• 분석과 대안
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• 제3권1호
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• pp.5-28
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• 2019

This study suggests that Korea - Russia economic cooperation, which has been sluggish in the meantime, should be revitalized as a small, medium sized business that can be practiced at the local level of both countries. Some large scales of national projects were difficult to realize due to some internal and external factors. Therefore, if Russia's Far East region of the complementary economic structure with the Korea's Gyeonggi Province of Korea could form the basis of cooperation by centering on SMEs, it further can be positive for promoting cooperation among South Korea, North Korea and Russia. The trilateral cooperation among two Koreas and Russia is necessary for the balance of political and economic powers in the East Asia. China's retaliation case regarding THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) clearly showed that the greater the economic dependence on a particular country, the more threatening it could be. Therefore, it is important for the political and economic security to keep the balance by diversifying economic cooperation counterparts. As China's influence in the global economy grows, building value chains for mutual prosperity with various neighboring countries is gaining great importance. To this end, this paper examined Russia's Eurasian Strategy, New East Policy, and Far East Development Policy which were designed to seek the way to establish Russia's independent economic zone not absorbed by Europe and China.

• 해양안보
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• 제3권1호
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• pp.1-44
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• 2021

중국의 새로운 해양정책법(Maritime Policy Law: MPL)은 중국해안경비대 등의 중국 해양경찰 기관들의 임무를 규제하고, 중국의 주권, 안보, 권리, 이해관계를 보호한다고 주장한다. [하지만] 중국이 본토 주위 및 남중국해에서 넓은 해역에 대한 권리를 주장하고 있다는 점에서, MPL은 훨씬 광범위하게 적용될 수 있다. 중국이 제기하는 대부분의 해양 주장이 국제법에 부합하지 않는다는 점을 고려하면, 이렇게 해양법 집행 관할권을 광범위하게 적용하는 것은 문제의 소지가 많다. MPL이 분쟁해역 또는 공해에서 외국선적 선박에 대한 관할권을 주장한다면, 이는 국제법 위반이다. 무력 사용에 관한 MPL의 많은 규정 역시, 해양법 집행 관할권의 사용에 관한 국제 규칙 및 기준을 위반한 것이며, 모든 국가의 영토 온전성이나 정치적 독립성에 반하는 위협이나 무력사용을 금하는 유엔헌장에도 위배된다. 중국은 MPL을 남중국해와 동중국해에서 불법적인 영토 및 해양 주장을 제기하기 위한 구실로 사용할 수 있으며, 다른 연안국의 배타적경제수역 내 자원 권리 행사를 방해하기 위한 구실로도 사용할 수 있다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권33호
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• pp.37-64
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• 2014

The year 2010 has been regarded as a year of China's assertive diplomacy. A series of China's behavior--including China's critical reaction to the U.S. for its sales of weapons to Taiwan, the Dalai Lama's visit to President Obama, China's arbitrary designation of 'core interests' over the South China Sea, China's inordinate reactions to the sinking of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong bombardment, and China's activities in the Senkaku/Diaoyu island areas--has served as the witnesses to China's assertive diplomacy in 2010. The major causes of China's assertive diplomacy can be summed up by three factors: potential power transition from U.S. to China; emerging China's nationalism; and the recession of the Tao Guang Yang Hui as a diplomatic principle. But a majority of Western sinologists claim that China's assertive diplomacy is defensive in terms of its character. China's neighboring states, however, perceive its assertive diplomacy as diplomatic threat. Due to these states' geographical proximity and capability gaps with China, these neighbors experience difficulties in coping with China's behavior. In particular, China's coercive economic diplomacy, in which China tends to manipulate the neighbors' economic dependency on China for its diplomatic leverage, is a case in point for China's assertive diplomacy. China's assertiveness seems to be continued even after the inauguration of Xi Jinping government. Although the Xi government's diplomatic rhetorics in "New Type of Great Power Relationship" and the "Convention for Neighboring States Policy" sound friendly and cooperative, its subsequent behavior, like unilateral announcement of Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (CADIZ), does not conform with its rhetoric. Overall, China's assertiveness has been consolidated as a fashion of its diplomacy, and it is likely to continue in its relations with neighbors. As a neighboring state, the ROK should approach to it with more balanced attitude. In addition, it needs to find out a new diplomatic leverage to deal with China in accordance with its security environment, in which China plays a growing role.

