• Proceedings of the Korean Institute Of Construction Engineering and Management
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• autumn
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• pp.410-413
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• 2003

In order to build up competitive power in construction market and to cope with international policy, Design-Build bidding is one of the viable bidding system, encouraging collaboration between design office and building construction firm. Design-Build is a promising delivery system to help expediting schedules, saving costs, and improving Quality. However, the problems of Design-Build project in the domestic construction industry are not to be able to take advantages of fast-tracking and value engineering process, because of the problems of inappropriate system and participants' inexperience. The purpose of this study is to suggest alternatives for Design-Build bidding of public sector in the domestic construction industry in the costs, quality and time aspect.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2000.07a
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• pp.400-402
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• 2000

This paper presents a game theoretic approach for power transactions analysis in a competitive market. The considered competitive power market is regarded as PooICo model, and the participating players are restricted by only two generating entities for simplicity in this paper. The analysis is performed on the basis of marginal cost based relations of bidding price and bidding generations. That is, we assume that the bidding price of each player is determined by the marginal cost when the bidding generation is pre-determined. This paper models the power transaction as a two player game and analyzes by applying the Nash eauilibrium idea. The generalized game model for power transactions covering constant-sum(especially zero-sum), and nonconstant-sum game is developed in this paper. Also, the analysis for each game model are performed in the case studies. Here, we have defined the payoff of each player as the weighted sum of both player's profits.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.51 no.12
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• pp.597-602
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• 2002

The restructuring of power industry is still going on all over the world for last several decades. Many kinds of restructuring model have been studied, proposed, and applied. Among those models, power pool is more popular than other. This paper assumes the power pool market structure having competitive generation sector, and a new method is presented to build a bidding strategy in that market. The utilities participating in the market have the perfect information of their cost and price functions, but they don't know which strategy to be chosen by others. To define one's strategy as a vector, we make utility's cost/price functions into discrete step functions. An utility knows only his own strategy, so he estimates the other's cost/price functions into discrete step functions. An utility knows only his own strategy, so he estimates the other's strategy using Nash equilibrium or stochastic methods. And he also has to forecast the system demand. According to this forecasting result, his payoffs can be changed. Considering these all conditions, we formulate a bidding game problem and apply noncooperative game theory to that problem for the optimal strategy or solution. Some restrictive assumption are added for simplification of solving process. A numerical example is given in Case Study to show essential features and concrete results of this approach.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 1999.07c
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• pp.1344-1346
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• 1999

This paper presents a game theoretic approach for power transactions analysis in a competitive market. The considered competitive power market is regarded as PoolCO model, and the participating players are restricted by only two generating entities for simplicity in this paper. The analysis is performed on the basis of marginal cost based relations of bidding price and bidding generations. That is, we assume that the bidding price of each player is determined by the marginal cost when the bidding generation is pre-determined. This paper models the power transaction as a two player game and analyzes by applying the Nash eauilibrium idea. The generalized game model for power transactions covering constant-sum(especially zero-sum), and nonconstant-sum game is developed in this paper. Also, the analysis for each game model are Performed in the case studies. Here, we have defined the payoff of each player as the weighted sum of both player's profits.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.10 no.12
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• pp.5616-5642
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• 2016

Different from traditional auctions, electronic auctions provide a platform to allow bidders and auctioneers merchandise to each other over network anytime and anywhere. Auctioneers can publish information of goods, and bidders can choose the interested targets through this bidding platform. To ensure the fairness and security of electronic auctions, Li et al. have proposed a practical electronic auction scheme which can confirm the requirement of strong anonymity, bidding privacy, and secret bidding price. However, we have found out that Li et al.'s scheme may lurk the risk of the denial-of-service attack during the bidding phase in a sealed-bid auction. Thus, we propose a brand-new sealed-bid auction mechanism, in which the essentials of e-auction can be firmly preserved. In particular, each bidder only needs to register at the center once and then can join to multiple plays launched by different auctioneers. Moreover, the correctness of mutual authentication is confirmed according to the BAN logic model.

