• Journal of Environmental Health Sciences
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• v.43 no.1
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• pp.1-22
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• 2017

'The worstest environment disaster', 'World's first biocide massacre', 'Home-based Sewol ferry disaster' are all phrases attached to the recent humidifier disinfectant disaster. In the spring of 2011, four of 8 pregnant women including 1 adult man passed away at a university hospital in Seoul due to breathing failure. Epidemiologic investigation conducted by the Korean CDC soon revealed the inhalation of humidifier disinfectant, which had been widely used in Korea during the winter, to be responsible for the disease. As well as lung fibrosis hardening of the lungs, other diseases including asthma, rhinitis, skin disease, liver disease, fetal disease or cancers have been researched for their relation with exposure to the products. By February 9, 2017, 5,342 cases had registered for health problems and 1,131 of them were already dead (20.8% mortality rate). Based on studies by government agencies and a telephone survey of the general population by Seoul National University and civic groups, around 20% of the general public of Korea has used these products. Since the market release of the first product by SK Chemical in 1994, over 7.1 million items from around 20 brands were sold up to 2011. Most of the products were manufactured by well-known large conglomerates such as SK, Lotte, Samsung, Shinsegye, LG, and GS, as well as some European companies including UK-based Reckitt Benckiser and TESCO, the German firm Henkel, the Danish firm KeTox, and an Irish company. Even though this disaster was unveiled in 2011 by the Korean government, the issue of the victims was neglected for over five years. In 2016, an unexpected but intensive investigation by prosecutors found that Reckitt Benckiser manipulated and concealed animal tests for its own brand and brought several university experts and company employees to court. The matter was an intense social issue in Korea from May to June with a surge in media coverage. The prosecutor's investigation and a nationwide boycott campaign organized by victims and environmental groups against Reckitt Benckiser, whose product had been used by more than 70% of victims, led to the producer's official apology and a compensation scheme. A legislative investigation organized after the April 2016 national election revealed the producers' faults and the government's responsibility, but failed to meet expectations. A special law for the victims passed the National Assembly in January 2017 and a punitive system together with a massive environmental epidemiology investigation are expected to be the only solutions for this tragedy. Sciences of medicine, toxicology and environmental health have provided decisive evidence so far, but for the remaining problems the perspectives of social sciences such as sociology and jurisprudence are highly necessary, similar to with the Minamata disease and Wonjin Rayon events. It may not be easy to follow this issue using unfamiliar terminology from medical and chemical science and the long, complicated history of the event. For these reasons the author has attempted to write this article in a question and answer format to render it easier to follow. The 17 questions are: Q1 What is humidifier disinfectant? Q2 What kind of health problems are caused by humidifier disinfectant? Q3 How many victims are there? Q4 What is the analysis of the 1,112 cases of death? Q5 What is the problem with the government's diagnostic criteria and the solution? Q6 Who made what brands? Q7 Has there been a recall? What is still on sale? Q8 Was safety not checked by any producers? Q9 What are the government's responsibilities? Q10 Is it true that these products were sold only in Korea? Q11 Why and how was it unveiled only in 2011 after 17 years of sales? Q12 What delayed the resolution of the victim issue? Q13 What is the background of the prosecutor's investigation in early 2016? Q14 Is it possible to report new victim cases without evidence of product purchase? Q15 What is happening with the victim issue? Q16 How does it compare with the cases of Minamata disease and Wonjin Rayon? Q17 Are there prevention measures and lessons?

• The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.47-79
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• 2019

