• Strategy21
• /
• 통권44호
• /
• pp.5-27
• /
• 2018

The purpose of this paper is to look at USN's efforts to rebuild its combat power in the face of a reemergence of great powers competition, and to propose some recommendations for the ROKN. In addition to the plan to augment its fleet towards a 355-ships capacity, the USN is pursuing to improve exponentially combat lethality(quality) of its existing fleet by means of innovative science and technology. In other words, the USN is putting its utmost efforts to improve readiness of current forces, to modernize maintenance facilities such as naval shipyards, and simultaneously to invest in innovative weapons system R&D for the future. After all, the USN seems to pursue innovations in advanced military Science & Technology as the best way to ensure continued supremacy in the coming strategic competition between great powers. However, it is to be seen whether the USN can smoothly continue these efforts to rebuild combat strength vis-a-vis its new competition peers, namely China and Russian navy, due to the stringent fiscal constraints, originating, among others, from the 2011 Budget Control Act effective yet. Then, it seems to be China's unilateral and assertive behaviors to expand its maritime jurisdiction in the South China Sea that drives the USN's rebuild-up efforts of the future. Now, some changes began to be perceived in the basic framework of the hitherto regional maritime security, in the name of declining sea control of the USN as well as withering maritime order based on international law and norms. However, the ROK-US alliance system is the most excellent security mechanism upon which the ROK, as a trading power, depends for its survival and prosperity. In addition, as denuclearization of North Korea seems to take significant time and efforts to accomplish in the years to come, nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence by the US is still noting but indispensible for the security of the ROK. In this connection, the naval cooperation between ROKN and USN should be seen and strengthened as the most important deterrents to North Korean nuclear and missile threats, as well as to potential maritime provocation by neighboring countries. Based on these observations, this paper argues that the ROK Navy should try to expand its own deterrent capability by pursuing selective technological innovation in order to prevent this country's destiny from being dictated by other powers. In doing so, however, it may be too risky for the ROK to pursue the emerging, disruptive innovative technologies such as rail gun, hypersonic weapon... etc., due to enormous budget, time, and very thin chance of success. This paper recommends, therefore, to carefully select and extensively invest on the most cost-effective technological innovations, suitable in the operational environments of the ROK. In particular, this paper stresses the following six areas as most potential naval innovations for the ROK Navy: long range precision strike; air and missile defense at sea; ASW with various unmanned maritime system (UMS) such as USV, UUV based on advanced hydraulic acoustic sensor (Sonar) technology; network; digitalization for the use of AI and big data; and nuclear-powered attack submarines as a strategic deterrent.

• 예술인문사회 융합 멀티미디어 논문지
• /
• 제5권6호
• /
• pp.583-591
• /
• 2015

벨트 구동 방식의 소프트 하이브리드 자동차에 적용될 TAS(Torque Assist System)의 성능을 평가하기 위해서는 가속 성능과 연비 성능이 기존 차량보다 우수하여야 한다. 엔진, 모터, 그리고 배터리와 같은 벨트 구동 TAS의 핵심 구성 요소들은 자동차 연비 성능에 큰 영향을 미친다. 따라서, 전체 시스템 관점에서의 효율을 향상시키기 위해서는 핵심 동력원들을 제어하는 동력 분배 알고리즘에 대한 연구가 필수적이다. 본 논문에서는 등가 연료 관점에서 통일된 해석 방법을 적용한 연료 소모량을 최소화하는 동력 분배 알고리즘을 제안하였다. 제안한 알고리즘이 차량의 상태 정보 및 요구 동력을 고려한 구속 조건을 만족하면서 엔진의 연료소모량을 최소화하는 제어 변수들을 통해 연비 성능을 높이는 데 기여하는 것을 확인하였다. 제안한 운전 전략의 최적화 과정은 연구 개발 과정에서 시행 착오를 줄일 수 있고 제어 변수들의 특성을 빠르고 정확하게 관찰할 수 있다. 따라서 연료 소모량을 최소화하는 운전 전략을 도출해내는 방법으로 활용 가능하다.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권34호
• /
• pp.58-92
• /
• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권33호
• /
• pp.65-112
• /
• 2014

