• Trans-
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• v.12
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• pp.245-274
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• 2022

The interactive cinema is based on the interactivity between the cinema and the audience. The discussion of interactive cinema can be divided into two poles. One is to positively look at the possibilities of interactive cinema as a new format and to test with them in various ways. The other is the perspective of a critical warning that the interactivity of interactive cinema risks reinforcing biases while instilling the illusion of freedom and activity in the audience. Considering both of these perspectives, we try to find a way to realize the political and aesthetic possibilities of interactive cinema through characteristic analysis. To this end, we analyzed the interactive film , which has received public and critical attention, based on Brecht's epic theater as a theoretical and practical reference. We analyzed the text/contextual characteristics of this work in three dimensions - an interactive multi-branching structure, a self-reflecting Mise en abyme structure, and an active enjoyment of the audience - and compared them with the epic theater theory. Through this, we examined the conditions and possibilities of interactive cinema as a new epic theater in the new technological/media environment of the 21st century.

• Journal of Wind Energy
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.5-10
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• 2024

Offshore wind power generation has significant advantages, including enhanced energy security and job creation. However, despite these benefits, South Korea has not fully utilized its potential in this sector. In contrast, offshore wind power industry development in Europe has been driven by government leadership. Drawing from this experience, South Korea also needs to relax regulations, strengthen necessary infrastructure, and enhance financial support systems to activate the offshore wind power industry. For this, sustained government leadership is absolutely essential. Without addressing the capacity issues in the power grid, we cannot expect offshore wind power generation to succeed. To address grid issues, we propose the enactment of a special law called the "Special Act on Grid Expansion." Considering KEPCO's financial situation, private investment should be encouraged for grid construction. The role of developers is crucial for the successful development and operation of offshore wind power. They manage risks throughout various stages, from site acquisition to construction and operation, which have a significant impact on the success or failure of projects. Since domestic developers currently lack experience in offshore wind power, a cooperative strategy that leverages the experience and technology of advanced countries is necessary. Energy issues should be recognized as important tasks beyond mere political ideologies, as they are crucial for the survival of the nation and its development. It is essential to form a public consensus and implement ways for residents to coexist with offshore wind power, along with the conservation of marine ecosystems and effective communication with stakeholders. Expansion of the offshore wind power industry requires support in various areas, including financial and tax incentives, technology research investment, and workforce development. In particular, achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 necessitates the activation of offshore wind power alongside efforts by major corporations to transition to renewable energy. South Korea, surrounded by the sea, holds significant offshore wind power potential, and it is our responsibility to harness it as a sustainable energy source for future generations. To activate the offshore wind power market, we need to provide financial and tax support, develop infrastructure and research, and foster a skilled workforce. As major corporations transition to renewable energy to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050, offshore wind power must play a significant role. It is our responsibility to fully utilize South Korea's potential and make offshore wind power a new driver of growth.

• Korean Business Review
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• v.17
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• pp.153-183
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• 2004

The Gaisong Merchants can be regarded to playa pioneering role to activate the Korea's trade with foreign countries. In the early period of Yi-Dynasty, the Gaisong Merchants focused on personal trade, but in the middle period of Yi-Dynasty, they entered to the realm of governmental trade. Furthermore, their business activities widened to various forms of trades, for example, smuggling. Utilizing accumulated capital, Gaisong merchants expanded their trading activities to their neighboring countries such as Japan and China. In recent times, it is necessary for modem Korean companies to diversify risks through the establishment of corporations for production, marketing and R&D abroad or through joint venture, M&A and strategic alliance with foreign companies in order to reduce the risks originated from volatile economic and political situations. In this study, we utilize tools of comparative study to compare Gaisong Merchants' foreign trade strategies with those of modem companies such as AMOREPACIFIC, HANILCEMENT and SHINDORICO. The purpose of the paper is to test the hypothesis that modem Korean companies grew up by following the cases of Gaisong Merchants' business activities. We summarize our main findings as follows. First, both Gaisong Merchants and modem Korean companies have common functional core capability in the field of marketing, manufacturing technology, R&D, and human resources development. Second, both Gaisong Merchants and modem Korean companies have common organizational core capability. Third, both Gaisong Merchants and modem Korean companies have common infrastructures such as planning, finance, accounting and MIS. It constitutes the infrastructure of Korea's foreign trade sector. Fourth, both Gaisong Merchants and modem companies have common organizational culture in the field of management policy and philosophy. Actually, those factors are evaluated to be driving forces of Koera's success in foreign trade. In conclusion, the business activities of Gaisong Merchants who represented the peculiarity of Korean business spirit are partially inherited to current Korean business management. The value system and behavior pattern of modern Korean companies is succeeded from the spirit of Gaisong Merchants and it playa major role to specify the identity of Korean business administration.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.35-58
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• 2009

