• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.42 no.5
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• pp.582-589
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• 2010

As a part of the back-end fuel cycle, transportation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from nuclear power plants (NPPs) to a fuel storage facility is very important in establishing a nuclear fuel cycle. In Korea, the accumulated amount of SNF in the NPP pools is troublesome since the temporary storage facilities at these NPP pools are expected to be full of SNF within ten years. Therefore, Korea cannot help but plan for the construction of an interim storage facility to solve this problem in the near future. Especially, a decision on several factors, such as where the interim storage facility should be located, how many casks a transport ship can carry at a time and how many casks are initially required, affect the configuration of the transportation system. In order to analyze the various possible candidate scenarios, we assumed four cases for the interim storage facility location, three cases for the load capacity that a transport ship can carry and two cases for the total amount of casks used for transportation. First, this study considered the currently accumulated amount of SNF in Korea, and the amount of SNF generated from NPPs until all NPPs are shut down. Then, how much SNF per year must be transported from the NPPs to an interim storage facility was calculated during an assumed transportation period. Second, 24 candidate transportation scenarios were constructed by a combination of the decision factors. To construct viable yearly transportation schedules for the selected 24 scenarios, we created a spreadsheet program named TranScenario, which was developed by using MS EXCEL. TranScenario can help schedulers input shipping routes and allocate transportation casks. Also, TranScenario provides information on the cask distribution in the NPPs and in the interim storage facility automatically, by displaying it in real time according to the shipping routes, cask types and cask numbers that the user generates. Once a yearly transportation schedule is established, TranScenario provides some statistical information, such as the voyage time, the availability of the interim storage facility, the number of transported casks sent from the NPPs, and the number of transported casks received at the interim storage facility. By using this information, users can verify and validate a yearly transportation schedule. In this way, the 24 candidate scenarios could be constructed easily. Finally, these 24 scenarios were compared in terms of their operation cost.

• Proceedings of the Korean Radioactive Waste Society Conference
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• 2018.11a
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• pp.165-166
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• 2018

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.205-214
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• 2021

Currently, the interim storage pools of spent fuels in South Korea are expected to become saturated from 2024. It is required to prepare an operation plan of a domestic dry storage facility during a long-term period, with the researches on safety evaluation methods. This study modified the FRAPCON code to predict the spent fuel integrity evaluation such as the axial cladding temperature, the hoop stress and hydrogen distribution in dry storage. The cladding temperature in dry storage was calculated using the COBRA-SFS code with the burnup information which was calculated using the FRAPCON code. The hoop stress was calculated using the ideal gas equation with spent fuel information such as rod internal pressure. Numerical analysis method was used to calculate the degree of hydrogen diffusion according to the hydrogen concentration and temperature distribution during a dry storage period. Before 50 years of dry storage, the cladding temperature and hoop stress decreased rapidly. However, after 50 years, they decreased gradually and the cladding temperature was below 400 K. The initial temperature distribution and hydrogen concentration showed a parabolic line, but hydrogen was transferred by the hydrogen concentration and temperature gradient over time.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.9 no.4
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• pp.231-236
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• 2011

When the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident occurred in March of 2011, a hydrogen explosion in the reactor building at the 4th unit of Fukushima plants led to a big surprise because the full core of the unit 4 reactor had been moved and stored underwater at the spent nuclear fuel storage pool for periodic maintenance. It was because the possible criticality in the fuel storage pool by coolant loss may yield more severe situation than the similar accident happened inside the reactor vessel. Fortunately, it was assured to be evitable to an anxious situation by a look of water filled in the storage pool later. In the paper, the safety state of the spent fuel storage pool and rack structures of the domestic nuclear plants would be roughly reviewed and compared with the Fukushima plant case by engineering viewpoint of potential severe accidents.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.119-126
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• 2022

This study provides technical information about the nuclear fuel handling process, which consists of various subprocesses starting from new fuel receipt to spent fuel shipment at a nuclear power plant and the design requirements of fuel handling equipment. The fuel handling system is an integrated system of equipment, tools, and procedures that allow refueling, handling and storage of fuel assemblies, which comprise the fuel handling process. The understanding and reaffirming of detailed code requirements are requested for application to the design of the fuel handling and storage facility. We reviewed the design requirements of the fuel handling equipment for its adequate cooling, prevention of criticality, its operability and maintainability, and for the prevention of fuel damage and radiological release. Furthermore, we discussed additional technical issues related to upgrading the current code requirements based on the modification of the fuel handling equipment. The suggested information provided in this paper would be beneficial to enhance the safety and the reliability of the fuel handling equipment during the handling of new and spent fuel.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.263-278
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• 2019