• 동남아시아연구
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• 제28권2호
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• pp.119-145
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• 2018

2017년 창설 50주년을 맞은 아세안(ASEAN)은 제도적 보완과 기능적 협력을 강화하기 위해 일련의 선언과 행동 계획을 채택했다. 아세안의 '회합력'(convening power)이 아세안 중심성(centrality)과 회복력(resilience)을 촉진하고 있다. 반면 아세안 회원국의 민주주의 후퇴는 전통적 규범의 한계를 심화시키고 아세안의 이행력을 저하시킨다. 이 글은 아세안 주요 쟁점을 고찰하고 전망을 도출하고자 한다. 첫째, 아세안의 제도적 발전과 기능적 협력의 현황을 아세안 공동체 건설의 현황과 쟁점을 중심으로 살피고자 한다. 둘째, 아세안의 대외 관계를 중국, 미국, 한국과의 관계를 중심으로 살피고자 한다. 남중국해 이슈 및 중국의 경제적 영향력 확대는 아세안-중국관계의 복잡성을 심화시키고 있다. 트럼프 행정부의 대 동남아 정책 변화에 대응하기 위해서는 아세안의 단결이 필요하다. 한국의 신남방정책은 여러 제약에도 불구하고 양자 관계에 있어 전환점이 될 것으로 기대된다. 대외 환경의 변화 속에 아세안 단결과 중심성의 강화가 더욱 절실해지고 있다.

• 분석과 대안
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• 제1권2호
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• pp.31-43
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• 2017

The article is devoted to the theoretical and practical analysis of Chinese global leadership. The concept of leadership is applied as a methodology, which involves identifying the main factors, such as strategic power, the attractiveness of political institutions, the ability to provide acceptable ideas and the presence of allies that contribute to a comprehensive analysis of the country's leadership potential. The authors also describe the relevance of Chinese global leadership and analyze its domestic, economic and international causes. Moreover, the ''Belt and Road'' initiative is defined as the main mechanism for providing the influence of China on the global level which is now being changed its quantitative component, namely the increasing attention to the security aspects of this initiative. In addition to that, it is important to note that China maintains its economic and political positions in Africa, Central Asia and South-East Asia. Africa has a special role in the Chinese ''Belt and Road'' initiative as a recipient of Chinese investments and a site for the deployment of China's naval facilities to protect the trade routes. On the regional level, China will strive to become a leader of the trade and economic processes in the Asia-Pacific region, the South China Sea and the North Korea nuclear program issues. The American factor in modern international relations, namely so-called "Trump factor", which means the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris Agreement, will cause demand for Chinese leadership in the Asia-Pacific region and in the world as well. However, in this case a number of questions arise: is China prepared for this? Is Beijing able to bear greater responsibility? Does China have the potential for this? The article concludes that China will not become global leaders in the next 20-30 years, because of internal (political reforms) and foreign policy reasons (doctrinal formulation of foreign policy initiatives, military-political and economic power, international posture and relations with other states). The authors believe that the implementation of Chinese leadership is possible not on the condition of confrontation between China and the United States, but on the establishing of constructive relations between these countries. The last meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping showed a trend for creating channels for dialogue between Beijing and Washington, which can become the basis for interaction. An important place in the work is given to the analysis of development and forecasting the evolution of Russian-Chinese and U.S.-China relations. As for Russia, Moscow should conduct a policy that will not allow it to become a ''junior partner'' of China.

• 디지털융복합연구
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• 제17권7호
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• pp.1-13
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• 2019

본 연구는 한반도에서 평화협력의 기회가 확대되고 유라시아 역내 개발사업에 국제 사회의 관심이 집중되고 있는 시점에서 현 정부가 추진하는 신북방정책의 주요 특징과 주변 국가와의 협력 방안을 검토하고 시사점을 제시하는 것을 연구의 목적으로 하였다. 본 연구에서는 한반도 접경에 위치한 중국, 러시아, 몽골의 유라시아 정책인 일대일로, 신동방정책, 초원의 길 사업을 검토했으며, 한국 신북방정책의 주요 특징과 문제점, 추진방안 등을 제시했다. 본 연구에서 제시한 주요 추진방안으로 신북방정책은 북한을 포함한 역내 협력 가능성과 별도로 현시점에서 가능한 '한-중-몽-러' 협력 기회를 우선적으로 모색할 필요가 있으며, 향후 북한과의 협력 환경 조성을 위해서 러시아 등 한반도 주요 접경지역의 항만개발을 통한 해상경로 구축과 항만-철도 등 복합운송시스템 개발추진이 필요하다. 또한, 효율적 정책 추진을 위한 컨트롤 타워의 정비와 함께 향후 북핵 이슈가 해결되는 시점에 대비하여, 한반도에 보다 유리한 유라시아 물류 노선 개발이 진행될 수 있도록 주변 국가와 깊이 있는 협력이 필요할 것이다.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제17권2호
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• pp.101-124
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• 2007

