• Title/Summary/Keyword: navy strategy

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Analysis of Military Capability Balance on the Korean Peninsula Using the Net Assessment Methodology With a Focus on South and North Korean Naval Forces (Surface Combatants) (총괄평가 방법론을 활용한 한반도 군사력 균형분석 - 남·북한 해군력(수상함)을 중심으로 -)

  • Han, Jung-kyeong
    • Maritime Security
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    • v.7 no.1
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    • pp.61-96
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    • 2023
  • Amidst the ongoing instability and military tensions between North and South Korea, it is essential for us to comprehend and assess North Korea's military capabilities, while preparing for potential contingencies through military reinforcement. However, to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the military balance on the Korean Peninsula, it is imperative to move beyond simplistic quantitative comparisons of combat capabilities and embrace a broader perspective, which includes qualitative comparisons of military strength, operational capabilities, and a nation's ability to wage war. To address this need, this study employs the method of "Net Assessment" to evaluate the relative combat power of South and North Korean conventional naval forces, with a particular focus on surface combatants. This evaluation involves both quantitative and qualitative comparisons of military assets (personnel and equipment) and intangible factors (naval strategies, geography, etc.). By conducting a holistic assessment, the research aims to identify and analyze strategic asymmetries that may exist between the two navies.

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A Study on Future Operations of the ROK Marine Corps in Island Area: From the Perspective of Sea Denial (미래 한국 해병대의 도서지역 작전수행 연구: 해양거부 관점에서)

  • Cho, Min Sung;Jung, Chang Yun
    • Maritime Security
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    • v.8 no.1
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    • pp.73-102
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    • 2024
  • The recent rise of China has the potential to intensify competition for hegemony between the U.S. and China. China is strengthening its influence in the region through maritime military actions represented by Anti-Access/Area Denial(A2/AD). The U.S. is establishing a new concept of operation to respond to China's A2/AD and achieve superiority in the U.S - China competition. In particular, this study focused on the U.S. Marine Corps' contribution to naval operations as a means of sea denial through Expeditionary Advanced Base Operation(EABO), which mainly centered on islands, and changes to strengthen its influence in the sea. By applying these changes in the U.S. Marine Corps to the ROK Marine Corps, the future direction of the ROK Marine Corps' offensive island area operations that can contribute to joint and naval operations was suggested. This study is meaningful in that it presents the ROK Marine Corps' offensive island area operations using the strategic value of the island from the perspective of sea denial. However, by presenting the direction of operational performance and military power construction / development conceptually, specific discussions of this aspect are needed in the future. I hope that this study will be the starting point.

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Nuclear Weapons and Extended Deterrence in the U.S.-ROK Alliance (핵무기와 한·미 핵 확장억제 능력)

  • Huntley, Wade L.
    • Strategy21
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    • s.34
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    • pp.236-261
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    • 2014
  • The future role of nuclear extended deterrence in the security alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea is currently a central concern. The gradually lessening role of reliance on nuclear weapons in US security policies broadly, combined with increasing North Korean nuclear capabilities and belligerence, raise fresh questions about the sufficiency of the "nuclear umbrella" as a pillar of the US-ROK defense posture. This article addresses the current and future role of nuclear extended deterrence in Korea in this dynamic context. The article reviews the longstanding trend toward reducing the overall size of the US nuclear arsenal, and assesses developments in US-ROK outlooks toward extended deterrence in response to the Obama administration's nuclear policies and North Korea's recent smaller-scale aggressions. The analysis finds that the challenges of deterrence credibility and allied reassurance are difficult and long-term. The analysis explains how these challenges emerge less from a shrinking US numerical arsenal size than from the sufficiency of specific nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to meet emerging smaller-scale threats. The analysis also highlights the importance of broader strategic and political interaction in sustaining allied confidence in any joint security posture. The evaluation concludes that a strong US-ROK alliance relationship can be maintained while the size of the US nuclear arsenal continues to decline, in part because nuclear weapons in any deployment configuration are relatively ineffective means for deterring smaller-scale aggression. Nevertheless, continuing adjustment of the US-ROK extended deterrence posture to the evolving, complex and uncertain Korean peninsula security environment will remain an ongoing challenge. Finally, the article encourages further examination of the potential specific role ROK maritime forces might serve in enhancing deterrence of smaller-scale threats while minimizing risks of conflict escalation.

