Browse > Article
http://dx.doi.org/10.9708/jksci.2011.16.7.137

Incentive Design Considerations for Free-riding Prevention in Cooperative Distributed Systems  

Shin, Kyu-Yong (Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Information Science, Korea Military Academy)
Yoo, Jin-Cheol (Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Information Science, Korea Military Academy)
Lee, Jong-Deog (Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Information Science, Korea Military Academy)
Park, Byoung-Chul (Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Information Science, Korea Military Academy)
Publication Information
Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information / v.16, no.7, 2011 , pp. 137-148 More about this Journal
Abstract
Different from the traditional client-server model, it is possible for participants in a cooperative distributed system to get quality services regardless of the number of participants in the system since they voluntarily pool or share their resources in order to achieve their common goal. However, some selfish participants try to avoid providing their resources while still enjoying the benefits offered by the system, which is termed free-riding. The results of free-riding in cooperative distributed systems lead to system collapse because the system capacity (per participant) decreases as the number of free-riders increases, widely known as the tragedy of commons. As a consequence, designing an efficient incentive mechanism to prevent free-riding is mandatory for a successful cooperative distributed system. Because of the importance of incentive mechanisms in cooperative distributed system, a myriad of incentives mechanisms have been proposed without a standard for performance evaluation. This paper draws general incentive design considerations which can be used as performance metrics through an extensive survey on this literature, providing future researchers with guidelines for the effective incentive design in cooperative distributed systems.
Keywords
Cooperative Distributed Systems; Incentive Mechanism; Free-riding; Design Considerations;
Citations & Related Records
연도 인용수 순위
  • Reference
1 M. Iza, G. Urvoy-Keller, E. W. Biersack, P. Felber, A. A. Hamra and L. Garcp-Erice, "Dissecting BitTorrent: Five Months in a Torrent's Lifetime", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 3015/2004, 2004.
2 D. Hughes, G. Coulson and J. Walkerdine, "Free riding on gnutella revisited: The bell tolls?", IEEE Distributed Systems Online, 2005.
3 M. Zghaibeh and F. C. Harmantzis, "Revisiting free riding and the tit-for-tat in bittorrent: A measurement study", Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applications, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 162-173, 2008.   DOI   ScienceOn
4 H. Wang, J. Liu and K. Xu, "On the locality of bittorrent-based video swarming", 8th International workshop on Peer-To-Peer Systems, 2009.
5 A. Sherman, J. Nieh and C. Stein, "Fairtorrent : Bringing fairness to peer-topeer systems", ACM CoNEXT''09, Rome, Italy, 2009.
6 K. Shin, D. S. Reeves and I. Rhee, "Treat-before-trick : Free-riding prevention for bittorrent-like peer-to-peer networks", IPDPS'09, 2009.
7 G. Hardin, "Tragedy of the commons", Science 162.
8 M. Piatek, T. Isdal, T. Anderson, A. Krishnamurthy and A. Venkataramani, "Do incentives build robustness in bittorrent?", USENIX NSDI'07, 2007.
9 D. Levin, K. LaCurts, N. Spring and B. Bhatta charjee, "Bittorrent is an auction: Analyzing and improving bittorrent''s incentives", SIGCOMM'08, 2008.
10 Ipoque, "ipoque internet study 2008/2009 finds web and streaming outgrows p2p trac", URL http://www.ipoque.com/userfiles/file/ipoque-Internet-Study-08-09.pdf, 2009
11 E. Zhai, R. Chen, Z. Cai, L. Zhang, E. K. Lua, H. Sun, S. Qing, L. Tang and Z. Chen, "Sorcery: Could we make p2p content sharing systems robust to deceivers?", P2P'09, 2009.
12 J. J. D. Mol, J. A. Pouwelse, M. Meulpolder, D. H. J. Epema and H. J. Sips, "Give-to-get: free-riding resilient video-on-demand in p2p systems", SPIE Conference Series, 2008.
13 P. Maymounkov and D. MaziItes, "Kademlia: A peer-to-peer information system based on the xor metric", IPTPS'02, 2002.
14 Gnutella, http://www.gnutellaforums.com/
15 K. Tamilmani, V. Pai and A. Mohr, "Swift: A system with incentives for trading", P2PECON'04, 2004.
16 M. Feldman, K. Lai, I. Stoica and J. Chuang, "Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks", EC'04, 2004.
17 S. D. Kamvar, M. T. Schlosser and H. Garcia-molina, "The eigentrust algorithm for reputation management in p2p networks", WWW'03, 2003.
18 B. Cohen, "Incentives build robustness in bittorrent", P2PECON'03, 2003.
19 M. Piatek, T. Isdal, A. Krishnamurthy and T. Anderson, "One hop reputations for peer to peer file sharing workloads", NSDI'08, 2008.
20 M. Sirivianos, J. H. Park, X. Yang and S. Jarecski, "Dandelion: Cooperative content distribution with robust incentives", USENIX'07, 2007.
21 L. Jian and J. K. MacKie-Mason, "Why share in peer-to-peer networks?", International Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2008.
22 S. B. Handurukande, A.-M. Kermarrec, F. L. Fessa nt, L. Massoulie and S. Patarin, "Peer sharing beh aviour in the edonkey network, and implications for the design of server-less file sharing systems", Eur oSys conference, 2006.
23 V. Vishnumurthy, S. Chandrakumar and E. G. Sirer, "Karma: A secure economic framework for peer-to-peer resource sharing", P2PECON'03, 2003.
24 B. Fan, D. ming Chiu and J. Lui, "The delicate tradeoffs in bittorrent-like file sharing protocol design", ICNP'06, 2006.
25 T. Locher, S. Schmid and R. Wattenhofer, "Rescuing tit-for-tat with source coding", IEEE P2P'07, 2007.
26 M. Feldman and J. Chuang, "Overcoming free-riding behavior in peer-to-peer systems", ACM Sigecom Exchanges, Vol. 5, 2005.
27 A. R. Bharambe, C. Herley and V. N. Padmanabhan, "Analyzing and improving a bittorrent network''s performance mechanisms", INFOCOM'06, 2006.
28 T. Locher, P. Moor, S. Schmid and R. Wattenhofer, "Free riding in bittorrent is 12 cheap", HotNets'06, 2006.
29 The bittorrent protocol specification, http://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0003.html, Feburary, 2008.
30 R. Landa, D. Grin and R. G. Clegg, E. Mykoniati, M. Rio, "A sybilproof indirect reciprocity mecha nism for peer-to-peer networks", INFOCOM'09, 2009.
31 S. Jun and M. Ahamad, "Incentives in bittorrent induce free riding", P2PECON'05, Philadelphia, PA, 2005.
32 M. Sirivianos, J. H. Park, R. Chen and X. Yang, "Free-riding in bittorrent networks with the large view exploit", IPTPS'07, 2007.
33 J. R. Douceur, "The sybil attack", IPTPS'02, 2002.