• Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.69-96
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• 2019

This paper is written to suggest several recommendations for South Korea to deter and defend North Korean nuclear threat, when North Korea does not seem to give up its nuclear weapons and the US's extended deterrence including the nuclear umbrella could remain uncertain. For this purpose, it explains key options regarding nuclear deterrence and defense by non-nuclear weapon state. It evaluates the current status of South Korean non-nuclear preparedness against North Korean nuclear threat and provides some recommendations to improve the preparedness. As a result, this paper concluded that South Korean non-nuclear preparedness against North Korean nuclear threat was not that reliable. The preparedness has weakened since the South Korean effort to denuclearize North Korea through negotiations in 2018. In this sense, South Korea could have serious problems in protecting its people from North Korean nuclear threat if the US promise of extended deterrence is not implemented. South Korea should focus on its decapitation operation to North Korean highest leaders in case of North Korean nuclear attack based on a minimal deterrence concept. It should be prepared to conduct preventive strikes instead of preemptive strikes due to North Korea's development of solid fuel ballistic missiles. It should integrate its Ballistic Missile Defense with that of the US forces in Korea. South Korea should make a sincere effort for nuclear civil defense including construction of nuclear shelters.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.127-135
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• 2017

Today, Kim Jong-un, the third-hereditary regime in North Korea, is committing Nuclear Provocation more aggressively than the past when Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il dominated. Past South Korea government had suggested plans to restrain the provocation from North Korea and bring stabilization in the Korean Peninsula. However, consequentially it was limited to the primary role of the President. When President Trump takes over the government in February 2017, it has attracted the expectation about the issues occurred on the Korean Peninsula due to the pledge that he promised during the presidential election and his govern style. However, various speeches about the Korean Peninsula that he spoke recently made situations depressed about what South Korean currently encounters. Furthermore, previous regime in North Korea has laid the foundation for Kim Jong-un to be obsessed more on the nuclear and missile which has led him to provoke more imprudently by highlighting the light weight, advanced, and various kinds of nuclear and missiles. Thus, we would like to propose counter measures in order for South Korean government to handle and solve the issues that they encounters by themselves based on North Korea's Nuclear Provocation instead of relying on other countries to get involved and help.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.16 no.3_1
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• pp.107-114
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• 2016

The North Korean regime, Kim Jungun's foreign policy is changed frequently. And their military policy has no gravity. North Korea has developed nuclear weapons and long range missile. Now they have Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile. These activities redound a great threat in Korean peninsula. There are a no possibilities to give up its nuclear weapons and missile development. For the peace in Korean peninsula, we should make North Korea to abandon its nuclear himself through effective sanctions. Now China should effort to control North Korea. To reduce the threat we should coordinate the strategic interests of China and US. This study is to predict the North Korea military activities to analyze "military policies."

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.53
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• pp.255-279
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• 2017

The development of North Korea's nuclear weapons has worsened to the sixth nuclear test in 2017, and despite the sanctions of the international community including our government, we have not been able to offer clear solutions and alternatives, and the current measures are not enough in case of North Korea is using nuclear weapons. This study suggests how we should be prepared against the use of nuclear weapons under the premise that North Korea will never give up development of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. The first chapter outlines the current status of our preparedness if North Korea makes a nuclear attack. The second chapter analyzes and evaluates the power of nuclear weapons and North Korea's nuclear weapons threat. In the third chapter, we analyze North Korea nuclear attack and analyze the wartime emergency situation and civil defense posture. Finally, in order to implement the solutions presented in the text, we will identify priorities and summarize further developments.