A study on the guidelines for the Military Continuity of Operations Plan (군 COOP전략 지침 수립을 위한 연구)

  • Park, Chanyoung;Park, Seongsu
    • The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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    • v.8 no.1
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    • pp.291-298
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    • 2022
  • Unexpected massive disasters have occurred around the world, causing enormous socio-economic damage. The military has long been enacting laws, organizing organizations and establishing systems for crisis and disaster management, but it did not consider the situation when military essential functions were suspended due to unpredictable and massive disasters. With the September 11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. military has developed COOP strategy aimed at continuing military essential functions in all crisis, and is contributed to national continuity by ensuring uninterrupted national security functions. Korean military has established a crisis and disaster management system, but focuses on managing and controlling disasters and crisis situations. Korean military needs a system to guarantee military essential functions even in national crisis beyond its management capabilities. In this study, We compared and reviewed the U.S. administration and military COOP guidelines and directives, ISO22301 international standards., and developed planning guidelines suitable for the Korean military situation by responding to detailed items based on ISO22301. In particular, the U.S. military(DoD, Army, Navy, Air Force) COOP guidelines were drawn and incorporated into the guidelines(such as protection and succession of command authority, the fulfillment of essential functions and operational security, etc.). The planning guidelines are expected to be used as reference materials for the introduction of COOP systems in the military and the establishment of plans in the future.

A Study on the Balance of Power and Changes in Military Strength in Northeast Asia: Prospect of the Northeast Asian Security Environment in 2030 Based on the Balance of Power Theory (동북아시아의 세력균형과 군사력 수준 변화 연구: 세력균형이론에 기초한 2030년경의 동북아시아 안보환경 전망)

  • Kim, Myung-soo
    • Maritime Security
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    • v.3 no.1
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    • pp.73-114
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    • 2021
  • This study examines the distribution of power in Northeast Asia based on the balance of power theory, a representative theory of realism, assuming military capabilities as the core power of states. The results of previous studies on the balance of power and military forces are reviewed and used to analyze changes in the strength of the US, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea through 2020 to predict the security environment in 2030. In the balance of power theory, if the balance of power between a nation or a group of powers collapses, the possibility of war is high, and to survive in the international community with high uncertainty and distrust, the theory predicts that states must increase their powers in a self-help world and strengthen cooperation and alliance. Countries in Northeast Asia are also continuing to strengthen their military capabilities, and countries neighboring China are paying keen attention and remaining vigilant due to the rapid changes in the international security environment after the rapid rise of China. To mark the future 100th anniversary of the Chinese armed forces in the 2030s, China aims to realize 'defense and military modernization' and build a 'world-class military force' by the nation's 100th anniversary in the 2050s. The US is busy checking China's rise by strengthening international cooperation and alliances. The security environment and power dynamics in Northeast Asia are slowly changing as the US and China continue to compete for global hegemony. The changes and implications of the distribution of power in Northeast Asia after 2030 are examined based on the balance of power theory.

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Legitimacy of the wartime maritime blockade of the Korean Peninsula : Focusing on the response to ships in neutral countries (전시 한반도 근해 해상봉쇄의 합법성: 중립국 선박에 대한 대응을 중심으로)

  • Park, Hyun-rok
    • Maritime Security
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    • v.5 no.1
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    • pp.85-112
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    • 2022
  • The maritime blockade has long been used as a means of war in that it serves as a bridge for economic warfare by paralyzing enemy maritime transport, although it is not a decisive battle, and in the Korean War, U.N. forces have achieved significant results in the war with limited maritime blockade through the Clark Line. However, with China emerging as a maritime powers based on its strong naval power, there is a lack of consideration on how to set up a blockade to block maritime activities and how to respond neutral ships or carrying wartime contraband products if war breaks out again on the Korean Peninsula, In addition, since maritime blockade should be used as a sensitive and flexible naval force projection in that it has interests with neutral countries, it should be carefully reviewed in that it can be used only through careful and reasonable judgment considering the principle of ensuring the legality of maritime blockade Therefore, in this study, Reexamine the process of change in the application of the International Law of Blockade, and through this, Derive the basic principle of ensuring the legitimacy of maritime blockade. In addition, by reviewing the application of these basic principles in the waters off the Korean Peninsula at wartime, we presented answers to research questions by reviewing what needs to be done to neutral ships and ships carrying wartime contraband products, and considered the implications for us

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Strengthening International Collaboration for Counter-Piracy Efforts - Focusing on Counter-Piracy Operations Off the Coast of Somalia - (해적퇴치를 위한 국제공조 확대 방안 - 소말리아 해적퇴치 방안을 중심으로 -)

