The year 2010 has been regarded as a year of China's assertive diplomacy. A series of China's behavior--including China's critical reaction to the U.S. for its sales of weapons to Taiwan, the Dalai Lama's visit to President Obama, China's arbitrary designation of 'core interests' over the South China Sea, China's inordinate reactions to the sinking of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong bombardment, and China's activities in the Senkaku/Diaoyu island areas--has served as the witnesses to China's assertive diplomacy in 2010. The major causes of China's assertive diplomacy can be summed up by three factors: potential power transition from U.S. to China; emerging China's nationalism; and the recession of the Tao Guang Yang Hui as a diplomatic principle. But a majority of Western sinologists claim that China's assertive diplomacy is defensive in terms of its character. China's neighboring states, however, perceive its assertive diplomacy as diplomatic threat. Due to these states' geographical proximity and capability gaps with China, these neighbors experience difficulties in coping with China's behavior. In particular, China's coercive economic diplomacy, in which China tends to manipulate the neighbors' economic dependency on China for its diplomatic leverage, is a case in point for China's assertive diplomacy. China's assertiveness seems to be continued even after the inauguration of Xi Jinping government. Although the Xi government's diplomatic rhetorics in "New Type of Great Power Relationship" and the "Convention for Neighboring States Policy" sound friendly and cooperative, its subsequent behavior, like unilateral announcement of Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (CADIZ), does not conform with its rhetoric. Overall, China's assertiveness has been consolidated as a fashion of its diplomacy, and it is likely to continue in its relations with neighbors. As a neighboring state, the ROK should approach to it with more balanced attitude. In addition, it needs to find out a new diplomatic leverage to deal with China in accordance with its security environment, in which China plays a growing role.
Celebrating its $50^{th}$ anniversary in 2017, the leaders of ASEAN member sates have adopted a series of declarations and action plans for enhancing its institutional capability and functional cooperation. ASEAN's convening power is expected to underpin its centrality and resilience. Meanwhile, ASEAN's retreat from democracy has increasingly become a hindrance for its further development. This article reviews the process of ASEAN's community building and its external relations. First, it argues that there is increasing concerns over ASEAN's limited capability in dealing with regional issues mainly caused by the deprivation of human rights and the democracy in crisis. Second, this article considers the dynamics of ASEAN's external relations mainly focusing on its relations with China, the United States, and South Korea. The South China Sea issue and China's increasing economic influence in the region have contributed to the complexity of ASEAN-China relations. The ASEAN's responses to the shift in American foreign policy under the Trump administration posits the unity of ASEAN. The New Southern Policy initiated by South Korean President, Moon Jae-in appears to be a new focal point of Korea-ASEAN relations despite considerable challenges, which requires to maintain ASEAN centrality.
The article is devoted to the theoretical and practical analysis of Chinese global leadership. The concept of leadership is applied as a methodology, which involves identifying the main factors, such as strategic power, the attractiveness of political institutions, the ability to provide acceptable ideas and the presence of allies that contribute to a comprehensive analysis of the country's leadership potential. The authors also describe the relevance of Chinese global leadership and analyze its domestic, economic and international causes. Moreover, the ''Belt and Road'' initiative is defined as the main mechanism for providing the influence of China on the global level which is now being changed its quantitative component, namely the increasing attention to the security aspects of this initiative. In addition to that, it is important to note that China maintains its economic and political positions in Africa, Central Asia and South-East Asia. Africa has a special role in the Chinese ''Belt and Road'' initiative as a recipient of Chinese investments and a site for the deployment of China's naval facilities to protect the trade routes. On the regional level, China will strive to become a leader of the trade and economic processes in the Asia-Pacific region, the South China Sea and the North Korea nuclear program issues. The American factor in modern international relations, namely so-called "Trump factor", which means the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris Agreement, will cause demand for Chinese leadership in the Asia-Pacific region and in the world as well. However, in this case a number of questions arise: is China prepared for this? Is Beijing able to bear greater responsibility? Does China have the potential for this? The article concludes that China will not become global leaders in the next 20-30 years, because of internal (political reforms) and foreign policy reasons (doctrinal formulation of foreign policy initiatives, military-political and economic power, international posture and relations with other states). The authors believe that the implementation of Chinese leadership is possible not on the condition of confrontation between China and the United States, but on the establishing of constructive relations between these countries. The last meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping showed a trend for creating channels for dialogue between Beijing and Washington, which can become the basis for interaction. An important place in the work is given to the analysis of development and forecasting the evolution of Russian-Chinese and U.S.-China relations. As for Russia, Moscow should conduct a policy that will not allow it to become a ''junior partner'' of China.
