• 품질경영학회지
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• 제37권2호
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• pp.22-31
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• 2009

While large companies successfully manage incentive systems, small and medium sized companies have difficulties in successful management of the incentive system. In this article, we propose an incentive model fitted for the small and medium sized companies. To overcome the barriers, which are mainly due to lack of resources, we use the ideas of TOC and BSC. We also provide an application example of an actual company and examine the validity of our model.

• 한국국방경영분석학회지
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• 제6권1호
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• pp.79-92
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• 1980

In cost-only incentive contract the emphasis is the attainment of efficient and effective cost control. In contrast multiple incentives contract correlates contractor's profit motives with the generalized government objective function, the decision variables of which are performance or quality (technical progress), time or schedule (timely development and delivery) and the cost (efficient and effective cost control) Under multiple incentive structure, it is essential to formulate the trade-off curves between cost and performance, which are called iso-fee curves. Trade-off curves depict the combination of cost and performance achievement for which the contractor will be rewarded with the same fee. The basic function of trade-off curves is to show he the contractor will be motivated by incentive arragement to trade off or sacrifice the achievement in one incentive element for the acnievment in another.

• 한국도서관정보학회지
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• 제36권4호
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• pp.233-253
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• 2005

2002년 교육인적자원부가 발표한 "학교도서관 활성화 종합방안"에 힘입어 학교도서관 활성화에 박차를 가하고 있는 때이다. 이에 본 연구에서는 다양한 독서 흥미유발 프로그램을 통해 학교도서관 활성화를 꾀하고 있는 미국 학교도서관의 프로그램들을 국가적 차원의 독서 진흥책, 상업적 지원의 독서 흥미유발 프로그램, 컴퓨터 테스트를 이용한 독서 흥미유발 프로그램, 주 차원 그리고 각 학교의 독서 흥미유발 프로그램으로 나누어 소개하고 이를 우리나라에 적용할 수 있는 방안을 모색해보고자 하였다.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• 제14권3호
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• pp.248-274
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• 2015

This study discusses a contract to promote collection and recycling of used products in a green supply chain (GSC). A collection incentive contract is combined with a reward-penalty contract. The collection incentive contract for used products is made between a retailer and a manufacturer. The reward-penalty contract for recycling used products is made between a manufacturer and an external institution. A retailer pays an incentive for collecting used products from customers and delivers them to a manufacturer with a product order quantity under uncertainty in product demand. A manufacturer remanufactures products using recyclable parts with acceptable quality levels and covers a part of the retailer's incentive from the recycled parts by sharing the reward from an external institution. Product demand information is assumed as (i) the distribution is known (ii) mean and variance are known. Besides, the optimal decisions for product quantity, collection incentive of used products and lower limit of quality level for recyclable parts under decentralized integrated GSCs. The analysis numerically investigates how (1) contract for recycling activity, (ii) product demand information and (iii) quality of recyclable parts affect the optimal operation for each GSC. Supply chain coordination to shift IGSC is discussed by adopting Nash Bargaining solution.

• 전기학회논문지
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• 제67권8호
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• pp.1009-1018
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• 2018

As the generation of renewable energy increases rapidly, the stability of the grid due to its intermittency becomes a problem. The most appropriate way to solve this problem is to combine and operate the renewable generators with the ESS(Energy Storage System). However, since the revenues of operating the ESS are less than the investment cost, many countries are implementing various incentive policies for encouraging investment of the ESS. In this paper we estimated optimal capacity of the ESS to maximize profits of renewable energy generation businesses under the incentive policy of Korea and analyzed the impact of the incentive policy on the future electric power system of Jeju island. The simulation results show that the incentive policy has significantly improved the profitability of the renewable energy businesses generation business. But the volatility of the net demand has increased as the energy stored in the ESS is discharged intensively at the time of the incentive application.

• 한국항만경제학회지
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• 제27권2호
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• pp.355-372
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• 2011

동북아 물류중심지가 되겠다는 목표 하에 환적화물유치 증대를 위한 다양한 인센티브 제도를 실시하고 있다. 그러나 인센티브제도의 실질적인 효과에 대한 검증 없이 경쟁적으로 인센티브만 증가시키고 있다는 우려가 제기되고 있다. 터미널간 요율경쟁에 추가하여 지나친 인센티브경쟁으로 인해 가뜩이나 낮은 생산성을 가진 국내항만이 오히려 경쟁력 저하를 가져오지 않을까 우려되기도 한다. 따라서 본 연구는 부산항이 환적화물 유치증대를 위해 2004년부터 실시해온 볼륨인센티브제도가 과연 부산항의 환적화물 증대에 기여해 왔는지 분석하였다. 이를 위하여 기존의 연구들과 달리 각종 계량분석기법들을 적용하여 정량화된 분석을 시도하였다. ARIMA 타입의 모형과 공적분분석에 의한 장기균형모형을 구축한 후 모형의 예측치와 실제치를 비교함으로서 인센티브제도가 환적물량의 증대를 가져왔는지 검정하였다. 또한 인센티브제도의 도입이 모형의 구조변화를 가져왔는지 검정함으로서 인센티브효과에 대한 유의성을 확인하였다. ARIMA 타입의 모형들을 이용한 분석결과에 의하면 제도시행 7년간 총 100만 TEU 내외의 물량증가가 발생한 것으로 추정되었다. 한편 장기균형식을 이용한 분석결과에 의하면 7년간의 환적물량 증가효과가 총 50만 TEU미만인 것으로 나타났다. 한편 인센티브제도 도입으로 인한 구조변화를 검정한 결과 ARIMA모형과 장기균형식 모두에서 인센티브 더미변수가 유의하지 않은 것으로 나타났다. 즉, 인센티브제도의 도입이 부산항의 환적물량모형의 변화를 가져오지 못한 것으로 나타났다. 분석결과들을 종합해보면 다소 환적물량의 증가효과는 있었던 것으로 추정되나 모형의 변화를 유발할 만큼의 유의한 변화는 가져오지 못한 것으로 판단된다. 특히 부산항만공사의 막대한 투입비용을 고려할 때 그 성과는 불충분한 것으로 판단된다.