The Korean Society of Law and Medicine has faithfully played the role of professional academic organizations last 20 years in terms of academic activities, accumulated achievements, diversity, professionalism, and influence on academic circles. The Korean Society of Law and Medicine and the Journal of Medical Law serve as a platform for academic information and exchange of opinions on medical law. Medical law began in the midst of increasing conflicts and disputes caused by medical malpractice and the enactment and legal coercion of medical care as pressure on medical workers. It tried to find a way to coexist with each other through the encounter and convergence of medicine and law. Medical criminal law extends from traditional crimes in the realm of life and body protection to bioethics violations caused by the development of biomedical technology, corruption and economic crime in the medical field. Medical law has evolved into a comprehensive legal area dealing with legal issues raised in medical treatment, healthcare, bioethics, and life sciences technology. On the legal side, medical law is not independent legal areas. It is overlapping with traditional law areas such as civil law, administrative law, criminal law, social law, civil and criminal procedure law. However, it is now established as a convergence study in medicine, bioethics, life science, as well as in various fields of law. It has become an area where collaboration is needed with the field of law, medicine, ethics, sociology and economics. Medical criminal law has undergone a dynamic development over the last two decades. The development of medicine and medical technology provides new and innovative methods of diagnosis and treatment. The achievements and risks of revolutionary developments in biotechnology, genetic engineering and medicine coexist. While there is a dazzling achievement that mankind has hoped for: combating disease and improving health, it also creates unwanted side effects and risks to humans. There is a need to reconsider ethical and legal principles. The discovery and development of patient identity and autonomy has changed the medical doctor-patient relationship. Furthermore, it was complicated by the triangle relationship of patients, medical doctors and insurance. Legal matters are also complicated. This is why the necessity of legislation is emerging. Criminal punishment provisions are also required. The Medical Law and Biomedical Law are systematically and coherently deformed as mosaic-based legislation that takes place whenever there are social issues, citizens' needs, and medical organizations' interests, rather than sufficient enactment and revision procedures. It needs a complete overhaul, and this is possible through interdisciplinary collaboration which is the strength of The Korean Society of Law and Medicine.

• The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.173-206
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• 2019

This research examines the characteristic of regulation on Japanese clinical research in recent years. First, Japan has had a severe punishment policy on research misconduct like Korea, but, in recent days, Japan has changed the direction of research ethics policy from restriction to research publicness securement by educational training, in addition, Act of Clinical Research, effected April 2018, has recruited excellent researchers, and then integrated clinical research and medicine clinical trial through raising transparency of funding and integrating ethics screening by mandating announcement on funding information of clinical research. Second, Japan has integrated and organized ethics guideline from dual system that consists of ethics guideline on dynamic research(here after, referred to as 「dynamic guideline」) and ethics guideline on clinical research(here after, referred to as 「clinical guideline」) to ethics guideline on medical research aimed at human(here after, referred to as 「integrated guideline」), thus, it complements repetition and deficit of ethics guideline needed in clinical research and dynamic research, and it has risk evaluation system for protecting human subjects, and also it clarifies the concept of 「invasiveness」, a preliminary consideration of evaluation. 「Evaluation issue of risk and profit」, common contents of international regulation related clinical research, is the method to check whether the research is designed appropriately or not, this is the method for Institutional Review Board to decide whether the risk on human subjects could be justified, and also this is the important standard for future human subjects to participate in clinical trial. Therefore, it is meaningful to define 「invasiveness」 concept, a preliminary consideration of risk evaluation for human subjects. This research examines Japanese clinical trial focusing on change of awareness on prevention of research misconduct, efficiency improvement of research through research screening and integration of human subjects, and clarification and extension of range of 「invasiveness」 concept, a preliminary of risk evaluation to protect human subjects.

• Information Systems Review
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.17-39
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• 2018

SNS enables people to easily connect and communicate with each other. People share information, including personal information, through SNS. Users are concerned about their privacies, but they unconsciously or consciously disclose their personal information on SNS to interact with others. The privacy of a self-disclosed person can be intruded by others. A person can write, fabricate, or distribute a story using the disclosed information of another even without obtaining consent from the information owner. Many studies focused on privacy intrusion, especially from the perspective of a victim. However, only a few studies examined privacy intrusion from the perspective of an intruder on SNS. This study focuses on the intention of privacy intrusion from the perspective of an intruder on SNS and the factors that affect intention. Privacy intrusion intentions are categorized into two types. The first type is intrusion of privacy by writing one's personal information without obtaining consent from the information owner;, whereas the other type pertains to intrusion of privacy by distributing one's personal information without obtaining consent from the information owner. A research model is developed based on motivation theory to identify how these factors affect these two types of privacy intrusion intentions on SNS. From the perspective of motivation theory, we draw one extrinsic motivational factor (response cost) and four intrinsic motivational factors, namely, perceived enjoyment, experience of being intruded on privacy, experience of invading someone's privacy, and punishment behavior. After analyzing 202survey data, we conclude that different factors affect these two types of privacy intrusion intention. However, no relationship was found between the two types of privacy intrusion intentions. One of the most interesting findings is that the experience of privacy intrusion is the most significant factor related to the two types of privacy intrusion intentions. The findings contribute to the literature on privacy by suggesting two types of privacy intrusion intentions on SNS and identifying their antecedents from the perspective of an intruder. Practitioners can also use the findings to develop SNS applications that can improve protection of user privacies and legitimize proper regulations relevant to online privacy.

