Analysis of Contract Price in a B2B Automobile Auction

  • Received : 2009.03.31
  • Accepted : 2009.08.21
  • Published : 2009.12.31

Abstract

This study analyzed the structure of pricing in the automobile auction market by using real trade data. We focused on the bidding behavior of bidders and the contract price of exhibits. First, we proposed a relational framework among exhibits, number of bidders, and the contract price. Next, we utilized a neural network model to estimate the number of bidders and the contract price. Subsequently, we investigated the relationship between the number of bidders and the contact price, and evaluated our method through an analysis that employed verifying data. Lastly, we listed our suggestions for bidding in auction markets.

Keywords

References

  1. Dayhoff, J. (1990), Neural Network Architectures: An Introduction, Van Nostrand Reinhold
  2. Ikeda, K. (2006), Agent Theory and Online Auction. Communications of Operations Research Society of Japan, 51, 740-745 (in Japanese)
  3. Paarsch, H. J. (1997), Deriving an Estimate of the Optimal Reserve Price: An Application to British Columbian Timber Sales. Journal of Econometrics, 78, 333-357 https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4076(97)00017-1
  4. Paarsch, H. J. and Hong, H. (2006), An Introduction to the Structural Econometrics of Auction Data, MIT Press
  5. SPSS Inc. (2006), Clementine Advanced Modeling, Training Course
  6. Watanabe, Y. (2007), Estimating by structural positive analysis of price distribution in net-auction. MMRC Discussion Paper, 168, University of Tokyo (in Japanese)
  7. Yokoo, M. (2006), Principal of Auction Theory, Tokyo Denki Daigaku Shuppan (in Japanese)