The purpose of this study is to examine the main features of South Korea's New Northern Policy and to make some suggestions for cooperation with neighboring countries' initiatives. The New Northern Policy encompasses the whole of Eurasia, but the starting development area would be the border region of the Korean Peninsula. In this viewpoint, this study examines the Belt and Road Initiative of China, the New Eastern Policy of Russia and the Steppe Road Initiative of Mongolia, and presents the characteristics, problems and some implementation strategies of the New Northern Policy. Apart from the future possibilities of the regional cooperations that include North Korea, it would be necessary for South Korea to secure and expand the possible opportunities for "Korea-China-Mongolia-Russia" cooperation. In order to create a close cooperative environment with North Korea in the future, it would also be necessary to build a maritime route, with port development around major border regions on the Korean Peninsula, including Russia, and to develop the port-railway intermodal transportation system with neighboring countries. South Korea need to actively cooperate with neighboring countries to develop the new Eurasia logistics routes would be more favorable to the Korean Peninsula in preparation for the time when the North Korean nuclear issue will be resolved.
The legal systems and open-door policies to foreign affairs in North Korea have been followed by those of China. Whereas an arbitration system of South Korea accepted most parts of UNCITRAL Model Law, North Korea has succeeded to an arbitration system of a socialist country. China, under the arbitration system of socialist country, enacted an arbitration act reflected from UNCITRAL Model Law for keeping face with international trends. We have used these three arbitration system as a tool for analyzing an arbitration system in North Korea. With an open-door policy, North Korea and China enacted an arbitration act to provide a legal security. Therefore, the core parts of arbitration system in North Korea and China are based on a socialist system while those of South Korea is on liberalism. So, North Korea and China enacted an arbitration act on the basis of institutional arbitration, on the other side, South Korea is based on ad-hoc arbitration. Because of these characters, in terms of party autonomy, it is recognized with the order as South Korea, China and North Korea. Also North Korea enacted separate 'Foreign Economic Arbitration Act' to resolve disputes arising out of foreign economies including commercial things and investments. There are differences in arbitration procedures and appointment of arbitrators : South Korea recognizes parties' autonomy, however parties should follow the arbitration rules of arbitration institutes in North Korea and China. According to an appointment of arbitrators, if parties fail to appoint co-arbitrators or chief arbitrators by a mutual agreement, the court has the right to appoint them. In case of following KCAB's rules, KCAB secretariats take a scoring system by providing a list of candidates. A party has to appoint arbitrators out of the lists provided by arbitration board(or committee) in North Korea. If a party may fail to appoint a chief arbitrator, President of International Trade Arbitration Board(or Committee) may appoint it. In China, if parties fail to appoint a co-arbitrator or a chief arbitrator by a mutual agreement, Secretary general will decide it. If a arbitral tribunal fails to give a final award by a majority decision, a chief arbitrator has the right for a final decision making. These arbitration systems in North Korea and China are one of concerns that our companies take into account in conducting arbitration procedures inside China. It is only possible for a party to enforce a final arbitral award when he applies an arbitration inside North Korea according to International Trade Arbitration Act because North Korea has not joined the New York Convention. It's doubtful that a party might be treated very fairly in arbitration procedures in North Korea because International Trade Promotion Commission controls(or exercises its rights against) International Trade Arbitration Commission(or Board).
