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On Identity Between Truth Bearer and Fact  

Kim, Donghyun (Korean National University of Transportation, School of Liberal Arts and Science)
Publication Information
Korean Journal of Logic / v.21, no.2, 2018 , pp. 207-231 More about this Journal
Abstract
The identity theory of truth insists that a truth bearer is identical with a fact. First, I will consider how we can make the thesis intelligible. For this, I classify the identity relation which the identity theory discusses into two kind; trivial and non-trivial relation. And I show that the trivial one is not adequate to be qualified to be applied to the identity theory. The non-trivial relation can be adopted in robust or modest way. I argue that the robust kind of identity theory is incoherent itself. Then, I explain why we should compare the modest identity theory with the deflationism. From this comparing, I will draw the consequence that two choices are left to the modest theory. If they choose one way, there is no reason for us to prefer the identity theory to deflationism. On the other hand, in case that they choose the other way, I argue what kinds of interesting problem is left to be solved by the modest theorists. Finally, I will evaluate the limit and prospect of the result of the problem in case that the identity theorists achieve their goal.
Keywords
The identity theory of truth; Dodd; Hornsby; Thought; Deflationary truth;
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