• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.13
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• pp.699-733
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• 2000

This article analyzes the state-of-play of WTO dispute settlement for first four and a half years. Remarkable points found on this analysis are as follows: First, the Quad consisting of the United States, the European Community (EC), Canada and Japan has participated in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism more frequently than any other WTO member. Second, among developing country members some leading countries such as Korea, Brazil and India have relied actively upon the mechanism to claim and defend their rights and obligations under the WTO rules. Third, bilateral dispute settlements generally have been preferred to multilateral dispute settlements by the panel or Appellate Body. Fourth, observation of the Appellate Body proceedings well shows WTO members' strategy to use every process available to them. Fifth, the provisions of GATT 1994 have been most frequently invoked by the members. GATS and TRIPS Agreement disputes are mainly involved in developed countries, in particular the U.S. and the EC. Sixth, very high winning ratio in the panel and Appellate Body process indicates that complaining parties review the possibility to get favorable rulings even before referring to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and prepare for the case very thoroughly. Seventh, roughly speaking, disputes were settled within two or three years. Therefore, seeking bilateral dispute settlement can be more advantageous to a complaining party than referring to a panel or an arbitrator because of low costs and short time period in dispute settlement. Finally, the DSB approved retaliatory actions for winning complaining parties against the defending parties who had rejected implementation of its rulings and recommendations. In conclusion, it can be said that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has been operated very successfully for the first four and a half years. It is hoped that continued study on state-of-play of WTO dispute settlement mechanism will be contributory to improved national interest of Korea.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.27 no.4
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• pp.157-177
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• 2017

World Trade Organization(WTO) has 164 members since it has established on 1995. It plays a significant role in solving the world trade disputes. The process of the dispute settlement mechanism includes five steps: Negotiation, Establishment of experts group, Deliberation of appellate body, Execution and Supervision of Verdict and the Sanctions for Default. It suggested that the higher rate of developed countries using mechanism to solving the disputes than developing countries solving disputes by mechanism through the analysis of dispute of WTO members. Meanwhile, the more powerful economic entity is, the more trade dispute will be. There are several problems of mechanism by analysis the recently famous cases of trade disputes: Overburden of experts panel, Low utilization rate of the mechanism of developing countries, Lack of economic competition policy and labor standard terms and Unfulfillment of retaliatory measures of developing countries towards developed countries. This paper propose proper solutions and advises to improve mechanism of WTO dispute settlement.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.45 no.2
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• pp.177-189
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• 2020

The dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is in great peril. The Appellate Body has ceased to function last December as the United States has blocked the appointment of new Appellate Body members since 2017. The focus of this study is on the examination of US's discontent on the Appellate Body and various efforts to reform the Appellate Body. In a recent report, the US Trade Representative raises its concerns on the Appellate Body including 90 days mandatory deadline, transitional rules for outgoing Appellate Body members, scope of appeal, advisory opinions, precedent, recommendation, and overreach without offering any viable solutions. Some of WTO members and experts proposed several Appellate Body reform measures but agreement between WTO members is unlikely in a foreseeable future. Alternative dispute settlement mechanisms should be seriously considered such as interim appeal arbitration arrangements, separate dispute settlement mechanisms for trade remedies, unilateral retaliatory measures without WTO authorization. Rules-based multilateral dispute settlement system is imperative to small open economies like Korea. The Korean government should actively participate in Appellate Body reform discussions with other WTO members to keep the WTO dispute settlement system from collapsing.

• International Area Studies Review
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.618-642
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• 2009

Currently the nations which join the WTO shall observe understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes in WTO agreement. In addition this agreement provides it will be able to apply dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO. Korea and the United States are accomplishing an important role as the core members of the WTO. Regardless of this, The Korea - US FTA is providing a separate dispute settlement system. This paper pursues a comparative analysis concerning rules and procedures of dispute settlement between The Korea - US FTA and the WTO, and furthermore derives problems from the viewpoint of effectiveness, and suggests alternatives and implications in view of trade policy. I hope this study contributes to setting-up and development of national trade policy and is applied to FTA negotiation hereafter.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• v.44 no.2
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• pp.147-160
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• 2022

SRFC (Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission) requested to the ITLOS (International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea) an advisory opinion relating to the IUU (Illegl, Unreported, and Unregulated) fishing (Case No-21 of the ITLOS). Since, in the UNCLOS, there is no article authorizing the jurisdiction of the ITLOS full court's Advisory opinion, so various scholarly opinion wad divided. But ITLOS delivered its Advisory opinion confirming its jurisdictional competence over the Advisory proceedings with its legal opinion about the IUU issues. It opens new possibility of the alternative dispute settlement mechanism of the ITLOS through the advisory procedures. In reality, there has been a view that ICJ (International Court of Justice) could take the part of a kind of dispute settlement through its Advisory procedures. But the advisory procedures of the ITLOS, with no definite clause in UNCLOS about the advisory procedures, which provides more allowances for the function of advisory opinion as the alternative dispute settlement mechanism. ITLOS accepted the requests of the advisory opinion by the State parties through international organization or themselves directly. And the advisory opinion of the ITLOS aims the interpretation and application into the special issues-specially IUU fishing in Case No. 21 of the ITLOS-. Those factors could enable more enhanced role of the ITLOS as an alternative dispute settlement mechanism. But those possibility has contain risk of excessive and unlimited advisory role of the ITLOS. So it is important to focus on the restriction on the role of the State parties in the request of the advisory opinion to the ITLOS. In this regard it is meaningful that the ITLOS has suggested a kind of legal standing in the advisory procedures in that only coastal States could request the Advisory opinion about the IUU in their EEZ. Furthermore the discretionary power of the ITLOS in the Article 138 of the Rules of the Tribunal could curtail the abuse of the Advisory opinion initiated by the States parties of the UNCLOS. Under this framework, Advisory opinion could broaden more alternative option to the disputes between State parties of the UNCLOS in that after being delivered detailed interpretation of the UNCLOS about the specific issues, States parties could devote themselves to searching for flexible solution for the disputes between State parties. It could obtain legal explanation about the dispute under the Article 297 and Article 298 by detouring the jurisdiction limits through advisory procedures.