The purpose of this study is to explore the enlightenment of the Korean long-term care insurance policy on Qingdao's long-term care insurance policy through policy comparison. China and Korea are very similar in terms of cultural background, living habits, and population structure. Therefore, the successful experience of Korean long-term care insurance has great implications for Qingdao even China to build a long-term care insurance system. Through the literature review, this article compares the long-term care insurance policy implemented by Qingdao City and Korea in Gilbert & Terrell's social welfare policy analysis framework. With the comparison this article discusses about the existing problems of the current pilot policy system in Qingdao, such as lack of legislation support and financial independence, assessment standards are not detailed, and human resources are insufficient. The author raises five suggestions to improve Qingdao's long-term care policy as the conclusion of this paper: legislation support, detailed assessment standard, expand categories of benefits, enrich delivery network, optimize financing sources.
In south Korea, the so-called 'conservative-liberal' rivalry over the assessment of the government's North Korean policies is seen to be impeding the road to right policy choices. For example, the liberals accused former President Lee Myung-bak's hardline policy of provoking Pyongyang and leading to a deterioration of inter-Korean relations, while the conservatives appreciated it for helping nurture mutually beneficial inter-Korean relations in the longer term by compelling North Korea to observe international norms. However, such debate over the vices and virtues of Seoul's North Korea policies is hardly meaningful as the measuring sticks used by the liberals and the conservatives are entirely different matters. The two major goals South Korea must pursue with its North Korean policies should be 'peaceful management of division' and 'change in North Korea'. The former is related to maintaining stability within South Korea and promoting co-prosperity with North Korea. For this, the nation needs to engage, encompass and assist the Pyongyang regime. The second goal is also necessary since South Korea, as a divided nation, must seek a unified Korea under the system of democracy and market economies by bringing change in North Korea. For this, South Korea needs powerful leverages with which it can persuade and coerce the North. This means that the nation is destined to simultaneously chase the above-mentioned two goals, while also both recognizing and negating the legitimacy of the North Korean regime. This situation necessitates Seoul to apply flexibility in reconciling with Pyongyang while applying firm principles to sever the vicious circle involving the North's military provocations. The May 25 Measures, which banned trade and economic cooperation with the North except those related to humanitarian assistance, were taken as sanctions against Pyongyang for sinking the South Korean corvette Chonan in March 2010. The Measures were taken by the Seoul government immediately after a multinational investigation team discovered evidence confirming that the South Korean naval ship had been torpedoed by a midget North Korean submarine. Naturally, the May 24 Measures have since then become a major stumbling block in inter-Korean exchange, prompting opposition politicians and concerned entrepreneurs to demand Seoul to unilaterally lift the Measures. Given the significant damages the Measures have inflicted on inter-Korean economic relations, removing them remains as homework for both Koreas. However, the Measures pertains to the 'principles on national security' the Seoul government must adhere to under all circumstances. This is why North Korea's apology and promises not to repeat similar provocations must come first. For now, South Korea has no alternative but to let North Korea solve the problems it has created. South Korea's role is to help the North do so.
This study speculates on responses to the nuclear threats of North Korea and mutual assistance and cooperation between South Korea, the U.S. and China for the unification of the Korean Peninsula. As for the North Koreas nuclear issue and unification of the Korean Peninsula, South Korea is the subject of national division, the U.S. is a responsible country in international issues and does not have diplomatic ties with North Korea. China is a traditional socialist nation and a supporter of North Korea. As North Korea's strategic weapons including nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles are international issues, to defend against Kim Jung-Eun's unexpected acts, the three countries should actively cooperate with each other and develop countermeasures. However, with respect to the road map of the North Koreas issue, there are subtle differences between the U.S. and China in recognition of and sanctions against North Korea as a resolution of the U..N. Security Council. The U.S. has continued a deterrence policy and sanctions against North Korea based on joint threats between South Korea and the U.S. while China has showed a negative position in the process of solving the North Korean nuclear issue because of the unstable security derived from the U.S. 's intervention in the Korean peninsula. North Korea should change its diplomatic policy in a more concrete way towards world peace although it has continued trade of strategic weapons with Middle Eastern countries to maintain its political system. For example, to restart the summit talks and open multilateral security channels. Although the issue of unification of the Korean peninsula should be resolved by South and North Korea themselves, it is strange that South and North Korea depend on the logic of powerful countries for the resolution of a national problem. As for North Koreas nuclear and the Unification issues, peaceful solutions presented by South Korea seem more persuasive than the solution presented by North Korea which did not secure any international support. However, South Korea, the U.S. and China need to develop uni-directional two-tract strategies for sanctions against North Korea and talks with North Korea for peace on the Korean peninsula, and should continue to support the economic independence of North Korea.
