• 산업경영시스템학회지
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• 제37권4호
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• pp.145-153
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• 2014

In this paper, we study the bargaining strategy of a manufacturer who sells a product through the online and offline distribution channels. To do this, we derive and analyze the equilibrium solutions for both simultaneous and sequential bargaining games. The result shows that the optimal bargaining strategy heavily depends on the size of the online distribution channel's loyal customers and the difference between the retail prices of the online and the offline distribution channels. It is also shown that, in some cases, the online distribution channel has incentive to downsize its loyal customers and its retail price for a better bargaining outcome.

• 산업경영시스템학회지
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• 제38권2호
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• pp.31-39
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• 2015

In this paper, we study the bargaining strategy of a distributor who sells vertically differentiated, i.e. high and low brand products. We derive and analyze the equilibrium solutions for both simultaneous and sequential bargaining games among the distributor, the high brand product manufacturer and the low brand product manufacturer. The result shows that the optimal bargaining strategy for the distributor heavily depends on the relative quality and price level of the low brand product comparing to those of the high brand product. It is also shown that, for more bargaining profit, the distributor has strong motivation to prefer a low brand product which has lower quality level per unit price.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• 제35권1호
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• pp.137-146
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• 2013

본 논문은 복수의 피의자가 존재하는 경우 시차 제안을 통해 유죄인정감형제도의 효과를 긍정적으로 유도할 수 있음을 보였다. 시차 제안의 가능성으로 인해 피의자에게 제시되는 양형 감량이 최소화될 수 있음이 제시되었고, 모든 피의자가 유죄를 인정하게 되는 균형점 이외의 해가 존재함을 증명하였다. 시차 제안의 허용으로 인해 검사는 보다 높은 수준의 협상력을 지니게 되며, 이를 통해 피의자에게 엄정한 양형을 부여함으로써 사회후생을 증가시킬 수 있게 된다.

• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제22권3호
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• pp.209-222
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• 1997

In this paper, we study a bargaining order problem where one buyer sequentially bargains with two sellers whose reservation prices are unknown to the buyer but correlated. Our main question is who the buyer should bargain first with to maximize his expected payoff. This type of problem is widely applicable to business and political situations where one party negotiates with multiple parties sequentially. One of the most important element in a sequential bargaining is "linkage effect" which exists when the aggreement of the previous bargaining affects the outcome of the following bargaining. To examine "linkage effect", we assume that the sellers'objects are similar so that the sellers' reservation prices are correlated. In addition, to consider incomplete information aspect regarding reservation prices, it is assumed that the sellers' reservation prices are unknown to the buyer. That is, we deal with one sided incomplete information case. In our model, there are two stages in each of which the buyer meets one seller. Since we are concerned with the bargaining order, we consider two different bargaining orders. Using game theory, we find a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and compute the buyer's expected payoff for each bargaining order. Finally we identify the advantageous bargaining order for the buyer by comparing the expected payoffs obtained under two different bargaining orders. Our results are as follows: the advantageous bargaining order depends on the prior probability of the seller type. However, in general, the buyer should bargain first with the seller whose object is less valuable to the buyer. The basic reason for our result is that the buyer wants to experiment in the first stage to find out the sellers' reservation prices and in doing so, to minimize the experimental cost and maximize potential gain in case of negotiation failure in the first stage. in the first stage.

• 산업경영시스템학회지
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• 제38권4호
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• pp.80-87
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• 2015

The proliferation of the Internet and communication technologies and applications, besides the conventional retailers, has led to a new form of distribution channel, namely home sopping through the telephone, TV, catalog or the Internet. The conventional and new distribution channels have different transaction costs perceived by the consumers in the following perspectives: the accessibility to the product information, the traffic cost and the opportunity cost for the time to visit the store, the possibility of 'touch and feel' to test the quality of the product, the delivery time and the concern for the security for the personal information. Difference in the transaction costs between the distribution channels results in the different selling prices even for the same product. Moreover, distribution channels with different selling prices necessarily result in different business surpluses. In this paper, we study the multilateral bargaining strategy of a manufacturer who sells a product through multiple distribution channels with different transaction costs. We first derive the Nash equilibrium solutions for both simultaneous and sequential bargaining games. The numerical analyses for the Nash equilibrium solutions show that the optimal bargaining strategy of the manufacturer heavily depends not only on the degree of competition between the distribution channels but on the difference of the business surpluses of the distribution channels. First, it is shown that there can be four types of locally optimal bargaining strategies if we assume the market powers of the manufacturer over the distribution channels can be different. It is also shown that, among the four local optimal bargaining strategies, simultaneous bargaining with the distribution channels is the most preferred bargaining strategy for the manufacturer.

• 정보처리학회논문지:컴퓨터 및 통신 시스템
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• 제12권10호
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• pp.299-308
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• 2023

다양한 서비스가 등장으로 인해 스펙트럼 부족 문제가 가속하됨에 따라, 면허 대역에서 통신하던 사용자들을 비면허 대역에서 통신하는 NR-U(New Radio-Unlicensed)가 등장하였다. 하지만 NR-U 네트워크 사용자로 인해 동일한 비면허 대역에서 통신하는 Wi-Fi 네트워크 사용자의 성능이 감소하게 된다. 본 논문에서는 NR-U 네트워크 사용자와 WiFi 네트워크 사용자가 공존해있는 비면허 대역의 처리량과 비면허 대역의 사용에 대한 공평성을 동시에 최대화하는 것을 목표로 한다. 먼저 비면허 대역에서 전송률 분할 다중 접속 기술을 활용한 NR-U 네트워크의 합-전송 속도 (Sum of Rate)를 최대화하기 위해 강화 학습의 몬테 카를로 정책 하강법(Monte Carlo Policy Gradient)을 활용한 최적의 전력 할당 기법을 제안하였다. 그 뒤, 동일한 비면허 대역에서 NR-U 네트워크와 WiFi 네트워크의 공존을 위해 시스템 처리량과 공정성을 동시에 최대화할 수 있는 게임 이론의 순차적 라이파 협상 해법(Sequential Raiffa Bargaining Solution)을 활용한 채널 점유 시간 분할 알고리즘을 제안하였다. 시뮬레이션 결과에서 동일한 전력 할당 기법을 사용하였을 때, 본 논문에서 제안한 전송률 분할 다중 접속 기술이 기존의 다중 접속 기술들보다 더 빠른 합-전송속도를 보임을 확인하였다. 또한 비면허 대역 네트워크의 전송량과 공평성을 비교해본 결과 본 논문의 순차적 라이파 협상 해법을 활용한 채널 점유 시간 분할 알고리즘이 타 알고리즘보다 처리량과 공정성을 동시에 만족함을 입증하였다.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• 제3A권1호
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• pp.42-46
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• 2003

The economic operation of a utility in a deregulated environment brings about optimization problems different from those in vertically integrated one［1］. While each utility operates its own generation capacity to maximize profit, the market operator (or system operator) manages and allocates all the system resources and facilities to achieve the maximum social welfare. This paper presents a sequential application of non-cooperative and cooperative game theories in analyzing the entire power transaction process.