Recent trends show that the PRC has stepped aside its "army-centered approach" and placed greater emphasis on its Navy and Air Force for a wider range of operations, thereby reducing its ground force and harnessing its economic power and military technology into naval development. A quantitative growth of the PLA Navy itself is no surprise as this is not a recent phenomenon. Now is the time to pay closer attention to the level of PRC naval force's performance and the extent of its warfighting capacity in the maritime domain. It is also worth asking what China can do with its widening naval power foundation. In short, it is time to delve into several possible scenarios I which the PRC poses a real threat. With this in mind, in Section Two the paper seeks to observe the construction progress of PRC's naval power and its future prospects up to the year 2020, and categorize time frame according to its major force improvement trends. By analyzing qualitative improvements made over time, such as the scale of investment and the number of ships compared to increase in displacement (tonnage), this paper attempts to identify salient features in the construction of naval power. Chapter Three sets out performance evaluation on each type of PRC naval ships as well as capabilities of the Navy, Air Force, the Second Artillery (i.e., strategic missile forces) and satellites that could support maritime warfare. Finall, the concluding chapter estimates the PRC's maritime warfighting capability as anticipated in respective conflict scenarios, and considers its impact on the Korean Peninsula and proposes the directions ROK should steer in response. First of all, since the 1980s the PRC navy has undergone transitions as the focus of its military strategic outlook shifted from ground warfare to maritime warfare, and within 30 years of its effort to construct naval power while greatly reducing the size of its ground forces, the PRC has succeeded in building its naval power next to the U.S.'s in the world in terms of number, with acquisition of an aircraft carrier, Chinese-version of the Aegis, submarines and so on. The PRC also enjoys great potentials to qualitatively develop its forces such as indigenous aircraft carriers, next-generation strategic submarines, next-generation destroyers and so forth, which is possible because the PRC has accumulated its independent production capabilities in the process of its 30-year-long efforts. Secondly, one could argue that ROK still has its chances of coping with the PRC in naval power since, despite its continuous efforts, many estimate that the PRC naval force is roughly ten or more years behind that of superpowers such as the U.S., on areas including radar detection capability, EW capability, C4I and data-link systems, doctrines on force employment as well as tactics, and such gap cannot be easily overcome. The most probable scenarios involving the PRC in sea areas surrounding the Korean Peninsula are: first, upon the outbreak of war in the peninsula, the PRC may pursue military intervention through sea, thereby undermining efforts of the ROK-U.S. combined operations; second, ROK-PRC or PRC-Japan conflicts over maritime jurisdiction or ownership over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands could inflict damage to ROK territorial sovereignty or economic gains. The PRC would likely attempt to resolve the conflict employing blitzkrieg tactics before U.S. forces arrive on the scene, while at the same time delaying and denying access of the incoming U.S. forces. If this proves unattainable, the PRC could take a course of action adopting "long-term attrition warfare," thus weakening its enemy's sustainability. All in all, thiss paper makes three proposals on how the ROK should respond. First, modern warfare as well as the emergent future warfare demonstrates that the center stage of battle is no longer the domestic territory, but rather further away into the sea and space. In this respect, the ROKN should take advantage of the distinct feature of battle space on the peninsula, which is surrounded by the seas, and obtain capabilities to intercept more than 50 percent of the enemy's ballistic missiles, including those of North Korea. In tandem with this capacity, employment of a large scale of UAV/F Carrier for Kill Chain operations should enhance effectiveness. This is because conditions are more favorable to defend from sea, on matters concerning accuracy rates against enemy targets, minimized threat of friendly damage, and cost effectiveness. Second, to maintain readiness for a North Korean crisis where timely deployment of US forces is not possible, the ROKN ought to obtain capabilities to hold the enemy attack at bay while deterring PRC naval intervention. It is also argued that ROKN should strengthen its power so as to protect national interests in the seas surrounding the peninsula without support from the USN, should ROK-PRC or ROK-Japan conflict arise concerning maritime jurisprudence. Third, the ROK should fortify infrastructures for independent construction of naval power and expand its R&D efforts, and for this purpose, the ROK should make the most of the advantages stemming from the ROK-U.S. alliance inducing active support from the United States. The rationale behind this argument is that while it is strategically effective to rely on alliance or jump on the bandwagon, the ultimate goal is always to acquire an independent response capability as much as possible.

• 안보군사학연구
• /
• 통권13호
• /
• pp.687-738
• /
• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.

