• Korean Journal of Cognitive Science
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• v.29 no.2
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• pp.137-160
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• 2018

The present article reviews recent arguments on the moral-conventional distinction in moral judgment and discusses the implications for moral psychology research. Traditional research on moral judgment has considered both the evaluation of transgressive actions of others and the categorization of the norms on the moral-conventional dimension. Kohlberg, Piaget, and Turiel (1983) regard moral principles to be clearly distinguished from social-conventional norms and suggested criteria for the moral-conventional distinction. They assume that the moral domain should be specifically related to the value of care and justice, and the judgment for the moral transgression should be universal and objective. The cognitive developmental approach or social domain theory, which has been generally accepted by moral psychology researchers, is recently being challenged. In this article, we introduce three different approaches that criticize the assumptions for the moral-conventional distinction, namely, moral sentimentalism, moral parochialism, and moral pluralism. Moral sentimentalism emphasizes the role of emotion in moral judgment and suggests that moral and conventional norms can be continuously distributed on an affective-nonaffective dimension. Moral parochialism, based on the evidence from anthropology and cross-cultural psychology, asserts that norm transgression can be the object of moral judgment only when the action is relevant to the survival and reproduction of a group and the individuals within the group; judgment for moral transgression can be as relative as that for conventional transgression. Moral pluralism suggests multiple moral intuitions that vary with culture and individual, and questions the assumption of the social domain theory that morality is confined to care and justice. These new perspectives imply that the moral-conventional distinction may not properly tap into the nature of moral judgment and that further research is needed.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.137
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• pp.57-79
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• 2016

The purpose of this paper is to explain MacIntyre's critique of moral pluralism of modern society and reveal the limits of his critique of liberalism. It is a distinctive feature of the social and cultural order that we inhabit that disagreements over central moral issues are peculiarly unsettleable. Debates concerned with the value of human life such as those over abortion and euthanasia, or about distributive justice and property rights, or about war and peace degenerate into confrontations of assertion and counter-assertion because the protagonists of rival positions invoke incommensurable forms of moral assertion against each other. We usually call this situation 'modern moral pluralism' and concede as the natural outcome of the activities of human reason under free institution. But in After Virtue, MacIntyre vigorously criticizes modern moral pluralism. The main cause he took which brought about this state of affairs was the failure of 'the Enlightenment project'. According to MacIntyre, the Enlightenment project which has dominated philosophy for the past three hundred years promised a conception of rationality independent of historical and social context, and independent of any specific understanding of man's nature or purpose. But not only has that promise in fact been unfulfilled, the project is itself fundamentally flawed and the promise could never be fulfilled. In consequence, modern moral and political thought are in a state of disarray from which they can be rescued only if we revert to an Aristotelian paradigm, with its essential commitment, and construct an account of practical reason premised on that commitment. But one of the deepest difficulties with the argument of After Virtue is that the very extent of its critique of the modern world seems to cast doubt on the possibility of any realistic revival under the conditions of modernity of the Aristotelianism which MacIntyre advocates. Especially when we consider we are not only the characters found in our narratives but also we ourselves are the author of our own narratives. Moral pluralism is not seen as disaster but rather as the natural outcome of the activities of human reason under enduring free institutions.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.151-168
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• 2021

Misguided use, manipulation, misappropriation, disruption and mismanagement of Information deeply affects the infosphere as well as the social and moral fabric of a society. Information ethics is an attempt to bring the creation, organization, dissemination, and use of information within the ambit of ethical standards and moral codes. The diverse and inherently pluralistic nature of societies however puts forth an additional demand on us - to come up with an intercultural information ethics. An intercultural ethics which is other-centric, context sensitive and workable without being homogenizing, patronizing and colonizing. An endeavor in that direction has already been made by proponents of intercultural information ethics like: Charles M. Ess, Fay Sudweeks, Rafael Capurro, Pak-Hang Wong, Soraj Hongladarom et al. In our paper, we propose that the kind of ethical pluralism being sought in the domain of information ethics can be attained by having a reappraisal of the current methodological strategies, by casting a critical relook at the Eurocentric ethical model. This paper analyses the current framework of Intercultural Information Ethics. And in an endeavour to move towards an all-encompassing, other-centric, workable, intercultural, harmonious and compassionate model of 'Pluralistic Information Ethics', it proposes the Indian / Asian philosophical method of 'Samvāda' to the current inventory which includes methods like: 'parrhesia/free speech' and 'interpretive phronēsis.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.116
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• pp.437-464
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• 2010

