• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.201-212
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• 2009

This study analyzed the structure of pricing in the automobile auction market by using real trade data. We focused on the bidding behavior of bidders and the contract price of exhibits. First, we proposed a relational framework among exhibits, number of bidders, and the contract price. Next, we utilized a neural network model to estimate the number of bidders and the contract price. Subsequently, we investigated the relationship between the number of bidders and the contact price, and evaluated our method through an analysis that employed verifying data. Lastly, we listed our suggestions for bidding in auction markets.

• International Journal of Fuzzy Logic and Intelligent Systems
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.72-80
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• 2016

Re-auction happens when a bid winner defaults on the payment without making second in-line purchase declaration even after determining sales permission. This is a process of selling under the court's authority. Re-auctioning contract price of real estate is largely influenced by the real estate business, real estate value, and the number of bidders. This paper is designed to establish a statistical model that deals with the number of bidders participating especially in apartment re-auctioning. For these, diverse factors are taken into consideration, including ratio of minimum sales value from the point of selling to re-auctioning, number of bidders at the time of selling, investment value of the real estate, and so forth. As an attempt to consider ambiguous and vague factors, this paper presents a comparatively vague concept of real estate and bidders as trapezoid fuzzy number. Two different methods based on the least squares estimation are applied to fuzzy regression model in this paper. The first method is the estimating method applying substitution after obtaining the estimators of regression coefficients, and the other method is to estimate directly from the estimating procedure without substitution. These methods are provided in application for re-auction data, and appropriate performance measure is also provided to compare the accuracies.

• KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
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• v.31 no.2D
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• pp.247-253
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• 2011

In 2009, the Korean international construction industry showed a great performance, totaling 49.1 billion of contract and then this achievement has been considered a key milestone presenting that the international construction industry is one of the primary export industries of Korea. However, because of the construction firms' equalized levels of technology and price competitiveness, the competition among bidders is becoming more intensive. Moreover, this changing market circumstance leads construction firms to apply for bidding with the lowest price that could not meet the expected profitability of a project. Therefore, to develop various strategies based on project characteristics becomes one of the critical capabilities that construction firms should possess. Based on these motives, this study is aimed to investigate associations among number of bidders, contract award rate, profitability on international projects. For the correlation analysis, a set of data is structured by collecting all projects ranging from 1993 to 2009, excluding projects funded by official development and domestic funds. The number of bidders were grouped depending on project characteristics such as market regions, project types, bidding types, and order organization types. As the result of correlation analysis, contract award rate increases as the number of bidders increase, but the relationship between the number of bidders and profitability is negative. Understanding the correlations among variables can be employed in developing strategies to improve construction firms' competitiveness in the international construction market.

• The Journal of Bigdata
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• v.3 no.2
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• pp.87-99
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• 2018

This study analyze the factors affecting the number of bidders in public contracts by collecting contract data such as purchase of goods, service and facility construction through KONEPS among various forms of public contracts. The reason why the number of bidders is important in public contracts is that it can be a minimum criterion for judging whether to enter into a rational contract through fair competition and is closely related to the budget reduction of the ordering organization or the profitability of the bidders. The purpose of this study is to analyze the factors that determine the participation of bidders in public contracts and to present the problems and policy implications of bidders' participation in public contracts. This research distinguishes the existing sampling based research by analyzing and analyzing many contracts such as purchasing, service and facility construction of 4.35 million items in which 50,000 public institutions have been placed as national markets and 300,000 individual companies and corporations participated. As a research model, the number of announcement days, budget amount, contract method and winning bid is used as independent variables and the number of bidders is used as a dependent variable. Big data and multidimensional analysis techniques are used for survey analysis. The conclusions are as follows: First, the larger the budget amount of public works projects, the smaller the number of participants. Second, in the contract method, restricted competition has more participants than general competition. Third, the duration of bidding notice did not significantly affect the number of bidders. Fourth, in the winning bid method, the qualification examination bidding system has more bidders than the lowest bidding system.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.144-170
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• 2010

This paper considers the effect of various types of procurement auction system on competition focusing on the rate of successful bidding. We analyze the number of bidders and the rate of successful bids using online procurement data of the Public Procurement Service. The average number of bidders is 301 and the average rate of successful bids is 87.42% while the weighted average rate is 75.13%. These numbers show that there is quite strong competition among bidders and the rate is lower as the expected price is higher. When we analyze the data of price procurement auction, the rate is also shown to be lower as the expected price is higher. Furthermore, the rate decreases as the number of bidders increases which naturally makes the competition stronger. Meanwhile, the analysis finds that the inclusion of the onsite bidding, the PQ(Pre-Qualification) result, or major-10 winning companies cannot explain the rate much in our data. In case of turnkey-alternative, the average rate of successful bidding for 484 cases record 90.20%. The average is 84.89% with 120 alternatives and 91.97% with 364 cases of turnkey. The reason why the rate of turnkey-alternative is lower than that of price procurement auction is the lack of competition as well as the systematic difference. By setting up a model, we are able to explain the difference in rate caused by the respective reason. When we suppose there are 3 bidders in case of price procurement auction for a project that exceeds 100 billion won, the rate is expected to be around 64%. This implies that difference of 26% is caused by the systemic difference and 3% by the lack of competition. Therefore, we conclude that the difference in rate between turnkey-alternative and price procurement auction is caused mainly by the systemic difference. In case of PPP(Public Private Partnership) projects, among 154 projects in total, only 40% has more than 2 bidders that compete. The average number of bidders is 1.88 which is less than 2, and the average rate of successful bids is 90%. In sum, under the price procurement auction, there is strong competition which is reflected by the rate of successful bids. However, there is room to decrease the rate by strengthening the competition under the turnkey-alternative. Also with PPP projects, we expect the rate can be steadily reduced with revived competition among bidders.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.36 no.3
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• pp.61-93
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• 2014