During the ancient times, there was no separative judicial system and administrative , legislative and judiciary functions were ultimately concentrated in the all-powerful monarch. And the three states developed state organization , adopting hieratical structures and placing at the pinnacle . State Codes were promulgated to initiate a legal system to rule the people, these codes instituted under influence of China codes. The people tradition sees crime control as the preservation of the authority of hereditary rulers. In the period of the Koryeo dynasty, government accepted a serious of detailed penal code from Tang dynasty . Legal response to crime stressed preservation of the dynasty rather than making citizen behave according to certain rules. In the period of Early Joseon , the compilation of Grand Code for state administration was initiated, the Kyeongkuk Taejeon ,became comer stone of the dynastic administration and provided the monarchial system with a sort of constitutional law in written form. This national code was in portant means of criminal policy at that time, Late Joseon , the impact of Western culture entering through China gave further impetus to pragmatic studies which called for socio-economic reforms and readjustment. Approach to criminal justice policy emphasized more equitable operation of the criminal justice system ,rehabilitation and crime control. Korea-Japanese Treaty concluded on 22 August ,1910 and proclaim a week later ,Japan gave the coup de grace to the Korea Empire and changed the office of the Resident - General into the Government - General . Thus korean criminal policy were lost during a dark ages ,which lasted for 36 years after fall of Joseon Dynasty (the colnial period,1910${\sim}$1945). After 1945 Korea's liberation from Japanese colonial rule, the occupation of devided Korea by the United States and Soviet Union frustrated the efforts of Koreans to establish an independent government, and the transplantation of two conflicting political ideologies to south and the north of the 38th parallel further intensified the national split. U.S. military government office occupied the south of the 38 the parallel and placed emphasis on democracy of criminal policy. ln 1948, the U.S. military government handed over to the ROK government its administrative authority.
In this paper, in order to improve the online game fatigue system for the purpose of use in South Korea and China's online game fatigue system analysis and comparison and find the problem and make improvements..Poisoning Prevention Youth Network game system, although many of the practical implementation of the research is very inadequate.So here we do it by comparing South Korea and China's online game fatigue system, promote physical fatigue perfect game addicted youth to further resolve the issue.
본 웹사이트에 게시된 이메일 주소가 전자우편 수집 프로그램이나
그 밖의 기술적 장치를 이용하여 무단으로 수집되는 것을 거부하며,
이를 위반시 정보통신망법에 의해 형사 처벌됨을 유념하시기 바랍니다.
[게시일 2004년 10월 1일]
이용약관
제 1 장 총칙
제 1 조 (목적)
이 이용약관은 KoreaScience 홈페이지(이하 “당 사이트”)에서 제공하는 인터넷 서비스(이하 '서비스')의 가입조건 및 이용에 관한 제반 사항과 기타 필요한 사항을 구체적으로 규정함을 목적으로 합니다.
제 2 조 (용어의 정의)
① "이용자"라 함은 당 사이트에 접속하여 이 약관에 따라 당 사이트가 제공하는 서비스를 받는 회원 및 비회원을
말합니다.
② "회원"이라 함은 서비스를 이용하기 위하여 당 사이트에 개인정보를 제공하여 아이디(ID)와 비밀번호를 부여
받은 자를 말합니다.
③ "회원 아이디(ID)"라 함은 회원의 식별 및 서비스 이용을 위하여 자신이 선정한 문자 및 숫자의 조합을
말합니다.
④ "비밀번호(패스워드)"라 함은 회원이 자신의 비밀보호를 위하여 선정한 문자 및 숫자의 조합을 말합니다.
