• The Journal of Society for e-Business Studies
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• v.7 no.2
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• pp.55-68
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• 2002

Internet group buying systems have been widely used recently. In those systems, because the reserve price is provided by the buyer, the success rate can be decreased if the reserve price is set too low compared with the normal price. Otherwise, an unsuitable successful bid can be made if the reserve price is set too high based on inaccurate information. Likewise, the seller's providing too high a bid price can deteriorate his/her own successful bid rate, whereas a successful bid with too low a price may make no profit in the sale. Therefore, pricing agents that recommend adequate prices based on the past buying and selling history data can be helpful. In this paper, we propose two kinds of agents. One suggests reserve prices to buyers based on the past buying history database of the system. The other recommends bid prices to a seller based on the past bidding history data of the company using the cost accounting theory. Through performance experiments, we show that the successful bid rate can increase by preventing buyers from making unreasonable reserve prices. Also, we show that, for the seller, the rate of successful bids with appropriate profits can increase. Using the pricing agents, we design and implement an XML-based group buying system.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.59-76
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• 2007

Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) changed our everyday business drastically. Business routines have been transformed to online activities. New theories and models were developed for the brand new online environment. For online negotiations, however, the research on new mechanisms is not enough, especially for bilateral distributive negotiations. A reserve price reporting mechanism (RPR) together with its extended version (ERPR) is proposed in this paper. The key improvement of reserve price reporting mechanisms is to let the negotiators report their reserve price to a third-party system before they actually start the negotiation. A prototype of this RPR system is developed and a lab experiment is conducted to test the performance of the two mechanisms compared with traditional direct bargaining (TDB) mechanism. The results of the experiment support that the reserve price report mechanisms proposed are more efficient than the traditional one in several dimensions including social welfare.

• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.141-155
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• 2005

It is very important that sellers provide reasonable reserve prices for auction items in internet auction systems. Recently, an agent has been proposed to generate reserve prices automatically based on the case similarity of information retrieval theory and the moving average of time series analysis. However, one problem of the previous approaches is that the recent trend of auction prices is not well reflected on the generated reserve prices, because it simply provides the bid price of the most similar item or an average price of some similar items using the past auction data. In this paper. in order to overcome the problem. we propose a method that generates reserve prices based on the moving average. the exponential smoothing, and the least square of time series analysis. Through performance experiments. we show that the successful bid rate of the new method can be increased by preventing sellers from making unreasonable reserve prices compared with the previous methods.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.9-14
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• 1984

The competitive bidding model with the reserve price has been studied by Riley and Samuelson. We extend their studies to the competitive model with the reserve price and the entry fee. First we present the bidder's optimal strategy, the winner's expected profit, the auctioner's expected revenue in the first-price sealed bidding model, and next those in the second-price sealed bidding model.

• The KIPS Transactions:PartD
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• v.9D no.5
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• pp.955-962
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• 2002

Commercial internet auction systems have been successfully used recently. In those systems, because reserve prices of auction items are given by sellers only, the success bid rate can be decreased due to the large difference between the reserve price and the normal price. In this paper, we propose an agent that generates reserve prices to sellers based on past auction data and item prices gathered from the web. Through performance experiments, we show that the successful bid rate increases by preventing sellers from making unreasonable reserve prices. Using the pricing agent, we design and implement an XML-based auction system on the web.

• The Journal of Society for e-Business Studies
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.17-31
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• 2004

It is very important that sellers provide reasonable reserve prices for auction items in internet auction systems. Recently, an agent has been proposed to generate reserve prices automatically based on the case similarity of information retrieval theory. However, one of its drawbacks is that the recent trend of auction prices is not reflected in the generated reserve prices, because it suggests the bid price of the most similar item from the past auction data. In this paper, in order to overcome the problem, we propose a new method that generates reserve prices based on the moving average of time series analysis, in which more weight is provided to the recent bid prices. Through performance experiments, we show that the successful bid rate can be increased by preventing sellers from making unreasonable reserve prices.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.27-36
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• 1986

This paper deals with four types of multiple unit simultaneous auctions such as the discriminating. uniform-price, lowest accepted-price, and progressive auctions. These auctions have been studied by Vickrey, Ortega-Reichert, Herris and Raviv and so forth. In this paper, their studies are extended to the case with a reserve price and an entry fee, and then the equilibrium bidding strategy are presented. Further, those are analyzed with respect to the change of a reserve price, an entry fee, and the number of bidders and objects.

• Journal of Energy Engineering
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• v.15 no.4 s.48
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• pp.229-234
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• 2006

Electric energy is too difficult to manage realtime for irregular change of load because of non-storage. In specially, operation of reserve is ancillary service to supply stably to defend large troubles in electric power system. But whole of electric power system brings to economical loss because of reserve operation. Therefore optimal reserve quantity and optimal reserve price are necessary in order to minimize loss. In this paper, we have presents optimal dispatch and reserve price consideration of opportunity cost.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2006.07a
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• pp.418-419
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• 2006

After electricity power industry restructuring, "Long term power development plan", setting up by government, is replaced by "Basic plan of electricity supply and demand". In this basic plan, one of the most important factors is assessment of appropriate capacity margin. The benefit of GENCO is decided by the market price, and the price is largely affected by the level of reserve margin. As a consequence, appropriate reserve margin is determined by market power. However, Cost Based Pool(CBP) is a limited competitive market, and government policy for supply and demand is very important factor or reserve margin determination. This paper points out issues about existing reserve margin assessment method which is used in basic plan and suggests improved assessment method. In the case study, capacity margin is calculated by proposed assessment method and result shows the advantages of suggested method.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 1995.07b
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• pp.581-583
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• 1995

This paper presents a theory on the pricing and allocation of spinning reserve. It is shown in this paper, that it is possible to maintain system security with many participants each attempting to optimize their own benefit, through pricing incentive. Participant offers power consumption/generation and reserve contribution according to its price. And Price setter only distribute pricing signal to acquire system security. Participants induce disturbance on power system and they pay the penalty according to the size of disturbance. And they also offers some reserve capacity to earn reserve cost. In this scheme, the amount of data communication is very small.