  • Kim, Duk-Ki
    • Strategy21
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    • s.31
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    • pp.251-293
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    • 2013
  • 해적은 공해상 해상안전을 위협 한다는 점에서 '인류공동의 적'으로 규정되어 모든 국가가 이를 규제할 수 있는 보편적 관할권이 행사되는 범죄이다. 한국을 포함한 아시아 지역 국가들은 말라카해협 통항에 관해 깊은 이해관계를 갖고 있어 해적 소탕에 대한 의지가 강한 편이다. 이러한 의지는 2006년 '아시아해적퇴치정보공유센터(ReCAAP ISO)'의 창설에 밑거름이 되었으며, 아시아 지역에서 해적이 출현하면 동 센터를 통해 17개국 회원국으로 즉시 통보되고, 주변국의 해경과 해군이 유기적인 작전을 통해 해적을 효율적으로 퇴치하고 있는 모범사례다. 그러나 2009년 소말리아 내란에 따른 무정부 상태가 지속되면서 소말리아 및 아덴만에서의 해적활동이 극성을 부리기 시작했으며, 선박납치 행위가 급증하자 세계 각국에서 함정과 항공기를 파견하여 해적퇴치 활동을 전개하고 있으나 근절되지 않을 뿐만 아니라 해적의 활동해역이 확대되고 있다. 이러한 배경 하에 시작된 본 연구는 연구결과를 중심으로 다음과 같은 대응 방안을 제시한다. 첫째, 소말리아 해적의 근본원인은 국가의 붕괴에서 비롯된 치안부재와 열악한 경제사정 등 내부적인 요인이 크기 때문에 다국적 해군 활동으로 인한 근본적인 해적퇴치에는 한계가 있다. 따라서 국제적인 차원에서 '지역협력협정'체결은 물론, 소말리아 국가재건을 위한 노력이 함께 이루어지는 종합적인 대책이 필요하다. 그러나 보다 더 근본적인 해결책은 유엔차원에서 빠른 시간 내에 소말리아가 정치적 안정을 유지할 수 있도록 정치적 차원에서의 지원이 필요하며, 해적과 테러리스트가 연계됨으로써 국제문제로 확대되지 않도록 하는 노력도 병행되어야 한다. 둘째, 해적문제는 특정국가에만 해당되는 것이 아니라 초국가적인 문제임을 감안하여 유엔안전보장이사회 결의 제1851호에서 '지역 센터' 설립을 권고하고 있는 것처럼 2006년 아시아 국가들이 설치한 ReCAAP ISO와 같은 형태의 지역국가 간 협력기구 또는 유엔 차원의 해적 전담기구를 설치하여 국제사회 공조 하에 해적에 대처하는 방안을 추진하는 것이 필요하다. 셋째, 최근 발생하고 있는 해적행위는 주로 항구 등 내수, 영해 등 연안국의 관할권이 행사되는 지역에서 발생하고 있어 유엔해양법상의 규정은 이러한 '해적' 퇴치에 더 이상 효율적이지 못하다. 국제사회는 이러한 문제점을 인식하여 국제해사기구 (IMO) 등 국제기구를 통해 영해내의 해적 처벌을 위해 최선의 노력을 기울이고 있다. 향후 궁극적으로는 유엔해양법협약의 개정을 통해 법적인 문제점이 개선되어야 한다. 넷째, 전술적인 측면에서도 지상에 기지를 두고 있는 해적들의 지도부가 그 동안 쌓아 놓은 네트워크를 이용하여 다국적 해군에 대한 정보를 수집하고 대응방안을 강구함으로써 나름대로의 생존전략을 구사할 것으로 예상된다. 특히, 선박을 납치한 후 소말리아 연안으로 이동하면서 해군함정과 대치하는 과정에서 해적들이 살상을 당하는 사례가 증가함에 따라 지금까지는 피랍된 선박의 선원을 단순히 해적활동에 참여시키거나, 항해지원을 위한 목적 등으로만 활용했는데, 앞으로는 해적들의 인명피해를 최소화하기 위해서라도 선원들을 방패막이로 활용할 가능성이 더욱 높아질 것으로 예상된다. 따라서 참가하는 해군함정 또는 부대간 해적들의 활동 관련 정보를 공유하는 등 사전에 정보를 획득하기 위한 협력을 강화해야 한다. 다섯째, 한국군함이 삼호주얼리호를 납치했던 소말리아 해적을 한국까지 대리고 와서 처벌하는 것은 불합리하고, 많은 문제점을 야기할 수 있기 때문에 향후 해적처벌을 위한 국제사법기구의 설치가 요구된다. 회원국 분담금으로 운영되는 유엔에 산하기관을 설치하여 소말리아 인접국에서 해결하도록 적극적인 노력을 경주할 필요가 있다. 마지막으로, 선박회사에서도 자국 선박이 위험구역으로 지정된 해역을 항해할 경우를 대비해서 선박자동식별 시스템 구축을 확대하고, 해적이 선박에 승선했을 경우를 대비해서 안전구역(citadel)을 설치하여 선원의 안전을 확보하는 등의 대책이 필요하다. 본 연구를 통해 해양안보는 어느 특정국가에게만 주어진 것이 아니며, 해적행위도 특정 국가의 선박을 대상으로 하는 것이 아니므로 각국 정부간 공동의 협력과 국제사회의 공조가 반드시 실현될 때 해적의 위협으로부터 선박의 안전과 국제사회의 평화가 실현될 수 있다는 것을 강조하고자 한다.