• 안보군사학연구
• /
• 통권7호
• /
• pp.271-303
• /
• 2009

"Ubiquitous sensor network" definition is this-Someone attaches electro-magnetic tag everything which needs communication between man to man, man to material and material to material(Ubiquitous). By using attached every electro-magnetic tag, someone detects it's native information as well as environmental information such as temperature, humidity, pollution and infiltration information(Sensor). someone connects it realtime network and manage generated information(Network). 21st century's war is joint combined operation connecting with ground, sea and air smoothly in digitalized war field, and is systematic war provided realtime information from sensor to shooter. So, it needs dramatic development on watch reconnaissance, command and control, pinpoint strike etc. Ubiquitous computing and network technologies are essential in national defense to operate 21st century style war. It is possible to use many parts such as USN combined smart dust and sensor network to protect friend unit as well as to watch enemy's deep area by unmanned reconnaissance, wearable computer upgrading soldier's operational ability and combat power dramatically, RFID which can be used material management as well as on time support. Especially, unmanned watch system using USN is core part to transit network centric military service and to get national defense efficiency which overcome the dilemma of national defense person resource reducing, and upgrade guard quality level, and improve combat power by normalizing guardian's bio rhythm. According to the test result of sensor network unmanned watch system, it needs more effort and time to stabilize because of low USN technology maturity and using maturity. In the future, USN unmanned watch system project must be decided the application scope such as application area and starting point by evaluating technology maturity and using maturity. And when you decide application scope, you must consider not only short period goal as cost reduction, soldier decrease and guard power upgrade but also long period goal as advanced defense ability strength. You must build basic infra in advance such as light cable network, frequency allocation and power facility etc. First of all, it must get budget guarantee and driving force for USN unmanned watch system project related to defense policy. You must forwarded the USN project assuming posses of operation skill as procedure, system, standard, training in advance. Operational skill posses is come from step by step application strategy such as test phase, introduction phase, spread phase, stabilization phase and also repeated test application taking example project.

• 한국지구과학회지
• /
• 제26권6호
• /
• pp.489-500
• /
• 2005

본 연구의 목적은 중학생에게 과학사 자료를 활용한 인지 갈등 수업을 하였을 때 나타나는 ‘우주관’에 대한 개념 변화의 인지적 과정을 살펴보는 것이다. 연구 대상은 인지수준이 각각 상, 중, 하인 중학교 2학년 학생 남녀 4명을 표집 하였다. 매 차시별 수업 후 형성된 학생의 ‘우주관’ 개념에 대해 면담과 탐구 활동지 분석을 실시하였으며, 사전$\cdot$사후 개념 검사로 개념 변화 정도를 알아보았다. 연구결과 4명의 학생들이 가지고 있는 천문학적 선개념은 차이가 있었고 천체의 운동과 관련된 오개념도 다양하였다. 형식적 조작기와 전이단계 있는 학생은 과학사를 이용한 수업을 통하여 천동설에서 지동설로 개념 변화가 이루어졌다. 그에 비하여 구체적 조작기에 해당하는 학생의 선개념은 전반적으로 비과학적이거나 무개념 상태였으며, 인지 갈등을 일으킬 만한 현상을 제시하여도 개념 변화를 일으키지 못하는 등 과정에 어려움을 보였다. 이 단계의 학생에게는 새로운 자료를 제시하고 이를 설명하게 하는 인지 갈등 과정을 통하여 천동설에서 지동설로의 개념 변화를 일으켰다. 수업 처치 후 학생들의 개념 검사지의 성취도가 $10\%$ 이상 높아졌다. 이는 과학사 자료를 이용한 학습 지도가 과학적 개념 변화에 있어 효과적이라고 할 수 있다.

• 한국위성정보통신학회논문지
• /
• 제3권2호
• /
• pp.13-17
• /
• 2008

저궤도위성의 프로그램 운영의 목적에 따라위성의 탑재체를 외부에서 개발하여 위성 버스에 장착하게 된다. 이때 탑재체의 원격텔레메트리 시스템이 위성버스시스템에 설계된 기존 원격텔레메트리 형태에서 벗어난 새로운 형태를 가질 경우, 기존 원격텔레메트리 시스템에 이를 쉽게 반영하기 힘들었으며, 위성 전체 원격텔레메트리 운영 구조가 기형적인 형태를 가지게 되었다. 즉, 기존 원격텔레메트리 구조와 변경된 구조가 동식에 존재하면서 위성 시험 및 관리, 탑재소프트웨어 개발 면에서 여러 가지 어려움이 제기되었다. 따라서 탑재체의 원격텔레메트리 시스템의 변경에 유연하게 대응할 수 있는 원격텔레메트리 시스템 개발이 필요하다. 또한 저궤도위성의 성능이 고도화됨에 따라 텔레메트리 데이터가 크게 증가하여기존의 텔레메트리 운용 시스템에서는 이들을 효과적으로 수용할 수 없었다. 원격텔레메트리를 전송하는 단위가 고정된 그리드 (Grid) 구조인 텔레메트리전송 체계는 설계상의 오류 발생 가능성이 크며 설계가 진행됨에 따라 새로운 텔레메트리를 전송받기 위해 그리드 전체를 변경해야 했다. 그리드 방식에서는 Dump 데이터의 운용 역시 많은 제한을 받았다. 이러한 약점을 보완하기위해 최근 유럽에서 인공위성의 텔레메트리 운용에 이용하고 있는PUS (Packet Utilization Standard) 개념을 검토하여 차세대 저궤도위성의 데이터 처리에 이용하고자 한다. 이 개념을 바탕으로 기존 위성 텔레메트리 시스템에서는 제한적으로 사용되었던 Dump 데이터 전송 및 Event 운용을 위성상태데이터와 별도로 운영 할 수 있게 설계 하였고, 대량의 위성상태데이터를 효율적으로 운영할 수 있도록 Packet 단위의 위성텔레메트리 시스템을 설계하였다.