A treaty that governs the compensation on damage caused by aircraft to the third parties on surface was first adopted in Rome in 1933, but without support from the international aviation community it was replaced by another convention adopted again in Rome in 1952. Despite the increase of the compensation amount and some improvements to the old version, the Rome Convention 1952 with 49 State parties as of today is not considered universally accepted. Neither is the Montreal Protocol 1978 amending the Rome Convention 1952, with only 12 State parties excluding major aviation powers like USA, Japan, UK, and Germany. Consequently, it is mostly the local laws that apply to the compensation case of surface damage caused by the aircraft, contrary to the intention of those countries and people who involved themselves in the drafting of the early conventions on surface damage. The terrorist attacks 9/11 proved that even the strongest power in the world like the USA cannot with ease bear all the damages done to the third parties by the terrorist acts involving aircraft. Accordingly as a matter of urgency, the International Civil Aviation Organization(ICAO) picked up the matter and have it considered among member States for a few years through its Legal Committee before proposing for adoption as a new treaty in the Diplomatic Conference held in Montreal, Canada 20 April to 2 May 2009. Accordingly, two treaties based on the drafts of the Legal Committee were adopted in Montreal by consensus, one on the compensation for general risk damage caused by aircraft, the other one on compensation for damage from acts of unlawful interference involving aircraft. Both Conventions improved the old Convention/Protocol in many aspects. Deleting 'surface' in defining the damage to the third parties in the title and contents of the Conventions is the first improvement because the third party damage is not necessarily limited to surface on the soil and sea of the Earth. Thus Mid-air collision is now the new scope of application. Increasing compensation limit in big gallop is another improvement, so is the inclusion of the mental injury accompanied by bodily injury as the damage to be compensated. In fact, jurisprudence in recent years for cases of passengers in aircraft accident holds aircraft operators to be liable to such mental injuries. However, "Terror Convention" involving unlawful interference of aircraft has some unique provisions of innovation and others. While establishing the International Civil Aviation Compensation Fund to supplement, when necessary, the damages that exceed the limit to be covered by aircraft operators through insurance taking is an innovation, leaving the fate of the Convention to a State Party, implying in fact the USA, is harming its universality. Furthermore, taking into account the fact that the damage incurred by the terrorist acts, where ever it takes place targeting whichever sector or industry, are the domain of the State responsibility, imposing the burden of compensation resulting from terrorist acts in the air industry on the aircraft operators and passengers/shippers is a source of serious concern for the prospect of the Convention. This is more so when the risks of terrorist acts normally aimed at a few countries because of current international political situation are spread out to many innocent countries without quid pro quo.