The legal systems and open-door policies to foreign affairs in North Korea have been followed by those of China. Whereas an arbitration system of South Korea accepted most parts of UNCITRAL Model Law, North Korea has succeeded to an arbitration system of a socialist country. China, under the arbitration system of socialist country, enacted an arbitration act reflected from UNCITRAL Model Law for keeping face with international trends. We have used these three arbitration system as a tool for analyzing an arbitration system in North Korea. With an open-door policy, North Korea and China enacted an arbitration act to provide a legal security. Therefore, the core parts of arbitration system in North Korea and China are based on a socialist system while those of South Korea is on liberalism. So, North Korea and China enacted an arbitration act on the basis of institutional arbitration, on the other side, South Korea is based on ad-hoc arbitration. Because of these characters, in terms of party autonomy, it is recognized with the order as South Korea, China and North Korea. Also North Korea enacted separate 'Foreign Economic Arbitration Act' to resolve disputes arising out of foreign economies including commercial things and investments. There are differences in arbitration procedures and appointment of arbitrators : South Korea recognizes parties' autonomy, however parties should follow the arbitration rules of arbitration institutes in North Korea and China. According to an appointment of arbitrators, if parties fail to appoint co-arbitrators or chief arbitrators by a mutual agreement, the court has the right to appoint them. In case of following KCAB's rules, KCAB secretariats take a scoring system by providing a list of candidates. A party has to appoint arbitrators out of the lists provided by arbitration board(or committee) in North Korea. If a party may fail to appoint a chief arbitrator, President of International Trade Arbitration Board(or Committee) may appoint it. In China, if parties fail to appoint a co-arbitrator or a chief arbitrator by a mutual agreement, Secretary general will decide it. If a arbitral tribunal fails to give a final award by a majority decision, a chief arbitrator has the right for a final decision making. These arbitration systems in North Korea and China are one of concerns that our companies take into account in conducting arbitration procedures inside China. It is only possible for a party to enforce a final arbitral award when he applies an arbitration inside North Korea according to International Trade Arbitration Act because North Korea has not joined the New York Convention. It's doubtful that a party might be treated very fairly in arbitration procedures in North Korea because International Trade Promotion Commission controls(or exercises its rights against) International Trade Arbitration Commission(or Board).

• 한국노년학
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• 제38권3호
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• pp.453-466
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• 2018

본 연구의 목적은 정책 비교를 통한 한국의 장기요양보험 제도가 중국 청도의 장기요양보험 시스템 구축에 미치는 영향과 시사점을 검토하는데 있다. 중국과 한국의 문화배경, 생활습관 및 인구구조 등 다양한 측면에서 매우 유사하여 한국 장기요양보험의 성공적인 경험은 중국 청도의 장기요양보험 제도를 구축하는 데 큰 도움이 될 것으로 판단된다. 이에 본 연구는 문헌연구를 통해 Gilbert & Terrell의 사회복지정책분석 프레임워크에서 청도와 한국의 장기요양보험 정책을 비교해 보았다. 정책비교를 통해 청도의 현재 시범 정책 문제점들로 입법 지원 부족, 재정 독립 그리고 심사 기준 등이 명확하지 않고 인적자원 부족을 논의하였다. 이에 다양한 차원에서의 정책비교를 통해 법제 지원, 평가기준 상세화, 혜택범주 확대화, 서비스네트워크 강화, 재원 최적화를 위해 청도의 장기요양보험 개선 제안들을 결론으로 제시해 보았다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권34호
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• pp.128-148
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• 2014

