• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.28 no.4
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• pp.999-1007
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• 2018

To implement crowdsensing system in reality, trustiness between service provider server and user is necessary. Service provider server could manipulate the evaluation of sensing data to reduce incentive. Moreover, user could send a fake sensing data to get unjust incentive. In this paper, we adopt private blockchain on crowdsensing system, and thus paid incentives and sent data are unmodifiablely recorded. It makes server and users act as watcher of each others. Through adopting smart contract, our system automates sensing data evaluation and opens to users how it works. Finally, we show the feasibility of proposing system with performance evaluation and comparison with other systems.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.13 no.3
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• pp.1481-1501
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• 2019

In opportunistic network, the behavior of a node is autonomous and has social attributes such as selfishness.If a node wants to forward information to another node, it is bound to be limited by the node's own resources such as cache, power, and energy.Therefore, in the process of communication, some nodes do not help to forward information of other nodes because of their selfish behavior. This will lead to the inability to complete cooperation, greatly reduce the success rate of message transmission, increase network delay, and affect the overall network performance. This article proposes a hybrid incentive mechanism (Mim) based on the Reputation mechanism and the Credit mechanism.The selfishness model, energy model (The energy in the article exists in the form of electricity) and transaction model constitute our Mim mechanism. The Mim classifies the selfishness of nodes and constantly pay attention to changes in node energy, and manage the wealth of both sides of the node by introducing the Central Money Management Center. By calculating the selfishness of the node, the currency trading model is used to differentiate pricing of the node's services. Simulation results show that by using the Mim, the information delivery rate in the network and the fairness of node transactions are improved. At the same time, it also greatly increases the average life of the network.

• Environmental Engineering Research
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.369-373
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• 2014

In view of the problem of the invalidity of the incentive mechanism of the ecological subsidies, which is due to the information asymmetry between the government's supervision and the enterprise endeavor to fulfill their ecological responsibilities, this paper attempts to analyze the supervision of ecological subsidies based on the Principal-agent Model. Two conclusions are drawn: firstly, the government's supervision regarding the effect of the enterprises' fulfilling the ecological responsibilities can significantly reduce the information asymmetry; secondly, the government's incentive strength and the enterprises' endeavor level of fulfilling the ecological responsibilities are both improving the surveillance dynamics. Here is the suggestion: with the increasing of the surveillance dynamics of the government and the transparency of the enterprises' fulfilling the ecological responsibilities, the government should meanwhile increase the subsidies incentive strength, therefore, to promote the effort level of the enterprises' fulfilling the ecological responsibilities to approach to the Pareto optimal value.

• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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• v.9 no.12
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• pp.321-332
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• 2020

Decentralized approaches are extensively researched by academia and industry in order to cover up the flaws of existing systems in terms of data privacy. Blockchain and decentralized learning are prominent representatives of a deconcentrated approach. Blockchain is secure by design since the data record is irrevocable, tamper-resistant, consensus-based decision making, and inexpensive of overall transactions. On the other hand, decentralized learning empowers a number of devices collectively in improving a deep learning model without exposing the dataset publicly. To motivate participants to use their resources in building models, a decent and proportional incentive system is a necessity. A centralized incentive mechanism is likely inconvenient to be adopted in decentralized learning since it relies on the middleman that still suffers from bottleneck issues. Therefore, we design an incentive model for decentralized learning applications by leveraging the Ethereum smart contract. The simulation results satisfy the design goals. We also outline the concerns in implementing the presented scheme for sensitive data regarding privacy and data leakage.

• 한국사회정책
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.69-96
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• 2013

This paper is to critically review the economic reasoning of non-sustainability of welfare state due to its intrinsic incentive problems and to see how the nordic welfare state responds to them. The welfare state as a political design of state to pursue equality has social insurance as its main economic function. It survives market failure of private insurance to contribute to human capital investment and industrial restructuring. The universal tax-financed welfare state, however, has the problem of tragedy of commons such as reduced work incentive and work ethics. But, the existing nordic welfare state overcomes it through employment-focused policy arrangements, maintenance of work ethics and benefits moral, incentive mechanism of wage-compression, public educational investment and its complementation with social security. The Nordic model shows that problems of incentive and moral are not about those of theory and reasoning, but about their reality which policies and institutions could respond to.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.9 no.1
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• pp.33-50
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• 2014