제 3 조 (이용약관의 효력 및 변경)
① 이 약관은 당 사이트에 게시하거나 기타의 방법으로 회원에게 공지함으로써 효력이 발생합니다.
② 당 사이트는 이 약관을 개정할 경우에 적용일자 및 개정사유를 명시하여 현행 약관과 함께 당 사이트의
초기화면에 그 적용일자 7일 이전부터 적용일자 전일까지 공지합니다. 다만, 회원에게 불리하게 약관내용을
변경하는 경우에는 최소한 30일 이상의 사전 유예기간을 두고 공지합니다. 이 경우 당 사이트는 개정 전
내용과 개정 후 내용을 명확하게 비교하여 이용자가 알기 쉽도록 표시합니다.
제 4 조(약관 외 준칙)
① 이 약관은 당 사이트가 제공하는 서비스에 관한 이용안내와 함께 적용됩니다.
② 이 약관에 명시되지 아니한 사항은 관계법령의 규정이 적용됩니다.
제 2 장 이용계약의 체결
제 5 조 (이용계약의 성립 등)
① 이용계약은 이용고객이 당 사이트가 정한 약관에 「동의합니다」를 선택하고, 당 사이트가 정한
온라인신청양식을 작성하여 서비스 이용을 신청한 후, 당 사이트가 이를 승낙함으로써 성립합니다.
② 제1항의 승낙은 당 사이트가 제공하는 과학기술정보검색, 맞춤정보, 서지정보 등 다른 서비스의 이용승낙을
포함합니다.
제 6 조 (회원가입)
서비스를 이용하고자 하는 고객은 당 사이트에서 정한 회원가입양식에 개인정보를 기재하여 가입을 하여야 합니다.
제 7 조 (개인정보의 보호 및 사용)
당 사이트는 관계법령이 정하는 바에 따라 회원 등록정보를 포함한 회원의 개인정보를 보호하기 위해 노력합니다. 회원 개인정보의 보호 및 사용에 대해서는 관련법령 및 당 사이트의 개인정보 보호정책이 적용됩니다.
제 8 조 (이용 신청의 승낙과 제한)
① 당 사이트는 제6조의 규정에 의한 이용신청고객에 대하여 서비스 이용을 승낙합니다.
② 당 사이트는 아래사항에 해당하는 경우에 대해서 승낙하지 아니 합니다.
- 이용계약 신청서의 내용을 허위로 기재한 경우
- 기타 규정한 제반사항을 위반하며 신청하는 경우
제 9 조 (회원 ID 부여 및 변경 등)
① 당 사이트는 이용고객에 대하여 약관에 정하는 바에 따라 자신이 선정한 회원 ID를 부여합니다.
② 회원 ID는 원칙적으로 변경이 불가하며 부득이한 사유로 인하여 변경 하고자 하는 경우에는 해당 ID를
해지하고 재가입해야 합니다.
③ 기타 회원 개인정보 관리 및 변경 등에 관한 사항은 서비스별 안내에 정하는 바에 의합니다.
제 3 장 계약 당사자의 의무
제 10 조 (KISTI의 의무)
① 당 사이트는 이용고객이 희망한 서비스 제공 개시일에 특별한 사정이 없는 한 서비스를 이용할 수 있도록
하여야 합니다.
② 당 사이트는 개인정보 보호를 위해 보안시스템을 구축하며 개인정보 보호정책을 공시하고 준수합니다.
③ 당 사이트는 회원으로부터 제기되는 의견이나 불만이 정당하다고 객관적으로 인정될 경우에는 적절한 절차를
거쳐 즉시 처리하여야 합니다. 다만, 즉시 처리가 곤란한 경우는 회원에게 그 사유와 처리일정을 통보하여야
합니다.
제 11 조 (회원의 의무)
① 이용자는 회원가입 신청 또는 회원정보 변경 시 실명으로 모든 사항을 사실에 근거하여 작성하여야 하며,
허위 또는 타인의 정보를 등록할 경우 일체의 권리를 주장할 수 없습니다.
