'s Aggression and Aid North Korea," "Save Endangered Home & defend Nation," and "If the Lips Are Gone, the Teeth Will Be Exposed to the Cold or If One of Them Falls, the Other is in Danger." However, China had a deep and long connection with North Korea through 1st Chinese Civil War, war against Japan imperialism, and 2nd Chinese Civil War. China has consulted with Kim Il-sung on his invasion of South Korea at the initial stage of development and played a casting vote role in the execution of the invasion plan. During the Korean War, the PLA supported the North Korea's regime by its action, and made the Korea Peninsula divide into two semi-permanently. Even after the war, China continues to maintain relations with North Korea by helping North Korea build the Kim Il-sung's Kingdom. Currently, whenever any issue related to North Korea rises in the international society, China definitely gets involved in those issues and exercises its power. Conditionally 'either armed aggression or, and wartime' in North Korea, China would follow the "Clause of Military Auto Intervention." In addition, China is very likely to establish refugee camps for North Koreans in the Northeastern-Three-Province and to provide rear bases or guerrilla camps for pro-Chinese sects. Furthermore, voluntarily playing a role as spokesman of North Korean Regime in the international society, China will exercise enormous influence on the reunification of the Korean Peninsula.

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Study on Military Policy of North Korea (북한군사정책 특징 연구)

  • Kim, Sung Woo
    • Convergence Security Journal
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    • v.16 no.3_1
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    • pp.107-114
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    • 2016
  • The North Korean regime, Kim Jungun's foreign policy is changed frequently. And their military policy has no gravity. North Korea has developed nuclear weapons and long range missile. Now they have Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile. These activities redound a great threat in Korean peninsula. There are a no possibilities to give up its nuclear weapons and missile development. For the peace in Korean peninsula, we should make North Korea to abandon its nuclear himself through effective sanctions. Now China should effort to control North Korea. To reduce the threat we should coordinate the strategic interests of China and US. This study is to predict the North Korea military activities to analyze "military policies."

Directions of ROK Navy's Future Developments in Responding to Asymmetric Threats posed by North Korea (북한 비대칭 위협 대응한 한국 해군전력 발전방향)

  • Boo, Hyeong-wook
    • Strategy21
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    • s.40
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    • pp.190-215
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    • 2016
  • As North Korea's asymmetric threats are growing, there have been numerous discussions to find out effective counter-measures and many official plans and procurements efforts have been established. However, discussions on ROK Navy's roles in countering North Korea's asymmetric threats have been taken place very limitedly. Decision makers and military planners put enormous efforts in getting counter-measures, however, most of the options on the table are systems of Army and Air Force. This is true if one looks at components of Kill-Chain, KAMD, and KMPR. With worsening security environment of the Korean peninsula, it has been said by many commentators that ROK Navy needs to consider expanding its roles in countering against North Korea's asymmetric military threats. They asked ROK Navy to go beyond the mind-set that has confined Navy's roles in deterring North Korean naval threats. That is, ROK Navy should fight 'from the sea' as well as fight 'on the sea.' If ROK Navy begins to think about fight 'from the sea,' there would be many possibilities for the Navy to be a part of countering North Korea's asymmetric military threats. In order to pursue proactive roles in countering North Korea's asymmetric threat, ROK Navy needs to consider various options. Massive missile forces, nuclear-propelled submarines, naval special forces may be some of them. With those measures, ROK Navy would launch massive and decisive attacks from the sea without risking survivability of our forces. Considering North Korean Navy's weakness, it is very probable that sea would be safer place than ground or sky. Expanding ROK Navy's roles and being a proactive deterrent forces against North Korean asymmetric threats would provide very reliable counter-measures to South Korean military. Thus, military planners should think how to take the best advantage of expanded ROK Navy's roles and capabilities against North Korean asymmetric threats.

North Korean Defense Reform: Strategic Strength through R&D (북한의 국방개혁: 기술개발을 통한 전략적 역량 확보)

  • Yang, Uk
    • The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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    • v.6 no.4
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    • pp.209-217
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    • 2020
  • North Korea has steadily implemented defense reforms to strengthen its national defense capabilities, and in particular, has made military technology development and military industrial capability strengthening as the focus of national defense reform. North Korea's defense reform ultimately aimed at securing nuclear posture, and as technical achievements accumulated in the Kim Jung-Un era, it led to the development of military strength such as hydrogen bombs and ICBM/SLBM. Having secured nuclear capability, North Korea is also pursuing a symmetricality in the conventional military strength by securing a strategic advantage by pursuing the modernization of the conventional weapon systems through defense reform again. Up to now, North Korea's defense reform has succeeded in establishing a new ruling system for Kim Jung-Un and creating a driving force for negotiations with the United States.

The Influence of Watching Military Life Experience TV Program ('Real Man') on University Students' Military Image and Security Awareness (군생활체험 TV프로그램 '진짜사나이' 시청이 대학생의 군 이미지와 안보의식에 미치는 영향)

  • Cho, Sang-Hyeok
    • Convergence Security Journal
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    • v.16 no.7
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    • pp.147-158
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    • 2016
  • The purpose of this study was to investigate the influence of watching 'Real Man' program on university student s' military image and security awareness. For the purpose of the study, 392 university students in Seoul, Chungcheong and Jeolla were selected. With the collected data, factorial analysis, t-test, frequency analysis, one-way analysis of variance, and multiple regression analysis were performed through SPSS 21.0. First, according to personal characteristic and watching degree, there were differences in military image and security awareness. There were significant differences in rationality, coherence, familiarity, violence, authority among sub factors of military image and in perspective about policy towards North Korea, persepectives about North Korea, military threats of North Korea, security will among sub factors of security awareness. Second, military image of university students who watched 'Real Man' had an influence on security awareness. Military image had an meaningful influence on perspective about North Korea, military threats of North Korea, security will among sub factors of security awareness.