• Journal of Aerospace System Engineering
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• v.10 no.1
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• pp.118-126
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• 2016

North Korea has continued developing ballistic missiles with various ranges. Even through the recent launch long-range missiles, it can be inferred that North Korea's Missile technology has reached a level where it can even threaten the US. moreover, through the three times nuclear tests, North Korea is known to have succeeded at gaining 10~20KT of explosive power as well as the minimization and lightening of nuclear warhead. Considering the short length of war zone in Korean peninsula and the possibility of nuclear equipment, if be the most severe threat across the whole peninsula. Since the midcourse phase flight takes the longest time, ROK should establish the ability to intercept at this middle phase. From this perspective, this paper describes mission effect of a sea-based BMD system through empirical threat and flight characteristic analysis using MIT model that was not suggested in original research.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.37
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• pp.325-354
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• 2013

The concept of national security and the fundamental system for crisis management have departed from traditional methods and the importance of a national critical infrastructure crisis management has been emphasized. A national critical infrastructure crisis means a situation where human resource, material and functional system that may have a material effect on the critical functions of the government, the vitality and integrity of society, national economy and the safety of the public becomes disabled due to causes such as terrorism or major disasters. Although North Korea had been subject to numerous rounds of negotiations and sanctions as it continually developed nuclear weapons since the 1960s, it has also showed off its nuclear armaments through successful nuclear testings and missile launches. As the development and threat of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction becomes more noticeable and the range of its risk expands, this study focuses on the potential for an absence of leadership for national crisis management where the country's leadership, which should serve the critical role and function of handling national crises, becomes completely destroyed by the unexpected initial attacks by North Korea. As a result, the purpose of this study is to propose safety measures for the country's leadership in preparation for North Korea's threat of nuclear weapons by examining the concept and degree of risk of weapons of mass destruction with a focus on nuclear weapons, analyzing the substance of the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons and evaluating such threat. In conclusion, first, to ensure the normal functioning of a national crisis management system in the event of a national crisis, we must seek safety measures that conform to the scope and succession order of the leadership of the national crisis management for an Enduring Constitutional Government (ECG) and the Continuity Of Operations (COOP). Second, in the event of a national ceremony, the gathering of the country's leadership all together in an open place should be avoided. In unavoidable circumstances, the next in rank that will act on behalf of the current leader should be designated and relevant safety measures should be taken. Third, during time of peace, in preparation for national crises, the scope of protection for the country's leadership should be prescribed and specific security and safety measures should be implemented. Fourth, the succession order for acting president in the case of the death of the president pursuant to Articles 71 and 26(1) of the National Government Organization Act should reconsidered to see whether it is a reasonable provision that takes into consideration a national crisis management that corresponds to the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Pursuant to the Basic Guidelines for National Crisis Management set out under Presidential Directive No. 229, the Korean government is currently operating a case-by-case "crisis management standard manual" and its sub-manuals and has also prepared the Presidential Security Service's security and safety measure regulations regarding the acting president. Therefore, the Korean government should actualize the above points in the case-by-case crisis management standard manual and security and safety measure regulations regarding the acting president to implement and legislate them.

• Strategy21
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• s.40
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• pp.82-114
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• 2016

The purpose of this article is to analyze the progress of North Korea's SLBM threat, and to assess the technological capacity and threat level of its SLBMs. Currently, North Korea has approximately 1000 ballistic missiles, such as the SCUD, Musudan, and Nodong, in stock. This article pays close attention to the background and strategical implication behind North Korea's obsession with developing SLBMs despite possessing sufficient means to launch provocations with its current arsenal of ground based ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Based on the abovementioned analysis, this article will recommend possible response directions for the ROK Armed Forces to North Korea's SLBM threat. It is highly difficult to detect SLBMs due to its stealthy nature, as it is launched underwater after covert infiltration. North Korea's SLBM is considered a game changer in that even one SLBM can significantly change the strategic balance of North East Asia. North Korea's SLBM test launch in August has made a 500km flight, landing 80km inside the JADIZ (Japan Air Defense Identification Zone), and as such, it is assessed that North Korea already possesses underwater ejection and cold launch capabilities. The most realistic response to North Korea's imminent SLBM threat is bolstering anti-submarine capabilities. ROK Armed Forces need to upgrade its underwater kill-chain by modernizing and introducing new airborne anti-submarine assets and nuclear-powered submarines, among many options. Moreover, we should integrate SM-3 missiles with the Aegis Combat system that possess strong detection capabilities and flexibility, thereby establishing a sea-based Ballistic Missle Defense (BMD) system centered around the Aegis Combat System, as sea-based ballistic missile threats are best countered out in the seas. Finally, the capabilities gap that could arise as a result of budgetary concerns and timing of fielding new assets should be filled by establishing firm ROK-US-Japan combined defense posture.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.5
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• pp.173-202
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• 2007