• Korean Journal of Heritage: History & Science
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• v.53 no.1
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• pp.184-203
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• 2020

The Confucian ruling class of the Joseon Dynasty regarded Buddhist rituals as "dangerous festivals." However, these Buddhist ceremonies facilitated transitions between phases of life from birth till death and strengthened communal unity through their joint practice of the rites. Ritual spaces were decorated with various utensils and objects that transformed them into wondrous arenas. Of these ornaments, Buddhist paintings served as the most effective visual medium for educating the common people. As an example, a painting of the Ten Kings of the Underworld (siwangdo) could be hung as a means to illustrate the Buddhist view of the afterlife, embedded in images not only inside a Buddhist temple hall, but in any space where a Buddhist ritual was being held. Demand for Buddhist paintings rose considerably with their use in ritual spaces. Nectar ritual paintings (gamnodo), including scenes of appeasement rites for the souls of the deceased, emphasized depictions of royal family members and their royal relatives. In Chinese paintings of the water and land ceremony (suryukjae), these figures referred to one of several sacred groups who invited deities to a ritual. However, in Korean paintings of a nectar ritual, the iconography symbolized the patronage of the royal court and underlined the historicity and tradition of nationally conducted water and land ceremonies. This royal patronage implied the social and governmental sanction of Buddhist rituals. By including depictions of royal family members and their royal relatives, Joseon Buddhist paintings highlighted this approval. The Joseon ruling class outwardly feared that Buddhist rituals might undermine observance of Confucian proprieties and lead to a corruption of public morals, since monks and laymen, men and women, and people of all ranks mingled within the ritual spaces. The concern of the ruling class was also closely related to the nature of festivals, which involved deviation from the routines of daily life and violation of taboos. Since visual media such as paintings were considered to hold a special power, some members of the ruling class attempted to exploit this power, while others were apprehensive of the risks they entailed. According to Joseon wangjo sillok (The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty), the Joseon royal court burned Buddhist paintings and ordered the arrest of those who created them, while emphasizing their dangers. It further announced that so many citizens were gathering in Buddhist ritual spaces that the capital city was being left vacant. However, this record also paradoxically suggests that Buddhist rituals were widely considered festivals that people should participate in. Buddhist rituals could not be easily suppressed since they performed important religious functions reflecting the phases of the human life cycle, and had no available Confucian replacements. Their festive nature, unifying communities, expanded significantly at the time. The nectar ritual paintings of the late Joseon period realistically delineated nectar rituals and depicted the troops of traveling actors and performers that began to emerge during the seventeenth century. Such Buddhist rituals for consoling souls who encountered an unfortunate death were held annually and evolved into festivals during which the Joseon people relieved their everyday fatigue and refreshed themselves. The process of adopting Buddhist rituals-regarded as "dangerous festivals" due to political suppression of Buddhism in the Confucian nation-as seasonal customs and communal feasts is well reflected in the changes made in Buddhist paintings.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• v.37 no.4
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• pp.341-356
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• 2015

