Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information (한국컴퓨터정보학회논문지)

Korean Society of Computer Information (한국컴퓨터정보학회)
권호 표지
DOI QR코드

DOI QR Code

Incentive Design Considerations for Free-riding Prevention in Cooperative Distributed Systems

협조적 분산시스템 환경에서 무임승차 방지를 위한 인센티브 디자인 고려사항 도출에 관한 연구

  • Shin, Kyu-Yong (Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Information Science, Korea Military Academy) ;
  • Yoo, Jin-Cheol (Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Information Science, Korea Military Academy) ;
  • Lee, Jong-Deog (Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Information Science, Korea Military Academy) ;
  • Park, Byoung-Chul (Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Information Science, Korea Military Academy)
  • 신규용 (육군사관학교 전자정보학과) ;
  • 유진철 (육군사관학교 전자정보학과) ;
  • 이종덕 (육군사관학교 전자정보학과) ;
  • 박병철 (육군사관학교 전자정보학과)
  • Received : 2011.02.15
  • Accepted : 2011.04.03
  • Published : 2011.07.31
Download PDF
⟨ Previous Next ⟩

Abstract

Different from the traditional client-server model, it is possible for participants in a cooperative distributed system to get quality services regardless of the number of participants in the system since they voluntarily pool or share their resources in order to achieve their common goal. However, some selfish participants try to avoid providing their resources while still enjoying the benefits offered by the system, which is termed free-riding. The results of free-riding in cooperative distributed systems lead to system collapse because the system capacity (per participant) decreases as the number of free-riders increases, widely known as the tragedy of commons. As a consequence, designing an efficient incentive mechanism to prevent free-riding is mandatory for a successful cooperative distributed system. Because of the importance of incentive mechanisms in cooperative distributed system, a myriad of incentives mechanisms have been proposed without a standard for performance evaluation. This paper draws general incentive design considerations which can be used as performance metrics through an extensive survey on this literature, providing future researchers with guidelines for the effective incentive design in cooperative distributed systems.

전통적인 클라이언트-서버 방식과는 달리 협조적 분산시스템 환경에서는 시스템에 참여하는 구성원들이 공통의 목표를 달성하기 위해 자신들의 자원을 자발적으로 제공하므로 참여자의 수에 관계없이 양질의 서비스 제공이 가능하다. 하지만 이기적인 참여자들의 경우 시스템으로부터 서비스를 제공받으면서도 자신들의 자원은 공유하지 않는 경우가 발생하는데 이를 무임승차라 한다. 협조적 분산시스템 환경에서 무임승차자의 수가 늘어나면 서비스 제공을 위한 시스템의 수용력은 줄어들게 되고, 종국에는 공유지의 비극, 즉 시스템으로부터 아무도 서비스를 제공받을 수 없는 현상이 발생한다. 따라서 성공적인 협조적 분산시스템을 구현하기 위해서는 무임승차 방지를 위한 효과적인 인센티브 메커니즘 개발이 필수적이다. 협조적 분산시스템환경에서 인센티브 메커니즘이 갖는 중요성 때문에 지금까지 수많은 종류의 인센티브 메커니즘들이 개발되어 왔지만 인센티브 메커니즘의 성능을 판단하기 위한 기준이 불분명하였다. 따라서 본 논문은 광범위한 관련 연구를 통해 협조적 분산시스템 환경을 위한 일반적인 인센티브 디자인고려사항들을 도출한다. 본 논문에서 도출된 고려사항들은 관련 연구자들에게 협조적 분산시스템 환경에서 무임승차방지를 위한 효과적인 인센티브 메커니즘 디자인을 위한 가이드라인 및 성능 척도를 제공할 것이다.