After successful nuclear tests Pakistan launched a more severe surprise attack toward India than before. It is highly possible that North Korea will adopt this Pakistan military strategy if it is armed with nuclear weapons. The North Korean forces armed, with nuclear bombs could make double its war capability through strengthening aggressive force structure and come into effect on blocking reinforcement of the US forces at the initial phase of war time. Therefore we may regard that Pyongyang's nuclear arming is a major one of various factors which increase possibility of waging a conventional warfare or a nuclear war. North Korea's high self-confidence after nuclear arming will heighten tension on the Korean Peninsula via aggressive military threat or terror toward South Korea, and endeavor to accomplish its political purpose via low-intensity conflicts. For instance, nuclear arming of the Pyongyang regime enforces the North Korean forces to invade the Northern Limit Line(NLL), provoke naval battles at the West Sea, and occupy one or two among the Five Islands at the West Sea. In that case, the South Korean forces will be faced with a serious dilemma. In order to recapture the islands, Seoul should be ready for escalating a war. However it is hard to imagine that South Korea fights with North Korea armed with nuclear weapons. This paper concludes that the Pyongyang regime after nuclear arming strongly tends to occupy superiority of military strategy and wage military provocations on the Korean Peninsula.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.16 no.5
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• pp.1102-1112
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• 2012

The policy of the United States is a Korean Peninsula free of all nuclear weapons. The United States government was considering the possibility of military action to eliminate the North Korean nuclear threat. Talk of military action peaked from mid-1993 through mid-1994. Such an attack might have led directly to a Korean war. At that time the nuclear crisis solutioned by North Korea-United States negotiation and ROK-United States alliance. PSI's purpose is to prevent or at least inhibit the spread of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors whose possession would be a serious threat to global or regional security. The most controversial activity of PSI is interdiction. North Korea has expressed grave concern over the initiative, stating that it has a sovereign right to develop, deploy, and export weapons, and that it would view any interdiction of its ships as a declaration of war. If South Korea is to execute interdiction North Korean ships expect tensions to increase dramatically on the peninsula with North Korea doing something quite provacative in response. South Korea cannot help approaching PSI with great caution, since it has to consider the ROK-United States alliance, and inter-Korean relations.

• Journal of People, Plants, and Environment
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• v.22 no.6
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• pp.563-573
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• 2019

The North Korean government conducted its first nuclear test in 2006 and more recently the sixth nuclear test on September 3, 2017. In order to identify how North Korea's nuclear tests have affected the environment, a scientific approach is required. Although North Korea's nuclear tests and their environmental destruction are not a severe threat to the environment of the Korean Peninsula at this time, identifying environmental damage and taking countermeasures in advance are essential to minimize their potential threats to the environments. The purpose of this study is to study the environmental impact of North Korea's nuclear tests using Google Earth image analysis. As a method of the study, we compare Google Earth images taken before and after each nuclear test was conducted in North Korea. To overcome limitations of the suggested comparison method, we cross-checked our results with those of previous scientific research. After the 1st-3rd nuclear tests, green spaces were found to be considerably reduced. In particular, when comparing the Google Earth images before and after the second nuclear test, some ground subsidences were observed. Such subsidences can cause tunnels on the mountainsides and cracks in rocks around the mountains, leading to the release of radioactive materials and contaminating groundwater. Besides, after the 4th-6th nuclear tests, decay and deforestation were observed not in the nuclear test sites, but in their surrounding areas. Especially after the 5th and 6th nuclear tests, the topography and the forests of the surrounding areas were severely damaged. In relation to North Korea's nuclear tests and their impact on the natural environment, we need to prepare various policy measures to reduce North Korea's environmental pollution and natural environment destruction. Those policy measures include the establishment of various cooperative governance between the Korean government, the private sector, the academia, NGOs, and international organizations.