• International Area Studies Review
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.3-21
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• 2018

The WTO was established in 1995 as an organization which protects and promotes free trade among its members. However, since about this time they have signed many bilateral and multilateral FTAs and joined many other new international agreements and organizations, the purpose of which at times overlaps with that of the WTO. Some existing works on international organizations contend that these FTAs and many other IOs could weaken the role of the WTO as a promoter of free trade. However, the results of regression analyses on the use of the WTO do not support this argument, but show that the experiences of WTO members in these FTAs and many other IOs help them to use its dispute settlement mechanism more frequently

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.68
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• pp.89-121
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• 2015

Investor-State Dispute Settlement(ISDS) grants a foreign investor the right to access an international arbitrator, if he believes actions taken by a host government are in breach of commitments made in an investment agreement or an investment treaty. The arbitration procedure of ICSID is made specifically to resolve investment disputes, so most of investment disputes have been settled in accordance with the procedure. Owing to limitation of dispute settlements through the ICSID arbitration procedure, several investment dispute conciliation schemes have been emerged as alternatives. In the case of a conciliation, the conciliation procedure will be in progress based on arbitrary agreement between parties, and if both parties agree on a conciliation program, then the arbitrary execution rate is relatively higher than that of arbitration procedures. In addition, it is evaluated that the time duration of conducting a conciliation procedure is in general rather short in 8 to 24months, and its incumbent cost is also rather inexpensive. Most of all, through amicable settlement of a dispute between a foreign investor and a host state, the foreign investor may continue his investment activities without a hitch, while the host state may invite more investment without any risk of losing its external credibility. In conclusion, it is desirable to lead any investment dispute between a foreign investor and a host state settle in accordance with the dispute settlement procedure as specified in the relevant investment agreement. In addition, to make the foreign investor continue his investment activities, it will be necessary to provide a separate investment dispute conciliation system aside from such arbitration procedures to cope any unexpected incident flexibly.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.4 no.1
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• pp.1-22
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• 1994

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.47 no.5
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• pp.273-288
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• 2022

This study first classifies and organizes provisions on institutional arrangements (or IAs) and dispute settlement mechanism(or DSM) in a digital trade agreement. Then it conducts a case study on seven major digital trade agreements: the CPTPP, the USJDTA, the USMCA, the ASDEA, the RCEP, the KSDPA, and the DEPA. And it finally derives implications for Korea to improve implementation of DTAs by communicating better and resolving disputes efficiently with the help of IAs and DSM-related provisions. IAs of a digital trade agreement can be defined as a set of agreements on the division of the respective responsibilities of agencies involved in implementing and enforcing the agreement, including committees, working groups, or contact points. DSM of a digital trade agreement includes consultation, mediation, arbitration, and establishment of a panel. Comparing six FTAs with an e-commerce chapter, the CPTPP, the USMCA, and the RCEP contain the most advanced type of IA provisions while the CPTPP, the USMCA, the RCEP, and the KSDPA have that of DSM provisions. Korea is its initial stage as it has only signed the KSDPA with Singapore as well as it is about to launch a new digital trade negotiation for the DEPA, the CPTPP, and even the IPEF, it is necessary to engage in negotiations with a clearer position on behalf of Korean digital companies. As provisions on IAs and DSM are important policy tools that can reflect industry concerns and convey proposals in inter-governmental dialogue, a Korean draft of the IAs and DSM-related provision should be prepared in advance.

• Current Industrial and Technological Trends in Aerospace
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• v.6 no.2
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• pp.11-21
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• 2008

This paper focuses on finding the way of aerospace industry promotion in Korea compatible with fair trade system under international rules by considering and analysing the WTO subsidy rules and WTO dispute settlement cases. As for subsidy rules in WTO, the paper deals with two matters such as financial contribution and benefit and further studies provisions on the prohibited subsidies and actionable subsidies. And as for the dispute settlement matters, it reviews the Brazil-Canada case and the US-EC case on civil aircraft export subsidies. While aerospace industry in Korea is not yet internationally competitive still requiring government's continuous supports, it must not be in conflict with subsidy rules under WTO mechanism. This paper makes several suggestions to meet these conditions.