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Understanding Contemporary Interstate Rivalries: Consensus Rivalries and Rivalry Termination (숙적관계 국가들에 대한 연구 - 숙적관계 종식에 영향을 미치는 주요 요인들을 중심으로 -)

  • Oh, Soon-Kun
    • Strategy21
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    • s.32
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    • pp.222-270
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    • 2013
  • 서구 근대 국제관계학의 태동은 "전쟁의 원인"을 밝혀내려고 했던 유럽 지식인들의 학문적 도전에서부터 비롯되었다고 할 수 있다. 1, 2차 세계대전의 잔혹함을 겪으면서 이들은 전쟁(특히 전쟁의 원인)에 대한 좀 더 과학적인 연구를 통해 어떻게 하면 국가들 간의 전쟁을 예방할 수 있을까에 집중해 왔다. 이러한 학문적 경향을 반영한 것이 잘 알려진 미국 미시간 대학의 "전쟁 상관성 연구 프로젝트(Correlates of War Project)"이다. 이는 나폴레옹 전쟁이 끝나고 비엔나체제가 시작된 1815년 이후 국가들 간 발생한 모든 전쟁 관련 자료를 데이터베이스화하여,국제관계학자들이 전쟁(Interstate War)이나 군사분쟁(Militarized Interstate Disputes)을 정량 또는 정성적으로 연구할 수 있도록 다양한 정보들을 제공하고 있다. 최근 Paul F. Diehl, William R. Thompson과 같은 학자들은 전쟁을 분석단위로 하는 전쟁의 원인(Causes of War)을 연구하는 학풍에서 벗어나, 국가들 간의 분쟁과 전쟁을 연구하기 위해 숙적관계(Rivalry)라는 새로운 분석의 단위를 제시하였다. 숙적관계는 국제관계에 있어서 지속적으로 분쟁 또는 전쟁을 일으키는, 즉 무력분쟁의 긴 역사를 가지고 있는, 두 국가를 일컫는다. 국가들 간의 숙적관계는 학자들에 따라 Interstate Rivalry, Enduring Rivalry, Strategic Rivalry 등 다양한 정의와 성격을 갖고 있다. 이러한 국가들의 사례로는 2차대전 이전까지 프랑스-독일 관계, 2차대전 이후 중동지역 이스라엘과 아랍국가들 간의 관계, 냉전기 미소관계, 인도-파키스탄 및 남북한 관계 등을 예로 들 수 있다. 이렇게 널리 알려진 숙적관계 외에도 남미의 칠레-아르헨티나, 에콰도르-페루와 아프리카의 소말리아-에티오피아 등 학자들에 따라 1815년 이후 약 200개의 숙적관계를 제시하고 있다. 숙적관계에 대한 연구는 기존의 전쟁의 원인 중심이었던 정량적 국제분쟁 연구에 두 국가의 분쟁역사를 포함시키는 정성적 연구를 접합시키고 있다. 본 연구는 1945년 이후 숙적관계 국가들의 관계종식과 관련하여, 거시론적이고 전체론적 접근방법(Macro - level Holistic Approach)을 제시하고 있다. 먼저 1945년 이후 발생한 국가들 간의 숙적관계 종식(Rivalry Termination)을 이해하기 위해, 거시적 관점에서 숙적관계를 발생시키게 된 역사적 원인을 살펴보고 있다. 특히 1945년 이후 숙적관계와 관련된 중요한 요인들 중에서 전쟁, 영토분쟁, 그리고 근대국가 형성에 대해 살펴보고 다음과 같은 두 가지 명제(proposition)를 제시한다. 첫째, 1945년 이후의 숙적관계 형성과 지속에는 2차대전 이후 독립국가 형성, 헌팅턴이 주장한 제3의 물결(민주화), 그리고 냉전기 미소경쟁 등의 역사적 배경이 영향을 주었다는 것이다. 