Though South Korea has world-class volume of Venture Capital Investment, as a share of GDP, early stage venture investments are still short, and investments are concentrated in high technology area and Capital area. Because of the high barriers to entry of the new IPO and M&A market, the venture capital companies undergo difficulties in profit. High-tech ventures face difficulties in raising money from outside investors due to information asymmetry between venture investors and venture companies. To resolve these problems, developed countries's government make a co-funding investment scheme with private sectors and design incentive mechanism such as receiving knowledge of the reputable investors' joint venture. Korean central and local government can benchmark those of things. For example, the expansion of the investment volume with private sector, region-specific matching fund and venture capital's exit path diversification such as M&A through the establishment of a business venture eco-system. At the same time, venture companies are to make an efforts to enhance the ability of screening for venture companies and the value for investment activities through a joint venture investments.

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.16 no.7
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• pp.137-148
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• 2011

Different from the traditional client-server model, it is possible for participants in a cooperative distributed system to get quality services regardless of the number of participants in the system since they voluntarily pool or share their resources in order to achieve their common goal. However, some selfish participants try to avoid providing their resources while still enjoying the benefits offered by the system, which is termed free-riding. The results of free-riding in cooperative distributed systems lead to system collapse because the system capacity (per participant) decreases as the number of free-riders increases, widely known as the tragedy of commons. As a consequence, designing an efficient incentive mechanism to prevent free-riding is mandatory for a successful cooperative distributed system. Because of the importance of incentive mechanisms in cooperative distributed system, a myriad of incentives mechanisms have been proposed without a standard for performance evaluation. This paper draws general incentive design considerations which can be used as performance metrics through an extensive survey on this literature, providing future researchers with guidelines for the effective incentive design in cooperative distributed systems.

• Journal of the Institute of Electronics and Information Engineers
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• v.50 no.6
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• pp.33-42
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• 2013

In the early stage of P2P, the technology was limited to narrow usage of file sharing, but currently, P2P technology has become essential to maximize the efficiency between associated technologies without additional deployment of high costly infrastructure and also the burden of the server. Especially, P2P media streaming service is a highly attractive service to mobile users. which requires a higher quality in the mobile environment in accordance with the development of technology of wired network as well as better mobile terminals. However, P2P technology should consider the trade-off between 'peer selfishness' and QoE for providing fairness. The P2P system also try to maximize the resource utilization through an incentive mechanism for service differentiation and encourage peers to contribute continuously for improving the overall system performance. In this paper, we propose an point-based incentive mechanism based on peer's contribution level and energy availability for service differentiation. We also introduce that the proposed mechanism efficiently enhances the system performance as the peer with incentive using contribution and energy obtains more effective resource distribution.

• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
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• v.10 no.10
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• pp.173-183
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• 2019

The purpose of research is to explore the direction of building a collaborative supply chain, which may enhance the competitiveness of firms and their project-based supply chain. Large-scale plants or large-scale buildings construction is referred to as a EPC project. To identify a collaboration mechanism in the project-based supply chain, the empirical research was conducted on the interrelationship between the absorption capacity of firms participating in the EPC project, the incentive norms, the goal congruence with supply chain, and the ability of respond to changes of the task of supply chain. PLS-SEM was used as an analysis method to verify the research model. It is expected that the results will help inform the need for SCM, the importance of the incentive norms and the goal congruence in the supply chain of EPC project.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.6 no.4
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• pp.973-988
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• 2012

Delay tolerant networks (DTNs) characterized by the lack of guaranteed end-to-end paths exploit opportunistic data forwarding mechanism, which depends on the hypothesis that nodes are willing to store, carry, and forward the in-transit messages in an opportunistic way. However, this hypothesis might easily be violated by the presence of selfish nodes constrained with energy, bandwidth, and processing power. To address this problem, we propose a practical reputation-based incentive scheme, named PRI, to stimulate honest forwarding and discipline selfish behavior. A novel concept of successful forwarding credential and an observation protocol are presented to cope with the detection of nodes' behavior, and a reputation model is proposed to determine egoistic individuals. The simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness and practicality of our proposal.