This paper analyzes Onbid car auction data by employing various methods, including structural estimation, to identify main factors which decides auction prices and figure out what effects those factors are making on the auction price. I then discuss on how to maximize sellers' revenue in OnBid car auctions. The government and public institutes sell their assets through the OnBid auction, hence the optimal design of the OnBid auction is important. The paper's main findings are as follows: (ⅰ) The independent private value model explains OnBid car auction data better than the correlated private value model or the interdependent value model; (ⅱ) Both the number of bidders and the ratios of the auction price to the evaluation value were lower in the auctions posted by the Kamco than auctions by institutes other than the Kamco; (ⅲ) Some auctions require that at least two bidders should submit a bid no less than the reserve price for sale. In those auctions, both the number of bidders and each bidder's valuation on the auctioned object were lower than in auctions without that requirement; (ⅳ) The sum of sellers' revenue would be decreased in the simulation with the reserve price higher by 5%, 10%, and 20% across auctions by institutes other than Kamco.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.319-339
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• 1997

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the winner's curse in the context of corporate takeovers. The study analyzes conditions which make overpayment likely. For a sample of corporate takeovers completed between 1982 and 1993, the analysis shows that the volatility of targets relative to that of acquirers (not the uncertainty of the target or acquirer alone) has a definitive impact on the magnitude of the winner's curse. Also, the incidence is more pronounced in multiple-bidder than in single-bidder contests. Specifically, white knights are more likely to overpay than other acquirers in multiple bidding situations. Furthermore, the study finds that the process of competitive bidding is a zero sum game since the greater returns to the shareholders of target firms in multiple-bid contests come at the expense of the acquiring companies, Overall, the evidence suggests that the bidders need to become more conservative, particularly as the relative uncertainty of the target's 'true' value and the number of bidders increase.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.63-83
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• 1988

This study is concerned with the equilibrium bidding strategy and the optimal auction design of sequential auction with a reserve price and an entry fee. It is assumed that each bidder has a fixed reservation value and draws the reservation values of other bidders independently in the same distribution and may obtain at most one object to be sold. Under such assumptions, the sequential auction will be analyzed by the game theoretic approach. The purpose of this paper is, in the sequential auction, to find the equilibrium bidding strategy and to design the optimal auction under the equilibrium bidding strategy. The equilibrium bidding strategy and the optimal auction design are further analyzed with respect to change of the reserve price, the entry fee, and the number of bidders and objects. Specially, the auctioneer's expected revenue for each auction is obtained and analyzed.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.63-83
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• 1987

This study is concerned with the equilibrium bidding strategy and the optimal auction design of sequential auction with a reserve price and an entry fee. It is assumed that each bidder has a fixed reservation value and draws the reservation values of other bidders independently in the same distribution and may obtain at most one object to be sold. Under such assumptions, the sequential auction will be analyzed by the game theoretic approach. The purpose of this paper is, in the sequential auction, to find the equilibrium bidding strategy and to design the optimal auction under the equilibrium bidding strategy. The equilibrium bidding strategy and the optimal auction design are further analyzed with respect to change of the reserve price, the entry fee, and the number of bidders and objects. Specially, the auctioneer's expected revenue for each auction is obtained and analyzed.

• The Journal of Economics, Marketing and Management
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.33-43
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• 2021

Purpose: This study aims to verify sellers' economic incentives for voluntarily disclosing negative information in online markets and provide practical guidelines to online sellers in terms of whether, when, and how sharing low quality to buyers increase sales. Research design, data and methodology: Our model examines the number of bidders in Internet auctions to measure potential demand and uses count data analysis following previous studies that have also analyzed the number of bidders in auctions. After checking over-dispersion and zero-inflation in our data, we have run a Poisson regression to analyze the effect of sharing negative information on sales. Results: This study presents a counterintuitive result that low-quality sellers can increase their demand by fully disclosing negative information in an online market, if appropriate risk-reducing methods are employed. Our finding thus shows that there exists economic incentive for online sellers to voluntarily disclose negative information about their products, and that the context of transactions may affect this incentive structure as the incentive varies across product categories. Conclusions: As the positive impact of disclosing negative information has rarely been studied so far, this paper contributes to the literature by providing a unique empirical analysis on the impact of sellers' honesty on sales. By verifying economic incentives of disclosing low quality with actual online sales data, this study suggests practical implications on information disclosure strategy to many online sellers dealing with negative information.