• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제19권2호
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• pp.45-56
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• 1994

This paper the profit maximizing order quantity model to the symmetric oligopoly consisting of sellers of a homogeneous product who compete with each other for the same potential buyers. Buyers are classified by type, each selecting an optimal purchase quantity in response to the nonlinear quantity discount pricing schedule given by the sellers. Symmetric equilibrium and the economic quantities that sellers must determine are analysed in a Cournot framework, which explicitly depend on the number of sellers. Economic implications are obtianed from the optimality conditions based on themarket share paraments which are used to characterize the competitior's marketing strategy.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제11권3호
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• pp.1336-1356
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• 2017

The spectrum scarcity crisis has resulted in a shortage of resources for many emerging wireless services, and research on dynamic spectrum management has been used to solve this problem. Game theory can allocate resources to users in an economic way through market competition. In this paper, we propose a bidding game-based spectrum allocation mechanism in cognitive radio network. In our framework, primary networks provide heterogeneous wireless service and different numbers of channels, while secondary users have diverse bandwidth demands for transmission. Considering the features of traffic and QoS demands, we design a weighted interference graph-based grouping algorithm to divide users into several groups and construct the non-interference user-set in the first step. In the second step, we propose the dynamic bidding game-based spectrum allocation strategy; we analyze both buyer's and seller's revenue and determine the best allocation strategy. We also prove that our mechanism can achieve balanced pricing schema in competition. Theoretical and simulation results show that our strategy provides a feasible solution to improve spectrum utilization, can maximize overall utility and guarantee users' individual rationality.

• 한국경영과학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국경영과학회/대한산업공학회 2005년도 춘계공동학술대회 발표논문
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• pp.938-946
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• 2005

We study the firm's strategy to price its products and plan the spare parts manufacturing so as to maximize its profit and at the same time to fulfill its commitment to providing the customers with the key parts continuously over the relevant decision time horizon, i.e., the production plus warrantee period. To examine the research question, we developed and solved a two-stage optimal control theory model. Our analysis suggests that if the cost to produce the spare part during the warrantee period is more expensive than that during the production period, the firm should increase its sales price gradually throughout the production period to control its sales. In addition, during the production period it is optimal for the firm to produce the spare parts more than needed so that the overproduced spare parts can be used to partially meet the demand during the warrantee period. We conducted numerical analysis to investigate the sensitivity dynamics among key variables and parameters such as inventory holding cost, unit spare part production costs, part failure rate, and parameters in the demand function.

• Management Science and Financial Engineering
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• 제16권2호
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• pp.1-15
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• 2010

Digital convergence which means the convergence of industry areas related to digital technologies is an important phenomenon in business, which will decide the fates of firms in the near future. The only firms which can create synergy effects from digital convergence are expected to be the winners in the fierce competition of digital convergence era. In our analysis, we examine the strategy of an integrated firm which has businesses in two different industry areas which are related to each other. By using a game theoretical model, we show how the integrated firm can win over two single separated firms which have business in only one industry area each by leveraging the two businesses the integrated firm has. In our welfare analysis, we also show that this convergence may be even beneficial to consumers, which seems counter-intuitive to social concerns about anti-competitive behaviors by integrated firms. Additionally, we study comparison between industry convergence and product convergence.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2005년도 제36회 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.256-258
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• 2005

최근에, 전력 시장에 경쟁 체제가 소개되면서 탈규제(deregulation)가 중요한 문제로 대두되고 있다. 시장의 탈규제에 관한 중요한 주제 중에 하나가 정확한 전송 손실의 분석이 필요한 곳에서의 지역 경쟁 체제(spot pricing)이다. 이러한 경쟁 체제에서 해결해야 할 중요한 문제 중의 하나가 다수의 독립발전사업자에 대하여 공정하고 정확한 전력 요금을 책정하는 것이다. 따라서 각 모선별 전송 손실을 배분하는 것이 매우 중요하다. 이 논문은 송전 손실을 배분하는 새로운 알고리즘을 제시한다. 각 모선의 송전 손실을 계산하는 데는 손실 감도를 이용한 적분방법이 이용된다. 송전 손실은 전체 계통의 거래 전략(transaction strategy)을 이용한 부하 비율의 계산을 통해서 증분 송전 손실(incremental transmission losses)의 방법으로 계산된다. 제안된 방법은 9모선 계통에 시험되었고 이를 통해 제안된 방법이 신뢰할 만한 알고리즘임을 보여준다.

• STI Policy Review
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• 제6권1호
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• pp.54-69
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• 2015

Although there is progress in developing green sectors in North America and East Asia, the key challenge facing the expansion of economy-wide green innovation and structural change in these regions is the absence of relevant policy follow-up to the green stimulus enacted during the Great Recession. The boost to green sectors provided by such measures is waning quickly, given that much of the green stimulus focused on energy efficiency. The biggest obstacles to sustaining green growth in North America and East Asiaare major market disincentives, especially the under-pricing of fossil fuels and market failures that inhibit green innovation. A three-part strategy to overcome these obstacles would involve: first, removing fossil fuel subsidies; second, employing market-based instruments to further reduce the social costs of fossil fuel use; and third, allocating any resulting revenue to public support for green innovation and investments. Such a strategy would ensure that green growth is not about promoting niche green sectors but instigating economy-wide innovation and structural transformation in North America and East Asia.