둘째, 이러한 역사적 배경에 더하여 1945년 이후 숙적관계는 전쟁에 의해 시작된 숙적관계와 전쟁 없이 시작된 숙적관계 등 2가지로 나눌 수 있으며, 전쟁에 의해 시작되고 영토분쟁과 근대국가 형성 문제를 내포하고 있는 숙적관계가 그렇지 않은 숙적관계에 비해 오랫동안 지속되며 관계해결이 어렵다는 것이다. 앞서 제시된 2가지 명제들과 관련하여 본문에서는 다양한 학자들이 제시한 숙적관계 정의들에 일치하는 23개의 숙적관계(Consensus Rivalries)를 선정하여 이들에 대한 비교분석(Descriptive Analysis)을 실시하였다. 이들 사례들을 1945년 이전과 이후로 나누어, 숙적관계 형성과 종식에 있어 핵심요소인 국가들 간 힘의 차이(Power Relations), 분쟁의 주요 원인(Primary Conflict Issue), 숙적관계에 있어 다른 국가들과의 연계성(Rivalry Linkage), 전쟁의 횟수와 시기 등을 통해 비교하였다. 숙적관계의 종식과 관련하여 약소국 간의 숙적관계(Minor Dyad)가 오래 지속되고, 영토분쟁(Territorial Disputes)이 숙적관계를 지속시키는 주요인이며, 다른 숙적관계와의 연계성이 적은 숙적들이 오래 지속된다는 비교분석 결과가 나왔다. 또한 전쟁의 횟수는 숙적관계 종식에 큰 영향을 미치지 못하지만 전쟁으로 인해 시작된 숙적관계가 그렇지 않은 경우보다 더욱 오래 지속되는 것으로 확인되었다. 끝으로 2차대전 이전의 숙적관계는 대부분 전쟁을 통해 종식되었지만, 1945년 이후에는 전쟁 없이도 숙적관계가 종식된 경우가 많았음을 보여 주고 있다. 본 연구의 주목적은 "1945년 이후 형성된 숙적관계를 어떻게 종식시킬 수 있을 것인가?"라는 규범적 논제를 통해, 23개의 주요 숙적관계를 발굴하여 거시적, 역사적 관점에서 비교분석함에 있다. 이는 특히 우리나라가 처한 현실과 관련하여 중요한 시사점을 갖는다. 남북관계가 갖는 특수성보다는 1945년 이후 국제정치 역사속에서 발생한 숙적관계 현상이라는 일반성의 틀에서 남북관계를 이해하고자 했다. 남북관계를 베트남, 예멘, 독일 등 분단국가의 사례들과만 비교 연구하는 제한된 시각에서 벗어나, 인도-파키스탄, 그리스-터키, 에콰도르-페루 등 유사한 숙적들 간의 관계들과 비교하는 새로운 연구의 장을 제시하고자 한다. 따라서 앞으로 숙적관계 종식에 대한 더욱 다양화된 사례연구를 통해 한반도 분쟁해결에 필요한 새로운 교훈을 얻을 수 있을 것이다. 예를 들면 2차대전 이후 발생한 국경을 접하고 있는 비강대국들의 평화적인 숙적관계 종식에 대한 사례연구는 남북한이 앞으로 지향해야 할 방향을 제시해 줄 수 있을 것이다. 끝으로 본 연구는 특정한 정책적 함의를 도출하기 보다는 숙적관계와 관련된 하나의 거시적 이론를 제시하고, 주요 숙적관계 국가들에 대한 비교설명을 통해 현존하는 숙적관계 해결을 위한 하나의 분석의 틀을 제시하는 것으로 국제분쟁 연구에 기여하고자 하였다.

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The lesson From Korean War (한국전쟁의 교훈과 대비 -병력수(兵力數) 및 부대수(部隊數)를 중심으로-)

  • Yoon, Il-Young
    • Journal of National Security and Military Science
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    • s.8
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    • pp.49-168
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    • 2010
  • Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.

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