The article, focusing on the theory of Zhong-He, sheds a new light on the philosophy of Daizhen. The theory of Zhong-He, according to the philosophical system of Zhuxi, serves as the theoretical foundation in erecting the apriori moral nature and guiding mental cultivation of subjects. Daizhen, on the contrary, criticizes the doctrine of Zhonghe in Zhuxi's philosophy as it produces negative side-effects of moral dogmatism. Zhuxi's doctrine, according to Daizhen, as it reduce the origin of morality to apriori condition of consciousness and delimit the range of cultivation to psychological realm of subjects, restricts moral subjects in the fortress of their own subjectivity. In this vein of his criticism, Daizhen attempts new interpretation on Zhonghe. The character Zhong (中), according to him, does not refer to apriori moral state or metaphysical moral substance as it does in the doctrine of Zhuxi. On the contrary, it denotes the state in which diverse existent beings are placed in their own position by their own dispositions. Similarly, the other character He (和) does not refer to the condition where an individual's consciousness is in equilibrium, but to the process of achieving the harmony of entire society in which diverse existent beings are communicating to each other. With his novel interpretation of the theory of Zhong-He, Daizhen could dissolve the tradition of Weifa (未發) and moral subjectivism in Zhuxi's philosophy and provide a way of establishing reciprocal communication and harmony between various individuals. It is in his ethics of rational mutual understanding where the significance of Daizhen's philosophy should be found.

• Korean Institute of Interior Design Journal
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• v.13 no.3
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• pp.43-51
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• 2004

1"his Study is to make research a Image and Symbol in the Gothic Architecture. Firstly, the concept of the symbol and the image effect are essentially based on the meaning that the activity of consciousness take on the constitution of the symbol. Therefore the image represent the deepest content of human nature has been imagination and reality. Secondly, the symbol concept showed in Gothic Architecture was associated with the passion of the order of middle ages. The world, the cosmos and the history had been revealed in Gothic architecture. In Gothic Image, Emile Male maintained the symbol of the Catholic Church as above mentioned. The Catholic Church was mirror of the natural, the institution, the moral and history, then this passion of the order was a christian order. Especially, E. Panofsky said that the scholastic method was shown in Gothic architecture. He assert that it was especially dialectic method used in theology. That is, he explained the transfiguration of Gothic Architecture with the process of thesis, anti-thesis, synthesis. These symbolize light, magnitude, clearness. Finally, symbolic image is important in Post-Modem architecture at present. Post-Modern architecture is associated with the public and the Pluralism. Post-Modern architecture attempt to communicate as symbolic language among the assumption for diverse aspect of culture.

• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
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• v.23
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• pp.153-192
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• 2014

This article's purpose is to overcome the inadequacy of deliberative democracy for communication on the basis of Haewonsangsaeng. The inadequacy of deliberative democracy for communication is presented as the following two. First, as deliberative democracy treats civic virtue as instrumental thing, deliberative democracy is still in moral solipsism. Second, as deliberative democracy doesn't consider 'the inequality of power' among diverse political positions, the project of deliberative democracy for communication ends up in the exposure of the inequality of power among diverse political positions. Sangsaeng in Haewonsangsaeng concerned with inter-relationship over individualism treats civic virtue as original motility. In this context, Sangsaeng in Haewonsangsaeng is the alternative notion to overcome the first inadequacy of deliberative democracy for communication. Haewon in Haewonsangsaengas is the condition for Sangsaeng. and Haewon's method is to exclude or to eliminate the structural frame of Sanggeuk meaning mutual conflict and antagonism. This article presents two structural frame of Sanggeuk. First, First structural obstacle as internal obstacle is suggested through analyzing pluralism on the basis of existential philosophy. The result of the analysis is the 'antagonism' between the hegemonical value and the peripheral value. Second structural obstacle as external obstacle is the extinction of public sphere caused by the growth of market and the expansion of bureaucracy.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.120
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• pp.109-130
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• 2011

The main purpose of this paper is to examine Putnam's recent conception of ethics, and show that it gives rise to an ineluctable incoherence with his rationalism. This suggests that Putnam's philosophy has to be far more naturalized to make his new position cogent. Putnam recently has shown some explicit turn toward pragmatism a la James and Dewey under the name of "pragmatic pluralism." Putnam says that traditional ethics has presupposed some form of ontology in one way or another, which he sees is based on an unnecessary pursuit of a misleading conception of objectivity. Putnam tries to get rid of any notion of ontology in ethics, whereby we can talk about a third view which runs between traditional objectivism and nihilistic relativism. In this sense, he defines pragmatism as "fallibilism cum antiskepticism." Putnam's suggestion makes a good sense as far as it goes. However, his continuous transition toward pragmatism is critically impeded by his own adhesion to the normative conception of "reason." In this light, Putnam himself is wobbling between Kant and Dewey, just as he describes ethics is. Dewey's pragmatism does not have recourse to the very notion of reason to secure objectivity necessary to make sense of moral experience. Putnam needs to be far more naturalized to reach cogently where he espouses, and this can be done only by renouncing the normative conception of reason.