② 당 사이트가 관계법령 및 개인정보 보호정책에 의거하여 그 책임을 지는 경우를 제외하고 회원에게 부여된
ID의 비밀번호 관리소홀, 부정사용에 의하여 발생하는 모든 결과에 대한 책임은 회원에게 있습니다.
③ 회원은 당 사이트 및 제 3자의 지적 재산권을 침해해서는 안 됩니다.
제 4 장 서비스의 이용
제 12 조 (서비스 이용 시간)
① 서비스 이용은 당 사이트의 업무상 또는 기술상 특별한 지장이 없는 한 연중무휴, 1일 24시간 운영을
원칙으로 합니다. 단, 당 사이트는 시스템 정기점검, 증설 및 교체를 위해 당 사이트가 정한 날이나 시간에
서비스를 일시 중단할 수 있으며, 예정되어 있는 작업으로 인한 서비스 일시중단은 당 사이트 홈페이지를
통해 사전에 공지합니다.
② 당 사이트는 서비스를 특정범위로 분할하여 각 범위별로 이용가능시간을 별도로 지정할 수 있습니다. 다만
이 경우 그 내용을 공지합니다.
제 13 조 (홈페이지 저작권)
① NDSL에서 제공하는 모든 저작물의 저작권은 원저작자에게 있으며, KISTI는 복제/배포/전송권을 확보하고
있습니다.
② NDSL에서 제공하는 콘텐츠를 상업적 및 기타 영리목적으로 복제/배포/전송할 경우 사전에 KISTI의 허락을
받아야 합니다.
③ NDSL에서 제공하는 콘텐츠를 보도, 비평, 교육, 연구 등을 위하여 정당한 범위 안에서 공정한 관행에
합치되게 인용할 수 있습니다.
④ NDSL에서 제공하는 콘텐츠를 무단 복제, 전송, 배포 기타 저작권법에 위반되는 방법으로 이용할 경우
저작권법 제136조에 따라 5년 이하의 징역 또는 5천만 원 이하의 벌금에 처해질 수 있습니다.
제 14 조 (유료서비스)
① 당 사이트 및 협력기관이 정한 유료서비스(원문복사 등)는 별도로 정해진 바에 따르며, 변경사항은 시행 전에
당 사이트 홈페이지를 통하여 회원에게 공지합니다.
② 유료서비스를 이용하려는 회원은 정해진 요금체계에 따라 요금을 납부해야 합니다.
제 5 장 계약 해지 및 이용 제한
제 15 조 (계약 해지)
회원이 이용계약을 해지하고자 하는 때에는 [가입해지] 메뉴를 이용해 직접 해지해야 합니다.
제 16 조 (서비스 이용제한)
① 당 사이트는 회원이 서비스 이용내용에 있어서 본 약관 제 11조 내용을 위반하거나, 다음 각 호에 해당하는
경우 서비스 이용을 제한할 수 있습니다.
- 2년 이상 서비스를 이용한 적이 없는 경우
- 기타 정상적인 서비스 운영에 방해가 될 경우
② 상기 이용제한 규정에 따라 서비스를 이용하는 회원에게 서비스 이용에 대하여 별도 공지 없이 서비스 이용의
일시정지, 이용계약 해지 할 수 있습니다.
제 17 조 (전자우편주소 수집 금지)
회원은 전자우편주소 추출기 등을 이용하여 전자우편주소를 수집 또는 제3자에게 제공할 수 없습니다.
제 6 장 손해배상 및 기타사항
제 18 조 (손해배상)
당 사이트는 무료로 제공되는 서비스와 관련하여 회원에게 어떠한 손해가 발생하더라도 당 사이트가 고의 또는 과실로 인한 손해발생을 제외하고는 이에 대하여 책임을 부담하지 아니합니다.
제 19 조 (관할 법원)
서비스 이용으로 발생한 분쟁에 대해 소송이 제기되는 경우 민사 소송법상의 관할 법원에 제기합니다.
[부 칙]
1. (시행일) 이 약관은 2016년 9월 5일부터 적용되며, 종전 약관은 본 약관으로 대체되며, 개정된 약관의 적용일 이전 가입자도 개정된 약관의 적용을 받습니다.