In south Korea, the so-called 'conservative-liberal' rivalry over the assessment of the government's North Korean policies is seen to be impeding the road to right policy choices. For example, the liberals accused former President Lee Myung-bak's hardline policy of provoking Pyongyang and leading to a deterioration of inter-Korean relations, while the conservatives appreciated it for helping nurture mutually beneficial inter-Korean relations in the longer term by compelling North Korea to observe international norms. However, such debate over the vices and virtues of Seoul's North Korea policies is hardly meaningful as the measuring sticks used by the liberals and the conservatives are entirely different matters. The two major goals South Korea must pursue with its North Korean policies should be 'peaceful management of division' and 'change in North Korea'. The former is related to maintaining stability within South Korea and promoting co-prosperity with North Korea. For this, the nation needs to engage, encompass and assist the Pyongyang regime. The second goal is also necessary since South Korea, as a divided nation, must seek a unified Korea under the system of democracy and market economies by bringing change in North Korea. For this, South Korea needs powerful leverages with which it can persuade and coerce the North. This means that the nation is destined to simultaneously chase the above-mentioned two goals, while also both recognizing and negating the legitimacy of the North Korean regime. This situation necessitates Seoul to apply flexibility in reconciling with Pyongyang while applying firm principles to sever the vicious circle involving the North's military provocations. The May 25 Measures, which banned trade and economic cooperation with the North except those related to humanitarian assistance, were taken as sanctions against Pyongyang for sinking the South Korean corvette Chonan in March 2010. The Measures were taken by the Seoul government immediately after a multinational investigation team discovered evidence confirming that the South Korean naval ship had been torpedoed by a midget North Korean submarine. Naturally, the May 24 Measures have since then become a major stumbling block in inter-Korean exchange, prompting opposition politicians and concerned entrepreneurs to demand Seoul to unilaterally lift the Measures. Given the significant damages the Measures have inflicted on inter-Korean economic relations, removing them remains as homework for both Koreas. However, the Measures pertains to the 'principles on national security' the Seoul government must adhere to under all circumstances. This is why North Korea's apology and promises not to repeat similar provocations must come first. For now, South Korea has no alternative but to let North Korea solve the problems it has created. South Korea's role is to help the North do so.

• 한국과 국제사회
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• 제1권1호
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• pp.71-96
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• 2017

이 연구는 북한 핵위협에 대한 대응과 미래 한반도 통일과정에서 한 미 중 3개국의 공조체제와 협력구상에 관한 것이다. 북핵문제와 한반도 통일문제에서 한 미 중의 공조와 협력 및 역할과 책임에 있어서 한국은 민족분단의 당사자이고, 미국은 국제문제의 책임국가이자 북한과는 적대적 미수교국이라는 점이며, 중국은 전통적 사회주의 우호관계의 당사국이자 북한 후견인 당사국이라는 점을 지적할 수 있다. 북한의 핵무기와 탄도미사일 등의 전략무기는 국제적 문제로서 향후 김정은의 돌발적 행동에 대비하기 위해서는 한 미 중 3국의 적극적인 공조와 협력 등 대응방안이 모색되어져야 할 시점이다. 그러나 북핵문제의 로드맵에 있어서 G2체제의 미국과 중국의 인식과 대응방법은 유엔안 보리결의사항인 대북제재 이행에서 미묘한 차이를 보이고 있다. 미국은 북핵위협에 대해 한미동맹차원에서 공동위협에 기반한 대북제재와 대북군사력 억제정책을 강력히 추진한 반면, 중국은 북핵위협에 대해 미국의 한반도개입에 대한 안보불안 등으로 북핵해결 과정에서 소극적인 입장을 보이고 있다. 북한은 체제생존 차원에서 중동국가들과 전략무기 거래를 지속적으로 해 온 전례국가라는 점에서 세계평화유지 차원에서라도 중단된 6자회담 다자안보 채널가동 등 압박과 외교협상의 현실적 방안으로 전환해야 한다. 한반도 통일문제는 남북한 당사자의 문제가 전제되어야 함에도 남북한은 민족적 문제를 강대국에 논리에 편승하려는 기현상을 보이고 있다. 그럼에도 북핵과 남북통일문제는 민족 당사자문제로서 국제적 지지를 확보하지 못한 북한의 해법보다는 한국주도의 평화적 해법에 더 설득력이 있어 보인다. 하지만 한 미 중은 한반도 평화정착을 위한 북한에 대한 '대북제재'와 '북한과의 대화'라는 투트랙 전략을 전방위적으로 강구해 나갈 필요성이 있으며, 북한자체의 경제적 자생력을 꾸준히 향상시키는 지원노력을 지속적으로 추진해 나가야 한다.