• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.33 no.4
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• pp.85-118
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• 2011

This paper uses the horizontal regulation system as the base analysis framework. The study clearly defines the regulatory goals of the followings: the horizontal cross-ownership regulations on program provider (PP) and platform provider, the vertical regulation on cross-ownership between PP and platform operator, the regulation on cross-ownership of program provider by terrestrial broadcasting company, and the regulation on cross-ownership between terrestrial broadcasting company and platform provider. Then, by analyzing the conformity between goals and criteria of regulations and the adequacy of the regulation level according to regulatory purposes, this paper examines the justifiability of each regulation and extracts improvement measures that suite regulatory purposes. This analysis finds following appropriate measures: replacing the horizontal cross-ownership regulation on PP with conduct regulations, such as designating major broadcasting programs or replacing the current criterion of cross-ownership regulation from sales to the audience market share; reshaping the horizontal cross-ownership regulation on platform provider so that system operator (SO), satellite broadcaster and Internet protocol television (IPTV) operator would be applied by the same regulation based on the number of subscribers of pay television services; and discontinuing other cross-ownership regulation. In this way, the study shows that with appropriate regulations on cross-ownership of PP, there would be no need for additional regulation on vertical integration between PP and platform operator. On the other hand, given that the regulation on terrestrial broadcasting cross-ownership of PP could be justified only by regulatory purpose of the protection of the diversity of public opinions, it would be desirable to replace the current criteria of the number of PPs with the criteria of the audience market share. Lastly, the study shows that when platform operator is targeted by the cross-ownership regulation based on the number of subscribers of pay television services, the regulation on cross-ownership between terrestrial broadcasting company and platform provider should be replaced with conduct regulations, such as designating must-offer channels and major broadcasting programs.

• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
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• v.20 no.3_spc
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• pp.201-217
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• 2013

This paper analyzes the effect of network neutrality regulation on social welfare using the two-sided market under the network congestion. This paper deals with zero price rule regulation which means the price regulation on the side of content. The results are as follows : First, under the monopoly platform, internet use price, contents price, and the number of internet user and content provider are all decreasing as the network congestion increases. Second, under the monopoly platform internet use price, contents price, and the number of internet user and content provider are all increasing as the network capacity increases. Third, the price of internet use and contents internet use which maximize social welfare are increasing and the number of internet user and content provider are decreasing as the network congestion increases. Fourth, optimal network capacity for monopoly platform provider is less than socially optimal network capacity. Fifth, if network neutrality regulation is enforced, the price of internet use is higher than monopoly platform provider and the price of contents is lower than monopoly platform provider. Also, the number of internet user is less than monopoly platform provider and the number of content provider is more than that. By the way, when network congestion increases, internet use price, the number of internet user, and the number of content provider are decreasing. Sixth, network neutrality regulation is more effective for internet user side than contents provider when network congestion is considered. This means that network neutrality regulation is not effective for contents market side when network congestion is seriously large.

• Journal of Venture Innovation
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• v.5 no.2
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• pp.101-110
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• 2022

It is easy for first movers of platform business model to monopolize the market due to the platform's own characteristics such as network effect and flywheel strategy. Accordingly, the regulations on platform operators are constantly being discussed in the recent monopoly regulation arguments, but the concrete regulations have not been settled worldwide. This is because there is no clear consensus on the valuation method which can objectively identify dominant platform firms from the others. This study suggested a platform valuation method based on the Tobin's Q theory, by measuring the moderating effect of the existence of specific scale of platform on the relationship between replacement cost and market valuation. Our method can not only be a standard for settling monopoly regulation by converging the regulation targets, but also contribute to active investment on the new platform firms by evaluating their potential growths quantitatively.

• Informatization Policy
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• v.30 no.1
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• pp.3-22
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• 2023

This review article summarizes the issues around platform business with government regulation. We illustrated types and characteristics of platform business. We examined the current policy tools and government activities for regulating platform business in a digital economy. Policy tools of government regulation for platform business are not suitable or fit at times. We suggest an approach to look at the fit of platform business types and regulation policy tools. We also offer a policy recommendation to define situations whether to focus on minimizing conflicts among stakeholder or invite them to participate in anticipatory decision making process for new technology market.

• Journal of Internet Computing and Services
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• v.19 no.5
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• pp.133-145
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• 2018

This paper proposes a desirable regulatory measure for the rapidly growing shared economic platform. The development and innovation of digital technology is expected to create new services and new economic and industrial values, but it also raises concerns, challenges about social trust issues arising from conflicts of interest with existing industries. Although sharing economies also creates new forms of supply and demand and grows rapidly around the world with innovative trading methods, institutional limitations are still being exposed in the major cities in terms of conflicts with existing industrial values. In order to reduce the social costs associated with the regulatory process and reach the appropriate regulatory policy goal, this paper proposes a co-regulation approach considering the sharing economic characteristics.

