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Distributor's Multilateral Bargaining Strategy in the Vertically Differentiated Product Market

수직적으로 차별화된 제품시장 내에서 유통업체의 다자간 협상전략에 관한 연구

  • Cho, Hyung-Rae (Dept. of Industrial Systems Engineering/ERI, Gyeongsang National University) ;
  • Rhee, Minho (Dept. of Industrial Systems Engineering/ERI, Gyeongsang National University) ;
  • Lim, Sang-Gyu (Dept. of Industrial Systems Engineering/ERI, Gyeongsang National University)
  • 조형래 (경상대학교 공과대학 산업시스템공학부/공학연구원) ;
  • 이민호 (경상대학교 공과대학 산업시스템공학부/공학연구원) ;
  • 임상규 (경상대학교 공과대학 산업시스템공학부/공학연구원)
  • Received : 2015.03.23
  • Accepted : 2015.04.21
  • Published : 2015.06.30

Abstract

In this paper, we study the bargaining strategy of a distributor who sells vertically differentiated, i.e. high and low brand products. We derive and analyze the equilibrium solutions for both simultaneous and sequential bargaining games among the distributor, the high brand product manufacturer and the low brand product manufacturer. The result shows that the optimal bargaining strategy for the distributor heavily depends on the relative quality and price level of the low brand product comparing to those of the high brand product. It is also shown that, for more bargaining profit, the distributor has strong motivation to prefer a low brand product which has lower quality level per unit price.

Keywords

References

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