A nation has a sovereign right to develop and use its natural resources according to its policies with regard to development and the relevant environment. A nation also has an obligation not to harm other countries or damage environments of neighboring countries as consequences of such actions of developments or use of natural resources. However, international precedents induce a nation to take additional actions not to cause more damages from the specific acts causing environmental damages beyond national borders, when such acts have economic and social importance. That is to say that there is a tendency to resolve such issues in a way to promote the balance between the mutual interests by allowing such actions to continue. A solution to China's Three Gorges Dam dilemma based on a soft law approach is more credible than relying on a good faith approach of national responsibilities and international legal proceedings since the construction and operation of the dam falls within the category of exercising national sovereign rights. If a large scale construction project such as the Three Gorges Dam or operation of a nuclear power plant causes or may cause environmental damage beyond the border of a nation engaged in such an undertaking, countries affected by this undertaking should jointly monitor the environmental effects in a spirit of cooperation rather than trying to stop the construction and should seek cooperative solutions of mutual understanding to establish measures to prevent further damages. If China's Three Gorges Dam construction and operation cause or contain the possibility of causing serious damages to marine environment, China cannot set aside its national responsibility to meet international obligations if China is aware of or knows about the damage that has occurred or may occur but fail to prevent, minimize, reverse or eliminate additional chances of such damages, or fails to put in place measures in order to prevent the recurrence of such damages. However, Korea must be able to prove a causal relationship between the relevant actions and resulting damages if it is to raise objections to the construction or request certain damage-prevention actions against crucial adverse effects on the marine environment out of respect for China's right to develop resources and acts of use thereof. Therefore, it is essential to cumulate continuous monitoring and evaluations information pertaining to marine environmental changes and impacts or responses of affected waters as well as acquisition of scientific baseline data with observed changes in such baseline. As China has adopted a somewhat nonchalant attitude toward taking adequate actions to protect against marine pollution risks or adverse effects caused by the construction and operation of China's Three Gorges Dam, there is a need to persuade China to adopt a more active stance and become involved in the monitoring and co-investigation of the Yellow Sea in order to protect the marine environment. Moreover, there is a need to build a regular environmental monitoring system that includes the evaluation of environmental effects beyond borders. The Espoo Convention can serve as a mechanism to ease potential conflicts of national interest in the Northeast Asian waters where political and historical sensitivities are acute. Especially, the recent diplomatic policy advanced by Korea and China can be implemented as an important example of gentle cooperation as the policy tool of choice is based on regional cooperation or cooperation between different regions.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.7 no.4
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• pp.105-134
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• 2008

Local opposition and protest constitute single greatest hurdle to the siting of locally unwanted land uses(LULUs), especially siting of high-level radioactive disposal not only throughout Korea but also throughout the industrialized world. It can be attributed mainly to the NIMBYism, equity problem, and lack of participation. These problems are arisen from rational planning process which emphasizes instrumental rationality. But planning is a value-laden political activity, in which substantive rationality is central. To achieve this goals, we need a sound planning process for siting LULUs, which should improve the ability of citizens to influence the decisions that affects them. By a sound planning process, we mean one that is open to citizen input and contains accurate and complete information. In other word, the public is also part of the goal setting process and, as the information and analyses developed by the planners are evaluated by the public, strategies for solutions can be developed through consensus-building. This method is called as a co-operative siting process, and must be structured in order to arrive at publicly acceptable decisions. The followings are decided by consensus-building method. 1. Negotiation will be held? 2. What is the benefits and risks of negotiation? 3. What are solutions when collisions between national interests and local ones come into? 4. What are the agendas? 5. What is the community' role in site selection? 6. Are there incentives to negotiation. 7. Who are the parties to the negotiation? 8. Who will represent the community? 9. What groundwork of negotiation is set up? 10. How do we assure that the community access to information and expert? 11. What happens if negotiation is failed? 12. Is it necessary to trust each other in negotiations? 13. Is a mediator needed in negotiations?

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.16 no.4
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• pp.167-178
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• 2021

The purpose of this study is to analyze the direct investment decision factors in the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Vietnam, and to contribute to the creation of domestic jobs and the revitalization of the inter-Korean economy. According to the analysis, most of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Vietnamese investment companies are entering the complex for the purpose of utilizing cheap labor, cheap factory locations, sales/development of local markets, and bypass export production bases in third countries. This can be divided into production-efficient investors using differences in production price such as labor costs and market-oriented investors to sell and expand the local market, which seems to be consistent with global direct investment patterns such as Nike, Apple, and Amazon. However, even if the North Korea-U.S. denuclearization talks ease or lift sanctions, Vietnamese investors' willingness to invest in the North Korea has been most burdened by the possibility of closing special economic zones due to political risks. Last but not least, it is important to note that those willing to invest in North Korea are mostly smaller enterprises in textiles, sewing, footwear and leather industries-those that benefit from low-cost labor. Since their size is small, they need policy support in financing, especially in the early stages of their business. Even after they grow past the early stages, those without collateral would still need state guarantee letters to get financing. Thus, it is worth considering to use the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund to compensate commercial banks for bad loan loss or for low-interest loans for smaller SMEs. The interviews with SMEs found that red-tape is one of the biggest difficulties they face. Thus, it is recommended that a one-stop service agency should be established to cover all processes and issues related to inter-Korean economic cooperation to eliminate redundancy and expediate government support for SMEs.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.229-258
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• 2023