• Journal of Information Technology Services
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• v.21 no.6
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• pp.73-89
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• 2022

After COVID-19, the percentage of digital consumption has soared. Meanwhile, as the online platform market grows in size and digital commerce is activated, controversy over the "dark pattern" that induces consumers to do unintended things online continues. Dark patterns are deceptive design patterns that cause consumer rights and financial damage and can result in damaging fair market competition. As a result, the need to regulate dark patterns is raised not only by overseas regulators but also in Korea, and there are growing calls for strengthening consumer protection against dark patterns, with amendments to related laws being proposed by the National Assembly. On the other hand, there is no agreed definition of dark pattern from a normative point of view, and there is a concern that even legitimate advertising marketing activities of companies may be regulated, so a review of dark pattern regulatory measures is required. In this study, dark patterns were reviewed from a normative point of view and appropriate regulatory measures were analyzed. In particular, the problem of the dark pattern can be applied in a way that the market regulates and controls itself in consideration of the characteristics of the online platform. This study reviewed the possibility of self-regulation for dart patterns and proposed the role of each subject.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.15 no.6_2
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• pp.99-106
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• 2015

The purpose of this study was to explore the direction in applying platform business model to the site to facilitate the growth of a private security guard service according to the development phase of economy, The directions of platform business application to be suggested through the study method are as follows. First, ensuring publicness. It should be able to integrate the government's and private sector's ability to collect and impart information. Second, securing self-regulation. Self-regulation should be guaranteed in the limit not to abuse or misuse others' information in re-producing and using information on private safe management and public order. Third, ensuring access. Past safety management has been controlled by public order power such as nation, military and police power, but access should be made to be convenient between suppliers and demanders. Fourth, securing profitability. In conclusion, those supplying and consuming private security guard service should be able to get their wanted value and share economic profits.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.48 no.3
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• pp.177-197
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• 2023

The rent seeking behavior of monopolistic online platform enterprises against digital contents suppliers is similar to the importing countries transfers the monopoly profit acquired by exporting companies in the imperfectly competitive market through optimal tariffs. If such an optimal tariffs imposing mechanism of importing countries, according to so-called strategic trade policy theories, is applied to the rent-seeking behavior of online platform companies, important insights can be obtained in discussions on regulatory reform. In other words, if an online platform enterprises impose a differentiated fee on each contents-suppliers in a monopolistically competitive markets that pursues contents differentiation through R&D investment, it would reduce the innovation investment by contents suppliers. Nevertheless, profit-maximizing online platform enterprises would not voluntarily give up the discriminatory fee system. Therefore, we would like to propose the introduction of a regulation that can force the introduction of an non-discriminatory fee system for all the contents suppliers.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.23 no.1
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• pp.107-131
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• 2013

Online-ADR (Alternative Dispute Resolution) has been receiving attention from the international community as a means of alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes in both small and mass international e-commerce. The EU Parliament and the Council proposed the Online Dispute Resolution Regulation for Consumer Disputes (hereafter, "EU Consumer ODR Regulation") and the Directive on Alternative Dispute Resolution of Consumer Disputes (hereafter, "EU Consumer ADR Directive") as a legislative package, now scheduled to be adopted. Those efforts strengthen consumer protection by enhancing ODR in international e-commerce and improving of the functions of the e-commerce market. The EU Consumer ADR and ODR regulation package will operate in conjunction with the ODR platform as a single point across Europe, abandoning the ADR system of each member. Consumers and traders who need dispute resolution apply on the EU ODR platform linked website, and the applications are distributed to individual ADR institutions in accordance with the Rules and Procedure of ADR institutions in the respective country. Although there has been partial progress in Korea for ODR programs such as the establishment of the Online Administrative Trial and the procedures of individual ADR agencies operating through the website, existing norms do not fully support the system. At this point, we see many implications of the EU Consumer ADR and ODR regulation package on the direction chosen for domestic ADR and ODR policy and legislation. This study introduces the main features and content of the EU Consumer ADR Directive (draft) and ODR Regulation provisions, and describes the direction of domestic policy and legislation regarding Online-ADR.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.17 no.5
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• pp.237-250
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• 2022

On September 28, 2020, the Korea Fair Trade Commission introduced a proposed bill entitled the "Fair Online Platform Intermediary Transactions Act." We quantify the impact of this proposed act on Naver, Korea's major digital platform. Finding a proper control unit is not an easy task in social science studies. We overcome this caveat by constructing a synthetic version of Naver using Abadie & Gardeazabal's (2003) synthetic control method. It appears that the economic cost of the proposed act is not negligible at all. Naver's opportunity loss amounted to 16.18% of its market capitalization (approximately 8.5 trillion won in comparison with its pre-regulation market capitalization). Any regulation-based approaches to resolving digital platform issues have both promises and pitfalls. The results highlight that regulatory bodies should carefully gauge the impact of such regulations, as we have seen with Naver's case.