• 한국경영과학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국경영과학회 2004년도 추계학술대회 및 정기총회
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• pp.289-303
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• 2004

As needs for telecommunications services diversify, an increasingly wide range of telecommunications services is becoming available in the market. Any subscriber can find a service to satisfy his/her telecommunication requirements and competition between providers to retain heavy users is increasing. Service price reductions are one retention strategy, although price reductions for one service can affect the individual-level usage for other services. Price reductions can also be imposed on a service provider by regulation. For these reasons, understanding how price reductions affect service usage is of growing importance to the telecommunications industry for purposes of pricing and tariff development. In this paper, we develop an individual-level usage model for telecommunications services and analyze the effects on usage of a price reduction. We apply the model to age-stratified aggregate traffic data for a Korean mobile telecommunication service provider. Finally, we develop a model to support a market segmentation and price reduction strategy.

• 한국융합학회논문지
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• 제8권7호
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• pp.191-198
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• 2017

본 연구는 영상기술과 공공문화콘텐츠의 새로운 접목형 융합상품으로서의 가능성을 제시하였다. 소변기에 영상장치를 장착한 본 제품은 기존에 없던 감성형 위생도기 제품으로서 화장실에 대한 인식의 제고를 가져왔을 뿐 아니라 하이테크한 전자제품과 위생도기의 제품을 접목시키는 새로운 시도이다. 또한 유니크한 아이디어로써 광고효과로써 공공정보 알림등 소변기의 새로운 시장성을 제시하는 제품개발 아이템이다. 상품화를 위하여 본 과제에서 제작할 디자인이 반영되도록 3D Rendering, 3D Mock-up 등을 활용해 별도의 제작공정을 들여 프로토타입 형태로 제작하고, 이 후 생산자의 협의 등을 통해 다양한 상품으로 확장 고려될 수 있을 것으로 판단된다. 차별화된 동영상 콘텐츠를 제공함으로써 경쟁력 있는 품질과 가격으로 소규모 업체의 프랜차이즈를 타겟으로 한 새로운 이미지 메이킹을 시도함에 따라 다양한 마케팅이 가능한 트렌드를 리드할 수 있도록 하였다.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제10권10호
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• pp.4748-4765
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• 2016

We consider a virtualized cognitive radio (CR) network, where multiple virtual network operators (VNOs) who own different virtual cognitive base stations (VCBSs) share the same physical CBS (PCBS) which is owned by an infrastructure provider (InP), sharing the spectrum with the primary user (PU). The uplink scenario is considered where the secondary users (SUs) transmit to the VCBSs. The PU is protected by constraining the interference power from the SUs. Such constraint is applied by the InP through pricing the interference. A Stackelberg game is formulated to jointly maximize the revenue of the InP and the individual utilities of the VNOs, and then the Stackelberg equilibrium is investigated. Specifically, the optimal interference price and channel allocation for the VNOs to maximize the revenue of the InP and the optimal power allocation for the SUs to maximize the individual utilities of the VNOs are derived. In addition, a low‐complexity ±‐optimal solution is also proposed for obtaining the interference price and channel allocation for the VNOs. Simulations are provided to verify the proposed strategies. It is shown that the proposed strategies are effective in resource allocation and the ±‐optimal strategy achieves practically the same performance as the optimal strategy can achieve. It is also shown that the InP will not benefit from a large interference power limit, and selecting VNOs with higher unit rate utility gain to share the resources of the InP is beneficial to both the InP and the VNOs.

• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제35권4호
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• pp.55-79
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• 2010

This study deals with a model for platform competition in a two-sided market. We suppose there are both direct and indirect network externalities between suppliers and users of each platform. Moreover, we suppose that both users and suppliers are distributed in their relative affinity for each platform type. That is, each user [supplier] has his/her own preferential position toward each platform, and users [suppliers] are horizontally differentiated over [0, 1]. And for analytical tractability, some parameters like direct and indirect network externalities are the same across the markets. Given the parameters and the pricing profile, users and suppliers conduct subscription game, where participants select the platform that gives them the highest payoffs. This game proceeds according to a replicator dynamics of the evolutionary game, which is simplified by properly defining gains from participant's strategy in the subscription game. We find that depending on the strength of these network effects, there might either be multiple stable equilibria, at which users and suppliers distribute across both platforms, or one unstable interior equilibrium corresponding to the market tipping in favor of either platform. In both cases, we also consider the pricing power of competing platform providers under the framework of the Stackelberg game. In particular, our study examines the possible effects of the type of competition between platform providers, which may constrain the equilibrium selection in the subscription game.