• The Journal of Information Systems
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• v.26 no.3
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• pp.229-246
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• 2017

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the potential asymmetry in price competition between the geographically defined submarkets of the lodging industry, namely the traditional and alternative accommodation facilities. Design/methodology/approach The study utilizes a spatial econometric model to empirically test for the hypothesized asymmetry in price competition. Property-level panel data on hotels and alternative accommodation facilities collected from a major online travel agency (OTA: Agoda.com) was used for this purpose. Findings Result of the analysis shows significant intra-segment spatial price competition among the properties, that is, within hotels and within alternative accommodation submarkets, respectively. However, the inter-segment competition was found to be asymmetric as hypothesized. Room rates of hotels are influenced by prices of geographically close alternative accommodations, but the reverse does not hold. Implications for practitioners and suggestions for future research are discussed along with the findings of the study.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.23 no.4
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• pp.553-581
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• 2014

This paper analyzes competition among service stations in the Korean gasoline market. We consider spatial differentiation as a source of product differentiation as well as the characteristics of the stations and vertical contracts between refiners and retailers as factors causing changes in equilibrium prices in the Korean gasoline retail market. The effect of the government's price disclosure policy on the retail market competition is also analyzed. Moran's I test indicates that the prices of neighboring gas stations are spatially correlated in the market. It is also found that gasoline prices for vertically integrated stations are much lower than those for independent stations. In addition, unbranded stations charge lower prices than branded stations but also induce branded stations to price more competitively. Meanwhile, the government's price disclosure policy did intensify price competition in the retail gasoline market. It is inferred that the price disclosure policy contributed to retailers gaining more bargain power in price negotiation with refiners, causing an eventual increase in retail prices.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.6
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• pp.145-155
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• 2020

This study analyzes the degree of competition in the oil refinery market in Korea, which is considered an oligopoly market. The price of gasoline and diesel and the quantity of supply are used to identify the market competition. We also analyze whether the oil tax reduction policy has affected market competition. The competitiveness of the market was examined using monthly data from 2008 to 2019. Bresnahan-Lau method was employed to estimate the degree of competition in the oil refinery market, which is frequently used in the industrial studies. The analysis shows that the gasoline and diesel markets seem close to a perfect competitive market. Also, the tax cut has weakened market competition. In other words, the monopolistic power has increased in the market, so consumers have not benefit from the price cuts as much as tax cuts. Although the oil refinery market where four major companies are competing, the government's monitoring and price disclosure system help the market to be highly competitive as much as a perfect competition market. The tax cut, in the high oil price era, has a negative effect on the competition because of an information asymmetry about the price-setting process between suppliers and consumers.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.351-376
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• 2016

This study examines optimal emission taxes and welfares in mixed duopoly markets where public and private firms produce differentiated goods and emit pollutions. Both comparing quantity and price competitions and comparing simultaneous and simultaneous games provides the followings findings: First, irrespective of competition modes between quantity and price competitions or simultaneous and sequential games, the optimal emission tax is always lower than marginal environmental damage. Second, emission tax under private leadership is the highest in quantity competition while that under public leadership is the highest in price competition. Third, environmental damage under Cournot and private leadership is worsened in quantity competition while that under public leadership is worsened in price competition. Finally, welfare under Bertrand and public leadership is improved in price competition while that under private leadership is improved in quantity competition.

• STI Policy Review
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• v.6 no.1
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• pp.24-35
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• 2015

This research constructs a data set regarding competition policy through a comprehensive review of previous studies, and performs a meta-analysis to quantitatively assess the price effects of deregulation. A structural econometric model is used to eliminate possible biases from heterogeneity of the studies,such as in publication types and measurement methods. Four types of regulations that deter competition are characterized and three groups of industries are made for drawing practical implications. We fnd that deregulation to promote competition reduces prices by 0.23% and that these estimated price effects are more stable when we control for the publication types and measurement ways. Easing regulations that restrict consumers' choice is shown to be most effcient in promoting competition, lowering prices by 0.7%. This is followed by eliminating the limitation in the number of frms in the industry, with 0.2% price reduction. Overall, the network and service industries are shown to be more responsive to deregulation than the R&D industry. These results could shed light on policy implementation when a pro-competition policy is called for due to restrictive regulations in the corresponding industries.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• v.15 no.3
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• pp.1-7
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• 2005

This paper examines strategic competition model between offline and online retailers and draws strategic implications. Research on the price competition between conventional offline retailers and online retailers has been done through empirical approaches, however, the results are conflicting. This paper reconciles the existing conflicting empirical findings on price levels between offline and online retailers through theoretical approach. This paper analyzes how the internet market has effect on equilibrium prices of both offline and online retailers and discusses the possible reasons why there exist price differences between offline and online retailers in business to consumer electronic commerce.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.95-121
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• 2007

There are recently several studies of online auctions which have focused on exploring a bidder's bidding behavior in IS area. Those studies, however, have been limited to account for bidders' bidding behavior in the view of TAM and trust, not considering perceived price fairness and competition intensity. Although this view point seems reasonable in the online auction sites, few previous studies employing this perspective are found in the relevant literatures. Based on it, this study developed a comprehensive model based on trust and TAM in terms of perceived price fairness to explain competition intensity in the online auction sites. This study collected 269 survey responses from online bidders who have prior experiences with online auction sites. The survey data are used to empirically verify 11 research hypothesis by using LISREL. The results indicate that trust in websites, trust in sellers and perceived usefulness have significant impacts on perceived price fairness. Finally, perceived price fairness is strongly related to competition intensity in the online auction. This study ends with theoretical and managerial implications, as well as limitations and future research.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.1
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• pp.56-66
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• 2004

As deregulation evolves, pricing electricity becomes a major issue in the electric industry. Participants of competitive marketplace are able to improve their profits substantially by adequately pricing the electricity. In this paper, game theory is applied to analyze the price-clearing in the generation bidding competition and the competition is modeled as the noncooperative and complete information. The result of this analysis can be useful in understanding spot price-clearing of electricity and generating entity's strategic behavior in the competitive electricity market.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.4A no.4
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• pp.243-253
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• 2004

As deregulation evolves, pricing electricity becomes a major issue in the electric power industry. Participants in the competitive marketplace are able to improve their profits substantially by effectively pricing the electricity. In this paper, game theory is applied to analyze price-clearing in the generation bidding competition with the competition modeled as the non-cooperative and complete information game. The result of this analysis can be useful in understanding spot price-clearing of electricity as well as GENCOs' strategic behavior in the competitive electricity market.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2001.07a
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• pp.512-514
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• 2001

Recently, Korea's electric industry is in the midst of a period of profound changes in the structure and function, including the introduction of market competition in the generation sector. Korea is in the early stages of market competition, so the market price is chosen by generation costs but will be chosen by bids in future. Therefore, the profits of generators is determined by market pool price and the prospects of pool price are very important for new capacity investment determination of generators and IPPs. This study analyzes hourly marginal costs and LOLP considering basic generation mix and characteristics, develops the relationship of pool price using the above in competition market, and proposes basic direction for profits variation and supply-demand analysis in the electric market in future.