• International conference on construction engineering and project management
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• 2005.10a
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• pp.417-423
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• 2005

Contractor's opportunistic bidding behavior refers to contractor's deliberate low-bid, which cannot accord with the cost, and expectation for beyond-contractual reward (BCR), the compensation earned through cutting corners or claims after undertaking the construction project. This research applies System Dynamics to develop a model of contractor's pricing with consideration for dimensions of "cost", "market competition", and "BCR". Iterative computer simulations were performed to analyze the effects of contractor's pricing on the market price. The results were then examined by statistical analysis on data collected from 44 highway projects in Taiwan. It is found that the critical force driving the contractors to bid opportunistically is their excessive expectations in BCR under the current environment. Within the price competition mechanism, if the problem of BCR exists, even if the bidding system is further improved, contractors would still prefer opportunistic bidding behavior, and eventually make the whole construction industry operate ineffectively. Therefore, it is crucial to remedy the aforementioned BCR problem by more effective management policy.

• International conference on construction engineering and project management
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• 2013.01a
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• pp.479-487
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• 2013

State Highway Agencies (SHAs) have started utilizing cost-plus-time bidding (A+B bidding) since Federal Highway Agency (FHWA) declared it operational on May 4, 1995. Although this technique has successfully accelerated many projects by incorporating construction time in the bidding competition, a framework to illustrate the interactions of incentive/disincentive (I/D) rates on the competitiveness of contractors participating in the bid competition is yet to be developed. In a previous research, authors indicated that for each bid competition there is an efficient cap for I/D rates which are dictated by the capabilities of contractors in project acceleration. However, the results of previous study were based on the assumption that there is a statistically significant relationship between cost and time. In this study, the entire cost-plus-time projects implemented by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation (ODOT) were investigated. Then the significance of relationship between cost and time were analyzed for each contractor utilizing Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) technique, and the price-time function of each contractor was determined by regression analysis. The results of the analysis indicate that there is a significant relationship between cost and time for the majority of contractors. However, a quadratic relationship is not always significant and for some contractors a linear price-time relationship is significant. The results of this project can be used not only by ODOT to optimize the incentive/disincentive rates but also by contractors to determine the most competitive strategies of other bid participants.

• The Journal of the Korea institute of electronic communication sciences
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• v.18 no.6
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• pp.1171-1176
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• 2023

In this paper, we predicts the estimated price using the DNBP (Deep learning Network to predict Budget Price) model with bidding data obtained from the bidding websites, ElecNet and OK EMS. We use the DNBP model to predict four lottery preliminary price, calculate their arithmetic mean, and then estimate the expected budget price ratio. We evaluate the model's performance by comparing it with the actual expected budget price ratio. We train the DNBP model by removing some of the 15 input nodes. The prediction results showed the lowest RMSE of 0.75788% when the model had 6 input nodes (a, g, h, i, j, k).

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.40 no.9
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• pp.1802-1807
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• 2015

The cloud computing service provides physical IT resources to VM instances to users using virtual technique and the users pay cost of VM instances to service provider. The auction model based on cloud computing provides available resources of service provider to users through auction mechanism. The users bid spot instances to process their a job until its deadline time. If the bidding price of users is higher than the spot price, the user will be provided the spot instances by service provider. In this paper, we propose a new bidding strategy to minimize the total cost for job completion. Typically, the users propose bidding price as high as possible to get the spot instances and the spot price get high. we lower the spot price using proposed strategy and minimize the total cost for job completion. To evaluate the performance of our strategy, we compare the spot price and the total cost for job completion with real workload data.

• Survey Research
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• v.3 no.2
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• pp.47-76
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• 2002

Starting point bias arises in the iterative bidding framework when the initial bid influences respondent's final bids. The bidding game has become the most commonly used method of asking the valuation question in contingent valuation studies. A bidding game is typically conducted by either personal or telephone interview. Bidding begins with an interviewer positing an initial bid (starting bid) to a respondent. If the respondent is willing to pay the initial bid, the interviewer revises the bid upward until a negative respondent is obtained. A negative response to the initial bid downward until an acceptable amount is found. The final bid is a measure of the respondent's Hicksian compensating or equivalent surplus for the item being valued. This paper explicity tested for starting point bias in bidding games. That is, it was asked whether final bids are influenced by the magnitude of the starting bids in the process of valuating the WTP when to improve the quality of running water in Seoul and its vicinity. The result shows staring point bias exists in the present data and its magnitude is ${\delta}$=-0.265237.