• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.407-436
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• 2013

I examine the notion of truth in the intuitionistic type theory and provide a better explanation of the objective intuitionistic conception of mathematical truth than that of Dag Prawitz. After a brief explanation of the distinction among proposition, type and judgement in comparison with Frege's theory of judgement, I examine the judgements of the form 'A true' in the intuitionistic type theory and explain how the determinacy of the existence of proofs can be understood intuitionistically. I also examine how the existential judgements of the form 'Pf(A) exists' should be understood. In particular, I diagnose the reason why such existential judgements do not have propositional contents. I criticize an understanding of the existential judgements as elliptical judgements. I argue that, at least in two respects, the notion of truth explained in this paper is a more advanced version of the objective intuitionistic conception of mathematical truth than that provided by Prawitz. I briefly consider a subjectivist's objection to the conception of truth explained in this paper and provide an answer to it.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.207-231
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• 2018

The identity theory of truth insists that a truth bearer is identical with a fact. First, I will consider how we can make the thesis intelligible. For this, I classify the identity relation which the identity theory discusses into two kind; trivial and non-trivial relation. And I show that the trivial one is not adequate to be qualified to be applied to the identity theory. The non-trivial relation can be adopted in robust or modest way. I argue that the robust kind of identity theory is incoherent itself. Then, I explain why we should compare the modest identity theory with the deflationism. From this comparing, I will draw the consequence that two choices are left to the modest theory. If they choose one way, there is no reason for us to prefer the identity theory to deflationism. On the other hand, in case that they choose the other way, I argue what kinds of interesting problem is left to be solved by the modest theorists. Finally, I will evaluate the limit and prospect of the result of the problem in case that the identity theorists achieve their goal.

• Journal of Korean Library and Information Science Society
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• v.51 no.4
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• pp.279-311
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• 2020

People collectively understand and often use information and knowledge as terms in a variety of contexts without concern nor discussion of their many competing conceptual and theoretical definitions. The concepts of information and knowledge are intrinsically linked and suffer some of the same problems when scholars try to define them, especially when truth is a prerequisite. This theory paper presents a simple thought experiment that relates the reliabilist and truth-tracking analyses of knowledge with the physical and cognitive paradigms of information, respectively. The results of the thought experiment are discussed within the context of the Post-Truth era, with implications and applications for information literacy.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.125-150
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• 2019

A coherence theory is adequate as a theory of justification only when justification as conceived by the theory is truth-conducive. But it is not clear how coherentist justification is truth-conducive. This is the alleged truth-conduciveness problem of coherentism. In my 2017 paper, I argued that a certain version of the coherence theory, namely a Sellarsian coherence theory combined with the deflationary conception of truth, can cope with this problem. Against this claim, Kiyong Suk argues in his recent paper that my proposed solution fails on the grounds that there is no practical way of distinguishing between intersubjective justification and objective justification. The purpose of this paper is to clarify my view by way of explaining why Suk's criticism is not correct. In particular, I argue that his criticism is based on a wrong assumption, namely that for one to be objectively justified in believing something, one's justification must be qualitatively transformed into the status of having objective justification from the status of having intersubjective justification.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.23 no.4
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• pp.77-96
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• 2013

International Arbitration has distinguished itself as a method for dispute resolution that pleases both common and civil law practitioners. It, however, is not free of criticism, especially when fact-finding and evidentiary issues are at play. Perhaps because fact-finding is very closely linked to the culture in which they lie, perhaps because of the lack of a clear evidentiary rules governing international arbitration, a theory of evidence in international arbitration is still far fetched. Through the analysis of the distinctions between dispute resolution systems and the search for truth paradigm, this paper aims to develop and present an outline for the development of a theory of evidence in international arbitration.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.67-83
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• 2004

The purpose of this paper is to defend Kripke's theory of truth from Simmons' objection. First after introducing various sorts of the liar paradox, briefly I explain Tarski's attempt to solve the puzzle. Then, I outline Kripke's solution by using the concept of 'fixed point'. Simmons offers an interesting objection against Kripke's solution. He uses a diagonal argument in his attack to Kripke's idea. I claim that Simmons seem to use 'exclusion negation' in refuting Kripke. I think, however, there is an alternative interpretation, which is 'choice negation'. With using choice negation, I maintain that Kripke's theory of ruth can be defended from Simmons' objection.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.16 no.2
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• pp.131-154
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• 2013

Michael Williams, in his paper, rejects the wide-accepted view that Donald Davidson's radical interpretation is a truth conditional account of meaning, and suggests a claim that robust truth in fact does not play any role in Davidson's interpretation and thus interpretation can be in accord with the deflationary theory of truth. In this paper, I will first research the right understanding on the explanatory relations in radical interpretation between truth and meaning, and on that ground, will evaluate the adequacy of Williams' suggestion. My diagnosis is that the acceptability of Williams' idea depends on how we regard the several factors which are crucial for interpretation. Especially I will argue that whether truth condition is regarded as deflationary or inflationary makes difference to the way of understanding radical interpretation, hence the room for taking radical interpretation as deflationary can be in two different ways. Furthermore I will show the same argument can be applied to Williams' another claim that Paul Horwich's use theory of meaning is similar to Davidson's account.

• Language and Information
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• v.4 no.2
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• pp.69-92
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• 2000

It is well-known that default rules require a nonmonotonic logic. Veltman proposed one dynamic theory which interprets default rules in such a way that correct inferences can be made at each information state. But his theory has some problems. First, this theory excludes the possibility that a default rule can be true of false. Second, his representation of an information state makes it difficult to interpret a default rule embedded in another sentence. Third, the notion of a frame which is introduced in the interpretation of a default rule and the adjustment of inferential expectation has a more complex structure than is necessary, In this paper, I propose a truth-conditional theory of default rules in which the meaning of a default rule is defined as a truth-condition in a possible world and which assumes a simpler structure of a frame. This makes it possible to interpret a default rule embedded in a sentence. A dynamic theory for default rules is also proposed for correct inferences based on default rules.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.145-184
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• 2016

Williamson(1994) proved incompatibility of Gab Theory and Tarski T-schema. But this does not means that Gab Theory could not involve intuition on truth that is expressed by T-schema. I will show that Gab Theory and mutual entailment of 'p' and 'it is true that p'(p⊨T

and T

⊨p) are compatible. It will draw that Gab Theory can involve minimal intuition on truth. After all what I want to reveal is logical space for Gab Theory through the compatibility of the mutual entailment and negation of the Principle of Bivalence. To prove the compatibility, I will present a consequent relation which should be accepted whenever we accept Gab Theory and demonstrate Gab Theory and the mutual entailment imply following two thesis; 1) not-T

and T are not equivalent. 2) p entails T

but not-T

does not entails not-p.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.143
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• pp.27-46
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• 2017

This paper research an answer to the question what is the relation between intrinsic value of truth and substantiality of truth. The concept of substantiality can be variably defined, but I characterize it as being an opaque concept. Michael P. Lynch, who is one of the most influential pluralists about truth, accept both that truth is substantial and that truth is intrinsically valuable. This paper analyzes Lynch's argument for the intrinsic value of truth, and will show that his argument is independent of his theory which insists that truth is manifested plurally. Moreover I will discuss how Paul Horwich who is a deflationist denying substantiality of truth explains the intrinsic value of truth. And comparing these two views, I will elaborate the reason why intrinsic value of truth and its substantiality are logically independent each other. Finally, I will suggest a brief case which shows an implication included in the conclusion that plural manifestation of truth does not generally entails plurality of value of truth.