For the main countries of the Asia-Pacific region, the United States, China and Russia, a situation of "new normality" is emerging. Moreover, for each of the countries, this "new normality" has its own meaning. For the United States, this is an aggravation of the military confrontation with China in the Taiwan Strait. For China, this is an increase in the degree of rivalry with the United States and a slowdown in the pace of economic development with a very high probability of their decline in the future. For Russia, this is an almost complete curtailment of relations with the United States against the background of a special military operation and imposed sanctions. These nuances, in addition to the results of the 20th CPC Congress, will determine the main trends in Sino-American and Sino-Russian relations. It seems that China's attitude towards Russia will not change against the background of the Ukrainian crisis. Beijing will maintain a position of "benevolent neutrality" towards Moscow. At the same time, the balance between "goodwill" and "neutrality" may vary depending on the scope of Sino-Russian cooperation. For example, in the economic sphere, Chinese companies will be afraid to cooperate with Russian partners for fear of secondary sanctions. However, in general, Russia will retain its importance for China as the strongest anti-American pole. In relations with the United States, China will continue to firmly defend its interests, while at the same time not excluding the normalization of relations with Washington in certain areas of cooperation: strategic stability, non-traditional threats, ecology, etc. In general, the decisions of the 20th CPC Congress do not allow us to say either in favor or against the idea of China's readiness to resume dialogue with the United States in the post-congress period. Sino-American relations, as noted above, have their own logic and will probably continue to develop within its framework. However, so are Sino-Russian relations. Within the framework of these logics, Beijing seems to continue to balance between the two vectors of its foreign policy. On the one hand, this is the development of bilateral cooperation with Russia in order to strengthen its own negotiating positions in the confrontation with the United States: military cooperation with an emphasis on joint exercises, political cooperation based on anti-Americanism, economic cooperation with an eye to the risks of secondary sanctions. On the other hand, it is unacceptable for China to recognize the collapse of Ukraine, the inadmissibility of a direct military clash with the United States and the extreme undesirability of further aggravation of relations with the United States on the factor of Chinese friendship with Russia.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.236-261
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• 2014

The future role of nuclear extended deterrence in the security alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea is currently a central concern. The gradually lessening role of reliance on nuclear weapons in US security policies broadly, combined with increasing North Korean nuclear capabilities and belligerence, raise fresh questions about the sufficiency of the "nuclear umbrella" as a pillar of the US-ROK defense posture. This article addresses the current and future role of nuclear extended deterrence in Korea in this dynamic context. The article reviews the longstanding trend toward reducing the overall size of the US nuclear arsenal, and assesses developments in US-ROK outlooks toward extended deterrence in response to the Obama administration's nuclear policies and North Korea's recent smaller-scale aggressions. The analysis finds that the challenges of deterrence credibility and allied reassurance are difficult and long-term. The analysis explains how these challenges emerge less from a shrinking US numerical arsenal size than from the sufficiency of specific nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to meet emerging smaller-scale threats. The analysis also highlights the importance of broader strategic and political interaction in sustaining allied confidence in any joint security posture. The evaluation concludes that a strong US-ROK alliance relationship can be maintained while the size of the US nuclear arsenal continues to decline, in part because nuclear weapons in any deployment configuration are relatively ineffective means for deterring smaller-scale aggression. Nevertheless, continuing adjustment of the US-ROK extended deterrence posture to the evolving, complex and uncertain Korean peninsula security environment will remain an ongoing challenge. Finally, the article encourages further examination of the potential specific role ROK maritime forces might serve in enhancing deterrence of smaller-scale threats while minimizing risks of conflict escalation.