Keywords

References

  1. The bittorrent protocol specification, http://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0003.html, Feburary, 2008.
  2. B. Cohen, "Incentives build robustness in bittorrent", P2PECON'03, 2003.
  3. P. Maymounkov and D. MaziItes, "Kademlia: A peer-to-peer information system based on the xor metric", IPTPS'02, 2002.
  4. Gnutella, http://www.gnutellaforums.com/
  5. Ipoque, "ipoque internet study 2008/2009 finds web and streaming outgrows p2p trac", URL http://www.ipoque.com/userfiles/file/ipoque-Internet-Study-08-09.pdf, 2009
  6. G. Hardin, "Tragedy of the commons", Science 162.
  7. D. Hughes, G. Coulson and J. Walkerdine, "Free riding on gnutella revisited: The bell tolls?", IEEE Distributed Systems Online, 2005.
  8. S. B. Handurukande, A.-M. Kermarrec, F. L. Fessa nt, L. Massoulie and S. Patarin, "Peer sharing beh aviour in the edonkey network, and implications for the design of server-less file sharing systems", Eur oSys conference, 2006.
  9. V. Vishnumurthy, S. Chandrakumar and E. G. Sirer, "Karma: A secure economic framework for peer-to-peer resource sharing", P2PECON'03, 2003.
  10. M. Sirivianos, J. H. Park, X. Yang and S. Jarecski, "Dandelion: Cooperative content distribution with robust incentives", USENIX'07, 2007.
  11. S. D. Kamvar, M. T. Schlosser and H. Garcia-molina, "The eigentrust algorithm for reputation management in p2p networks", WWW'03, 2003.
  12. M. Piatek, T. Isdal, A. Krishnamurthy and T. Anderson, "One hop reputations for peer to peer file sharing workloads", NSDI'08, 2008.
  13. E. Zhai, R. Chen, Z. Cai, L. Zhang, E. K. Lua, H. Sun, S. Qing, L. Tang and Z. Chen, "Sorcery: Could we make p2p content sharing systems robust to deceivers?", P2P'09, 2009.
  14. K. Tamilmani, V. Pai and A. Mohr, "Swift: A system with incentives for trading", P2PECON'04, 2004.
  15. M. Feldman, K. Lai, I. Stoica and J. Chuang, "Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks", EC'04, 2004.
  16. M. Piatek, T. Isdal, T. Anderson, A. Krishnamurthy and A. Venkataramani, "Do incentives build robustness in bittorrent?", USENIX NSDI'07, 2007.
  17. D. Levin, K. LaCurts, N. Spring and B. Bhatta charjee, "Bittorrent is an auction: Analyzing and improving bittorrent''s incentives", SIGCOMM'08, 2008.
  18. A. Sherman, J. Nieh and C. Stein, "Fairtorrent : Bringing fairness to peer-topeer systems", ACM CoNEXT''09, Rome, Italy, 2009.
  19. K. Shin, D. S. Reeves and I. Rhee, "Treat-before-trick : Free-riding prevention for bittorrent-like peer-to-peer networks", IPDPS'09, 2009.
  20. M. Zghaibeh and F. C. Harmantzis, "Revisiting free riding and the tit-for-tat in bittorrent: A measurement study", Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applications, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 162-173, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12083-008-0013-7
  21. H. Wang, J. Liu and K. Xu, "On the locality of bittorrent-based video swarming", 8th International workshop on Peer-To-Peer Systems, 2009.
  22. M. Iza, G. Urvoy-Keller, E. W. Biersack, P. Felber, A. A. Hamra and L. Garcp-Erice, "Dissecting BitTorrent: Five Months in a Torrent's Lifetime", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 3015/2004, 2004.
  23. S. Jun and M. Ahamad, "Incentives in bittorrent induce free riding", P2PECON'05, Philadelphia, PA, 2005.
  24. L. Jian and J. K. MacKie-Mason, "Why share in peer-to-peer networks?", International Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2008.
  25. M. Sirivianos, J. H. Park, R. Chen and X. Yang, "Free-riding in bittorrent networks with the large view exploit", IPTPS'07, 2007.
  26. T. Locher, P. Moor, S. Schmid and R. Wattenhofer, "Free riding in bittorrent is 12 cheap", HotNets'06, 2006.
  27. J. R. Douceur, "The sybil attack", IPTPS'02, 2002.
  28. R. Landa, D. Grin and R. G. Clegg, E. Mykoniati, M. Rio, "A sybilproof indirect reciprocity mecha nism for peer-to-peer networks", INFOCOM'09, 2009.
  29. M. Feldman and J. Chuang, "Overcoming free-riding behavior in peer-to-peer systems", ACM Sigecom Exchanges, Vol. 5, 2005.
  30. A. R. Bharambe, C. Herley and V. N. Padmanabhan, "Analyzing and improving a bittorrent network''s performance mechanisms", INFOCOM'06, 2006.
  31. B. Fan, D. ming Chiu and J. Lui, "The delicate tradeoffs in bittorrent-like file sharing protocol design", ICNP'06, 2006.
  32. T. Locher, S. Schmid and R. Wattenhofer, "Rescuing tit-for-tat with source coding", IEEE P2P'07, 2007.
  33. J. J. D. Mol, J. A. Pouwelse, M. Meulpolder, D. H. J. Epema and H. J. Sips, "Give-to-get: free-riding resilient video-on-demand in p2p systems", SPIE Conference Series, 2008.