Since the 1970s, aircraft crash accidents have been considered as one of the severest external events that should be evaluated for license application of nuclear reactors. After the 9.11 terrorist attacks, many countries have performed safety assessment against intentional or targeted aircraft crashes into nuclear related facilities. In some countries, assessment against targeted aircraft crash was enforced by regulation and considered an important task for license approval. Safety assessment against aircraft crash is a technically difficult task and many countries manage R&D programs to improve its reliability. In this paper, regulations of many countries regarding safety assessment against aircraft crash are summarized, separating regulations for accident aircraft crash and those for targeted aircraft crash. Research performed in various countries on safety assessment of nuclear facility against aircraft crash are summarized, with a focus on spent nuclear fuel dry storage facilities.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.50 no.7
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• pp.1148-1153
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• 2018

The Leaking Fuel Experiment test facility was designed to simulate the activity release from spent leaking fuel rods under steady state and transient conditions in the spent fuel pool. The experimental rig included an electrically heated fuel rod with different defects and a cooling system. The fission product transport was simulated by potassium-chloride. The conductivity changes of the water in the cooling system were measured to provide information about the amount of released solution. Defects of different sizes and positions were applied, together with a wide range of rod powers to simulate decay heat. The produced data can be used for predicting the activity release from leaking fuel under storage conditions and for the interpretation of fuel examination procedures.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.37 no.4
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• pp.197-201
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• 2012

Annual dose at the boundary of the interim storage facility at normal condition was calculated to estimate the site area of the facility of PWR spent nuclear fuel. In this work, source term was generated by ORIGEN-ARP for 4.5 wt% initial enrichment, 45,000 MWd/MTU burnup and 10 years cooling time. Modeling of the storage facilities and radiation shielding evaluations were conducted by MCNP code depending on the storage capacity. In the case of the centralized storage system, the required site area was found to have the radius of more than 700 m.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.46 no.4
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• pp.547-556
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• 2014

Korea expects a shortage in storage capacity for spent fuels at reactor sites. Therefore, a need for more metal and/or concrete casks for storage systems is anticipated for either the reactor site or away from the reactor for interim storage. For the purpose of interim storage and transportation, a dual purpose metal cask that can load 21 spent fuel assemblies is being developed by Korea Radioactive Waste Management Corporation (KRMC) in Korea. At first the gamma and neutron flux for the design basis fuel were determined assuming in-core environment (the temperature, pressure, etc. of the moderator, boron, cladding, $UO_2$ pellets) in which the design basis fuel is loaded, as input data. The evaluation simulated burnup up to 45,000 MWD/MTU and decay during ten years of cooling using the SAS2H/OGIGEN-S module of the SCALE5.1 system. The results from the source term evaluation were used as input data for the final shielding evaluation utilizing the MCNP Code, which yielded the effective dose rate. The design of the cask is based on the safety requirements for normal storage conditions under 10 CFR Part 72. A radiation shielding analysis of the metal storage cask optimized for loading 21 design basis fuels was performed for two cases; one for a single cask and the other for a $2{\times}10$ cask array. For the single cask, dose rates at the external surface of the metal cask, 1m and 2m away from the cask surface, were evaluated. For the $2{\times}10$ cask array, dose rates at the center point of the array and at the center of the casks' height were evaluated. The results of the shielding analysis for the single cask show that dose rates were considerably higher at the lower side (from the bottom of the cask to the bottom of the neutron shielding) of the cask, at over 2mSv/hr at the external surface of the cask. However, this is not considered to be a significant issue since additional shielding will be installed at the storage facility. The shielding analysis results for the $2{\times}10$ cask array showed exponential decrease with distance off the sources. The controlled area boundary was calculated to be approximately 280m from the array, with a dose rate of 25mrem/yr. Actual dose rates within the controlled area boundary will be lower than 25mrem/yr, due to the decay of radioactivity of spent fuel in storage.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.34 no.1
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• pp.1-7
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• 2009

It is expected that a substantial amount of spent fuels will be transported from the four nuclear power plant (NPP) sites in Korea to a hypothetical centralized interim storage facility or a final repository in the near future. The cost for the transportation is proportional to the amount of spent fuels. In this paper, a cost estimation program is developed based on the conceptual design of a transportation system and a logistics analysis. Using the developed computer program, named as CASK, the minimum capacity of a centralized interim storage facility (CISF) and the transportation cost for PWR spent fuels are calculated. The PWR spent fuels are transported from 4 NPP sites to a final repository (FR) via the CISF. Since NPP sites and the CISF are located along the coast, a sea-transportation is considered and a road-transportation is considered between the CISF and the FR. The result shows that the minimum capacity of the interim storage facility is 15,000 MTU.