• Strategy21
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• s.46
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• pp.239-276
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• 2020

The failure of early economic sanctions aimed at hurting the overall economies of targeted states called for a more sophisticated design of economic sanctions. This paved way for the advent of 'smart sanctions,' which target the supporters of the regime instead of the public mass. Despite controversies over the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a coercive tool to change the behavior of a targeted state, the transformation from 'comprehensive sanctions' to 'smart sanctions' is gaining the status of a legitimate method to impose punishment on states that do not conform to international norms, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction in this particular context of the paper. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council proved that it can come to an accord on imposing economic sanctions over adopting resolutions on waging military war with targeted states. The North Korean nuclear issue has been the biggest security threat to countries in the region, even for China out of fear that further developments of nuclear weapons in North Korea might lead to a 'domino-effect,' leading to nuclear proliferation in the Northeast Asia region. Economic sanctions had been adopted by the UNSC as early as 2006 after the first North Korean nuclear test and has continually strengthened sanctions measures at each stage of North Korean weapons development. While dubious of the effectiveness of early sanctions on North Korea, recent sanctions that limit North Korea's exports of coal and imports of oil seem to have an impact on the regime, inducing Kim Jong-un to commit to peaceful talks since 2018. The purpose of this paper is to add a variable to the factors determining the success of economic sanctions on North Korea: preventing North Korea's evasion efforts by conducting illegal transshipments at sea. I first analyze the cause of recent success in the economic sanctions that led Kim Jong-un to engage in talks and add the maritime element to the argument. There are three conditions for the success of the sanctions regime, and they are: (1) smart sanctions, targeting commodities and support groups (elites) vital to regime survival., (2) China's faithful participation in the sanctions regime, and finally, (3) preventing North Korea's maritime evasion efforts.

• The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.105-162
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• 2020

In the pandemic of infectious disease, restrictions of individual liberty have been justified in the name of public health and public interest. In March 2020, the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea passed the revised bill of the 「Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act.」 The revised bill newly established the legal basis for forced testing and disclosure of the information of confirmed cases, and also raised the penalties for violation of self-isolation and treatment refusal. This paper examines whether and how these individual liberty limiting clauses be justified, and if so on what ethical and philosophical grounds. The authors propose the theories of the philosophy of law related to the justifiability of liberty-limiting measures by the state and conceptualized the dual-aspect of applying the liberty-limiting principle to the infected patient. In COVID-19 pandemic crisis, the infected person became the 'Patient as Victim and Vector (PVV)' that posits itself on the overlapping area of 'harm to self' and 'harm to others.' In order to apply the liberty-limiting principle proposed by Joel Feinberg to a pandemic with uncertainties, it is necessary to extend the harm principle from 'harm' to 'risk'. Under the crisis with many uncertainties like COVID-19 pandemic, this shift from 'harm' to 'risk' justifies the state's preemptive limitation on individual liberty based on the precautionary principle. This, at the same time, raises concerns of overcriminalization, i.e., too much limitation of individual liberty without sufficient grounds. In this article, we aim to propose principles regarding how to balance between the precautionary principle for preemptive restrictions of liberty and the concerns of overcriminalization. Public health crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic requires a population approach where the 'population' rather than an 'individual' works as a unit of analysis. We propose the second expansion of the harm principle to be applied to 'population' in order to deal with the public interest and public health. The new concept 'risk to population,' derived from the two arguments stated above, should be introduced to explain the public health crisis like COVID-19 pandemic. We theorize 'the extended harm principle' to include the 'risk to population' as a third liberty-limiting principle following 'harm to others' and 'harm to self.' Lastly, we examine whether the restriction of liberty of the revised 「Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act」 can be justified under the extended harm principle. First, we conclude that forced isolation of the infected patient could be justified in a pandemic situation by satisfying the 'risk to the population.' Secondly, the forced examination of COVID-19 does not violate the extended harm principle either, based on the high infectivity of asymptomatic infected people to others. Thirdly, however, the provision of forced treatment can not be justified, not only under the traditional harm principle but also under the extended harm principle. Therefore it is necessary to include additional clauses in the provision in order to justify the punishment of treatment refusal even in a pandemic.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.59-89
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• 2009

