• Journal of the Korea Institute of Military Science and Technology
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• v.18 no.3
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• pp.335-342
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• 2015

Laboratory facilities for biology are designed as biosafety level 1, biosafety level 2, biosafety level 3, and biosafety level 4. Biosafety level designations are based on a composite of the design features, construction, containment facilities, equipment, practice and operation procedures required for working with agents from the various risk groups. Generally, biosafety level 3 means the facility that is appropriate for the experiments using pathogens which can cause serious diseases by aerosol transmission. The biosafety level assigned for the specific work to be done is driven by professional judgement based on a risk assessment, rather than by automatic assignment according to the particular risk group designation of the pathogenic agents to be used. In this paper, we introduced the biosafety level 3 facility operated in ADD(Agency for defense development). It contains the overview of facility, microbiological experiment, animal experiment, decontamination and waste disposal. Biosafety level 3 laboratory in ADD has served the vital role in the research of biological agents and antidote development.

• Proceedings of the SAREK Conference
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• 2009.06a
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• pp.887-892
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• 2009

Biosafety research facilities require to verified about the facility and experimental environment, especially for level-3 and level-4 of biosafety research facilities verification is very important. In this paper, introduce verified procedures and present the methods and the results through a verified case of the biosafety level-3 research facilities.

• Korean Journal of Clinical Laboratory Science
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• v.50 no.2
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• pp.77-84
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• 2018

In Singapore, biosafety and biosecurity measures are controlled by the Biological Agents and Toxins Act (BATA) and other requirements by regulatory agencies. The law prohibits and otherwise regulates the possession, use, import, transhipment, transfer, and transportation of biological agents, inactivated biological agents, and toxins that are of public health concern. The law also defines the facility requirements for high risk biological agents and toxins. The containment facility (BSL 3) is a minimum requirement to handle biological agents that falls under Schedule 1 (Risk Group 3). The Nanyang Technological University School of Biological Sciences Biosafety Level 3 Facility (NTU-SBS BSL 3) was designed specifically for research involving potential hazardous biological materials. The facility requires yearly re-certification by an approved facility certifier to meet the local requirements and international biosafety standards for a containment facility in many instances. On the other hand, most NTU researchers conduct biological projects involving biological agents with low or moderate risk groups (Risk Groups 1 and 2 or biological agents described in schedule 3 and 4 of BATA) and GMOs, which need only a BSL 2 laboratory. BSL 2 laboratories are yet to be legally certified or registered in Singapore. Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) identifies the requirements; defines a minimum standard in the safe control of biological risks and registers all BSL 2 laboratories in the NTU. Therefore, under the guidance of the IBC, the University Biosafety and Biosecurity Programme includes the audit and certification program as a unique and an internal exercise to bring NTU biosafety to a higher level.

• Biomedical Science Letters
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• v.22 no.3
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• pp.65-74
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• 2016

The critical aspects of biosafety and bio-containment have been increasingly important in recent years. Biological agents involved in biological research projects at the Nanyang Technological University (NTU) Singapore are usually those with low risks. Biosafety level 2 or BSL 2 laboratories are widely used. However, biosafety measures which refer to the implementation of laboratory practices and procedures, specific construction features of laboratory facilities and safety equipment must be in place to reduce the exposure of laboratory personnel, the public or the environment to potentially infectious agents or other biological hazards. It is also required to pay more attention to laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) which may occur in research laboratories, clinical laboratories or animal facilities. BSL 2 audit and certification program is implemented as an internal exercise covering laboratories in the university where biological agents are handled or biological research works are carried out. We have put some efforts to raise biosafety standards university-wide in both laboratory infrastructure and laboratory practices to a higher level. Common audit findings are briefly discussed in this presentation.

• Journal of Preventive Medicine and Public Health
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• v.38 no.4
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• pp.449-456
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• 2005

Objectives : The biosafety level (BSL) practiced in microbiology laboratories in Korea according to the laboratory biosafety manual published by the World Health Organization (WHO) was evaluated using the data obtained by a survey. Methods : Under the advise of Clinical Laboratory Physicians, 144 types of microorganisms were screened based on the guidelines of biosafety in microbiological and biomedical laboratories published by the US Center for Disease Control and Prevention and classified into 1-4 risk groups. A questionnaire containing 21 questions in 5 areas was developed using the biosafety manual by published WHO. Of the 1,876 different organizations sent the survey, 563 responded to the survey (response rate: 30.0%). The species of microoganisms handled by as well as the biosafety level in microbiology laboratories were analyzed. Results : There were 123 species of microorganisms handled in microbiology labs in Korea. The BSL required in 512 microbiology labs was answered by the survey responders as the first grade in 33 labs (6.4%), 2nd in 437 (85.4%), 3rd in 42 (8.2%), and 4th in none. The average number of items satisfied was 12.2, showing only a 57.9% satisfactory rate and normal distribution. Conclusions : The state of overall observance of BSL in most microbiology labs of Korea was evaluated as lagging compared with the standard set up by WHO. Therefore, the Korean government need to produce and distribute a biosafety manual in microbiology laboratories and make efforts to prevent this threat through measures such as training in biosafety in microbiology labs.

• Proceedings of the SAREK Conference
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• 2008.06a
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• pp.84-89
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• 2008

The biosafety laboratory HVAC control technology may be applied in order to protect contamination of the researcher, supervisor and to prevent diffusion of biological pollution. In this study, a biosafety level, general configuration of control system, differential pressure control, distributed control system and network structure were discussed. These systems able to increase laboratory safety and efficiency of HVAC system.