• 벤처창업연구
• /
• 제11권5호
• /
• pp.77-90
• /
• 2016

본 연구는 외식 프랜차이즈의 입지요인과 서비스 품질 요인이 고객만족에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지를 파악하기 위해, 외식 프랜차이즈 예비창업자들을 연구대상으로 제한하여 외식 프랜차이즈 점포의 이용자에 대한 선호도 분석을 실시하였다. 이를 통해 예비 창업자들에게 외식경영에 있어 보다 이익을 극대화할 수 있는 대안을 제시하는 것이 본 연구의 목적이다. 본 연구에 대한 가설을 검증한 결과 첫째, 외식 프랜차이즈 입지요인과 서비스 품질 요인의 영향력 검증 결과, 응답자들은 점포의 청결함과 가시성을 중시하는 것으로 나타났으며, 근접성 및 교통편이성이 통계적으로 유의하지 못한 이유는 응답자들이 가까운 외식업소를 주로 이용하므로 거리가 크게 문제가 되지 않은 것으로 판단된다. 둘째, 서비스 품질요인과 입지요인과 고객만족의 영향력에 대해 살펴본 결과, 고객반응과 신속정확성, 정확성 요인이 영향력이 높게 나타나 응답자들은 고객의 욕구와 필요에 대한 신속한 반응과 빠른 판단 그리고 업무에 대한 전문적인 지식으로 서비스를 제공해주길 원하는 것으로 나타났으며, 신뢰성에 관련된 요인은 고객만족과는 관련성이 낮게 나타났다. 셋째, 서비스 품질요인과 입지요인과 재이용의 영향력에 대해 살펴본 결과, 재이용의도와 구전의도 두 요인에서 고객반응과 전문성이 모두 통계적으로 유의한 결과를 나타내어 고객만족과 비슷한 통계결과가 나타나 고객만족과 재이용 모두 고객의 욕구에 대한 발 빠른 판단과 행동 및 전문적 지식이 중요한 것으로 파악된다. 이상의 연구 결과는 외식프랜차이즈 창업시 입지요인과 서비스 품질 요인이 고객만족에 미치는 영향을 살펴봄으로써 예비 창업자들의 성공가능성을 높여줄 것으로 판단하며 나아가 기존의 창업자들에게도 직 간접적인 영향 요소들에 대한 개선을 통해 목표이익의 달성과 이익극대화에 도움이 될 것으로 판단한다.

• 대한교통학회지
• /
• 제34권1호
• /
• pp.68-80
• /
• 2016

본 연구는 다양한 교통상황에서의 오르막차로의 안전성 측면을 고려하여 운영기준 수립 및 운영 알고리즘을 개발하고자 하였다. 교통량과 중차량 비율에 따른 시나리오를 설정하고, 미시적 교통류 시뮬레이션으로 구현하여 분석을 수행하였으며, 오르막차로 개폐여부에 따른 안전성을 평가하였다. 안전성을 평가하기 위하여 교통상충건수와 상충심각도를 평가지표(SSM:Surrogate Safety Measure)로 사용하였다. 분석결과, 서비스 수준이 낮고 중차량 비율이 증가할수록 교통상충건수가 증가하였으며, 서비스수준이 높고 중차량 비율이 증가할수록 상충 심각도가 높아짐을 보였다. 이를 바탕으로 교통 안전성 측면을 고려한 오르막차로 개 폐 기준 및 탄력적 운영을 위한 알고리즘을 제시하였다. 본 연구결과를 활용할 경우, 기존의 운영효율성 측면과 안전성측면 동시에 고려할 수 있는 효율적인 오르막차로 운영이 가능할 것이며, 교통사고 감소 효과도 기대할 수 있을 것이다. 또한 갓길차로, 공사구간관리 등 LCS 운영시 안전성 측면을 고려한 전략적 운영을 지원할 수 있을 것이다.