The objectives of the 1963 Tokyo Convention cover a variety of subjects, with the intention of providing safety in aircraft, protection of life and property on board, and promoting the security of civil aviation. These objectives will be treated as follows: first, the unification of rules on jurisdiction; second, the question of filling the gap in jurisdiction; third, the scheme of maintaining law and order on board aircraft; fourth, the protection of persons acting in accordance with the Convention; fifth, the protection of the interests of disembarked persons; sixth, the question of hijacking of aircraft; and finally some general remarks on the objectives of the Convention. The Tokyo Convention mainly deals with general crimes such as murder, violence, robbery on board aircraft rather than aviation terrorism. The Article 11 of the Convention deals with hijacking in a simple way. As far as aviation terrorism is concerned 1970 Hague Convention and 1971 Montreal Convention cover the hijacking and sabotage respectively. The Problem of national jurisdiction over the offence and the offender was as tangled at the Hague and Montreal Convention, as under the Tokyo Convention. Under the Tokyo Convention the prime base of jurisdiction is the law of the flag (Article 3), but concurrent jurisdiction is also allowed on grounds of: territorial principle, active nationality and passive personality principle, security of the state, breach of flight rules, and exercise of jurisdiction necessary for the performance of obligations under multilateral agreements (Article 4). No Criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law is excluded [Article 3(2)]. However, Article 4 of the Hague Convention(hereafter Hague Article 4) and Article 5 of the Montreal Convention(hereafter Montreal Article 5), dealing with jurisdiction have moved a step further, inasmuch as the opening part of both paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Hague Article 4 and the Montreal Article 5 impose an obligation on all contracting states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over the offence (i.e., to ensure that their law is such that their courts will have jurisdiction to try offender in all the circumstances covered by Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5). The state of registration and the state where the aircraft lands with the hijacker still on board will have the most interest, and would be in the best position to prosecute him; the paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of the Montreal Article 5 deal with it, respectively. However, paragraph 1(b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraph 1(c) of the Montreal Article 5 do not specify if the aircraft is still under the control of the hijacker or if the hijacker has been overpowered by the aircraft commander, or if the offence has at all occurred in the airspace of the state of landing. The language of the paragraph would probably cover all these cases. The weaknesses of Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5 are however, patent. The Jurisdictions of the state of registration, the state of landing, the state of the lessee and the state where the offender is present, are concurrent. No priorities have been fixed despite a proposal to this effect in the Legal Committee and the Diplomatic Conference, and despite the fact that it was pointed out that the difficulty in accepting the Tokyo Convention has been the question of multiple jurisdiction, for the reason that it would be too difficult to determine the priorities. Disputes over the exercise of jurisdiction can be endemic, more so when Article 8(4) of the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention give every state mentioned in Hague Article 4(1) and Montreal Article 5(1) the right to seek extradition of the offender. A solution to the problem should not have been given up only because it was difficult. Hague Article 4(3) and Montreal Article 5(3) provide that they do not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. Thus the provisions of the two Conventions create additional obligations on the state, and do not exclude those already existing under national laws. Although the two Conventions do not require a state to establish jurisdiction over, for example, hijacking or sabotage committed by its own nationals in a foreign aircraft anywhere in the world, they do not preclude any contracting state from doing so. However, it has be noted that any jurisdiction established merely under the national law would not make the offence an extraditable one under Article 8 of the Hague and Montreal Convention. As far as international aviation terrorism is concerned 1988 Montreal Protocol and 1991 Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detention are added. The former deals with airport terrorism and the latter plastic explosives. Compared to the other International Terrorism Conventions, the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions do not have clauses of the passive personality principle. If the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions need to be revised in the future, those clauses containing the passive personality principle have to be inserted for the suppression of the international aviation terrorism more effectively. Article 3 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and Article 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would be models that the revised International Aviation Terrorism Conventions could follow in the future.