• Safety and Health at Work
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.49-58
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• 2017

Background: This study determined current status of laboratory biosafety in Nigerian veterinary research facilities. Methods: A questionnaire was developed to obtain information from researchers across Nigeria from July 2014 to July 2015. Information regarding demographics, knowledge of laboratory biosafety, availability and proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE), any priority pathogens researched, attitude on and use of standard laboratory practices, and biosafety awareness was obtained using a numeric scoring system. Data were analyzed with descriptive statistics, and univariate and multivariate logistic regression. Results: A total of 74 participants from 19 facilities completed the questionnaire. General knowledge scores ranged from 3 to 28 (out of 28 possible points), with 94.6% of respondents receiving low scores (scores < mean + 1 standard deviation). Very few (17.6%) reported availability or use PPE. Many participants (63.5%) reported no access to biosafety level (BSL)-1-3 facilities. None reported availability of a BSL-4 facility. Knowledge scores pertaining to biosafety management practices ranged from 0 to 14 (out of 14 possible points) with 47.3% of respondents receiving good scores (scores > mean + 1 standard deviation). Only 16.2% of respondents (from four facilities) reported having biosafety officers. Rabies virus was the most researched pathogen (31.1% of respondents). The majority (71.6%) were unaware of laws guiding biosafety. Researchers [odds ratio (OR) = 18.0; 95% confidence interval (CI): 1.63, 198.5; p = 0.023], especially in BSL-2 (OR = 258.5; 95% CI: 12.71, 5256; p < 0.001) facility of research institute (OR = 25.0; 95% CI: 5.18, 120.6; p < 0.001), are more likely to have adequate access to and properly utilize biosafety devices and PPE. Conclusions: Current knowledge of laboratory biosafety is limited except among a few researchers.

• Proceedings of the Korean Society for Applied Microbiology Conference
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• 2005.06a
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• pp.66-70
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• 2005

Microbiology research must be conducted in a fashion that assures the health and well being of the researcher and the safety of the community. This lecture raises awareness of biosafety issues and discusses how the interaction of the pathogen being studied, the person conducting the research, and the practices being used can be manipulated to assure safety. The characterization of pathogens into Risk Groups, how these relate to Biosafety Levels, and the personal practices and laboratory design criteria associated with each Biosafety Level are explained. The importance of preventing or containing aerosols, limiting opportunities for cross-contamination, and taking a flexible multi-component approach to biosafety are emphasized.

• Korean Journal of Clinical Laboratory Science
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• v.50 no.1
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• pp.71-76
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• 2018

This study examined the status of the laboratory biosafety of researchers in Korea during 03 Jan 2017~25 Mar 2017. Questionnaires were given out to 500 researchers working with pathogens in the laboratory of universities and institutes. According to the results, the respondents showed a high level of awareness but not compliance on the overall biosafety rules and regulations. Regarding the Biosafety facility level, 279 (55.8%) of respondents answered "know" and 221 (44.2%) of respondents answered "no". Despite the insufficient safety equipment and biosafety plans, researchers believed that appropriate safety measures could protect the workers and that their laboratories are safe. In a study involving biosafety education, 80% of the researchers had been trained in laboratory safety and 20% had never received safety education. The need for biosafety education was 66% and the satisfaction rate of education was 46%. These results suggest that the researchers already had experience in biosafety training, but they believed that continuing education is necessary. In addition, there were opinions that the most important thing to improve the biosafety status is to strengthen the training program and education system. In conclusion, it is necessary to develop a better training system for laboratory biosafety regarding the exposure risks.

• Safety and Health at Work
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• v.4 no.2
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• pp.100-104
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• 2013

Background: The aim of this study was to assess public and private medical diagnostic laboratories in Nigeria for the presence of biosafety equipment, devices, and measures. Methods: A total of 80 diagnostic laboratories in biosafety level 3 were assessed for the presence of biosafety equipment, devices, and compliance rate with biosafety practices. A detailed questionnaire and checklist was used to obtain the relevant information from enlisted laboratories. Results: The results showed the presence of an isolated unit for microbiological work, leak-proof working benches, self-closing doors, emergency exits, fire extinguisher(s), autoclaves, and hand washing sinks in 21.3%, 71.3%, 15.0%, 1.3%, 11.3%, 82.5%, and 67.5%, respectively, of all laboratories surveyed. It was observed that public diagnostic laboratories were significantly more likely to have an isolated unit for microbiological work (p = 0.001), hand washing sink (p = 0.003), and an autoclave ($p{\leq}0.001$) than private ones. Routine use of hand gloves, biosafety cabinet, and a first aid box was observed in 35.0%, 20.0%, and 2.5%, respectively, of all laboratories examined. Written standard operating procedures, biosafety manuals, and biohazard signs on door entrances were observed in 6.3%, 1.3%, and 3.8%, respectively, of all audited laboratories. No biosafety officer(s) or records of previous spills, or injuries and accidents, were observed in all diagnostic laboratories studied. Conclusion: In all laboratories (public and private) surveyed, marked deficiencies were observed in the area of administrative control responsible for implementing biosafety. Increased emphasis on provision of biosafety devices and compliance with standard codes of practices issued by relevant authorities is strongly advocated.