• 한국건설관리학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국건설관리학회 2007년도 정기학술발표대회 논문집
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• pp.1019-1022
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• 2007

최근 건설 프로젝트는 대형화${\cdot}$복잡화${\cdot}$고도화 되어 가고 있다. 이에 따라 비용${\cdot}$기능${\cdot}$품질을 최적화하기 위한 VE의 필요성이 강조되고 있다. 하지만 VE는 건설 분야에서 적용과정이나 방법상의 어려움으로 활성화 되지 못하고 있다. 건설 분야에서 VE를 활성화하기 위한 대안 중 하나는 인센티브제도를 도입하는 것이다. 인센티브 제도를 통해 발주자는 해당 프로젝트의 원가절감을 할 수 있고 시공자는 이윤 창출을 극대화 할 수 있을 것이다. 국내의 경우 지난 1992년 미국의 시공 VE 인센티브 제도와 유사한 '기술개발보상제도'를 마련하여 시공자의 기술개발노력에 대한 제도적 지원책을 제시하였으나 그 실적은 매우 저조하였다. 본 연구는 국내${\cdot}$외 건설VE 인센티브 제도를 고찰하고 건설VE 전문가를 대상으로 설문조사를 실시하여 국내 건설VE 인센티브 유사제도의 문제점인 '건설VE 인센티브 조항 및 기준의 미흡', '건설VE 평가자 및 전담부서 미흡' 등을 도출하였다. 도출된 문제점을 바탕으로 건설VE 전문가와 면담을 실시하여 건설 산업에 건설VE 인센티브제도를 도입하기 위한 방안으로 '건설VE 인센티브제도에 관련 법 및 제도의 개선', '건설VE 전문가 및 조직구축' 등을 제시하였다.

• 보건행정학회지
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• 제22권2호
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• pp.263-274
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• 2012

This study describes the hypertensive patients characteristics associated with the health incentive point program, and develops and analyzes a simple predictive model of participation in the program. Based on the Incheon Chronic Disease Management System(iCDMS), a model program of community partnership for hypertensive or diabetic patients detection and follow-up since 2005 in Incheon metropolitan city, a cross-sectional design was used in this study. An effective 10.844 adults sample was divided into groups according to participation in the health incentive point program and continuing treatment, and individual and health characteristics among groups were compared. Furthermore, the predictors associated with participation in the program were identified by the logistic regression analysis. After the health incentive point program in iCDMS was introduced, the number of hypertensive patients participation in the program increased 23.9 times which is vastly high given the various programs were provided. There were statistically significant differences among the groups: age(p=0.000), treatment compliance(p=0.000), and blood pressure control at the last measurement(p=0.000), in particular, between participation group(GroupI, n=246) and non-participation group(GroupIII, n=10,408). Furthermore, age over 60 years(OR: 0.33), treatment compliance(OR: 3.49~3.78) and blood pressure controls(OR: 2.13~2.30) were statistically significant predictors associated with participation in the program, based on the logistic regression analysis with GroupI and GroupIII. To increase participation in the health incentive point program, variables such as age, treatment compliance and blood pressure controls are more concerned. And, high-risk patients and family members need targeted health incentive programs.

• 한국디지털건축인테리어학회논문집
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• 제8권1호
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• pp.15-21
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• 2008

The district unit planning (DUP) in Korea is a planning instrument. One of the key methods is the incentive system focused on the mitigation of the financial charge of business proprietors with use of various planning deregulation. Here in this paper, it is examined whether the incentive system is indiscriminately applied not only in the metropolitan cities but also in the rural cities. The analysis is carried out with six indicators in relation to the effect on the incentive system on the market of Apartment Housing Development. The indicators are a. the building-to-land ratio(BLR), b. the floor area ratio(FAR) c. the publicly assessed value of land(PAVL), d. the sale price of land(SPL), e. the sale/lease price of apartment house(SLPH) and f. the ratio of housing subscription(RHS). The final result is that the incentive system has different effects between metropolitan cities and rural cities. One of reasons lies on the too high FAR in rural cities to be given basically. Another reason lies on the difference between the cost for purchasing public installation and the profit of the sale & lease price of apartment house. In rural cities their difference becomes much narrow. Finally, the low ratio of housing subscription(RHS) in rural cities makes the effect of the incentive system nearby meaningless.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• 제12권4호
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• pp.317-329
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• 2013

In recent years, for the purpose of solving the problem regarding environment protection and resource saving, certain measures and policies have been promoted to establish a green supply chains (GSC) with material flows from collection of used products to reuse of recycled parts in production of products. In this study, we propose an optimal operation of the GSC while considering the collection incentive of the used products and quality for recycling of used products. Two types of decision-making approaches are used for product quantity, collection incentive of used products and lower limit of quality level of reusable parts in the used products for recycling in the GSC. One is the decision-making under an independent policy in decentralized supply chains where a retailer and a manufacturer make decisions so as to maximize profits individually. The other is the decision-making under a cooperative policy in centralized supply chains where a retailer and a manufacturer make decisions cooperatively so as to maximize the whole system's profit. Additionally, we also discuss supply chain coordination as a manufacturer-retailer partnership based on profit sharing. Furthermore, we show the effect of the quality of the reusable parts on the optimal decisions. The collection incentive of the used products was found to bring more profitability to the GSC activity.