• Strategy21
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• s.30
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• pp.63-98
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• 2012

Northeast Asia has a multi-layered security structure within which major economic and military powers both confront one another and cooperate at the same time. Major regional powers maintain mutually cooperative activities in the economic sphere while competing one another in order to secure a dominant position in the politico-military arena. The multifarious threats, posed by the North Korea's nuclear development, territorial disputes, and maritime demarcation line issues demonstrate that Northeast Asia suffers more from military conflicts and strifes than any other region in the world. Specifically, major maritime security threats include North Korea's nuclear proliferation and missile launching problems as well as military provocations nearby the Northern Limit Line(NLL) as witnessed in the Cheonan naval ship and Yeonpyong incidents. The ROK Navy has been supplementing its firm military readiness posture in consideration of North Korea's threats on the NLL. It has performed superb roles in defending the nation and establishing the Navy advanced and best picked. It also has been conducive to defend the nation from external military threats and invasion, secure the sea lanes of communications, and establish regional stability and world peace. In order to effectively cope with the strategic environment and future warfares, the ROK Navy needs to shift its military structure to one that is more information and technology intensive. In addition, it should consolidate the ROK-US alliance and extend military cooperative measures with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Evolved steadily for the last 60 years, the ROK-US alliance format has contributed to peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the Northeast Asian region. In conclusion, this manuscript contends that the ROK Navy should strive for the establishment of the following: (1) Construction of Jeju Naval Base; (2) Strategic Navy Equipped with War Deterrence Capabilities; (3) Korean-type of System of Systems; (4) Structure, Budget and Human Resources of the Naval Forces Similar to the Advanced Countries; and (5) Strategic Maritime Alliance and Alignment System as well as Domestic Governance Network for the Naval Families.

• Journal of Environmental Health Sciences
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• v.37 no.3
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• pp.226-233
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• 2011

Exactly 25 years after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, 11th of March 2011 the Fukushima nuclear accident occurred in Japan and was ranked at level 7 same to the Chernobyl. A Korean and Japanese joint civil survey was conducted around Fukushima on April 13-17. The radiation survey data clearly shows a large hotspot area between 20 km and 50 km radius north and west direction from the accident reactors, with the highest radiation recorded being 55.64 ${\mu}Sv/hr$ in the air, 99.89 ${\mu}Sv/hr$ in the surface air, and 36.16 ${\mu}Sv/hr$ in a car, respectively. 3.65 ${\mu}Sv/hr$ in the air and 6.89 ${\mu}Sv/hr$ in the surface air were detected at the playground of an elementary school in Fukushima City. Spring came with full cherry blossoms in Fukushima, but it was silent spring of radiation contamination. Interviews with Fukushima nuclear refugees reveal serious problems about Japanese nuclear safety systems, such as there was no practical evacuation drill within 1-10 km and no plan at all for 10-30 km areas. Several reforms items for Korean nuclear safety system can be suggested: minimization of accident damage, clear separation of regulatory and safety bureaus with a new and independent administrating agency, community participation and agreement regarding the safety system and levels, which is the major concern of 80% Korean. To tackle threats of nuclear disaster in neighboring nations like China, a new position entitled 'Ambassador for nuclear safety diplomacy' is highly necessary. The nuclear safety of Korea should no longer be the monopoly of those nuclear engineers and limited technocrats criticized as a 'nuclear mafia'.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.56 no.3
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• pp.959-965
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• 2024

The High Temperature Test Unit (HTTU) was an experimental set-up to conduct separate and integral effects tests of the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) core. The annular core consisted of a randomly packed bed of uniform spheres. Natural convection tests using both nitrogen and helium, and forced convection tests using nitrogen, were conducted. The maximum material temperature achieved during forced convection testing was 1200 ℃. This paper presents the numerical analysis of the flow and temperature distribution for a forced convection test using 3D CFD as well as a 1D systems-CFD computer code. Several modelling approaches are possible, ranging from a fully explicit to a semi-implicit method that relies on correlations of their associated phenomena. For the comparison between codes, the analysis was performed using a porous media approach, where the conduction and radiative heat transfer were lumped together as an effective thermal conductivity and the convective heat transfer was correlated between the solid and gas phases. The results from both codes were validated against the experimental measurements. Favourable results were obtained, in particular by the systems-CFD code with minimal computational and time requirements.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.220-250
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• 2013

South Korean national security strategy should be developed to effectively handle and counter increasing maritime threats and challenges. There are three major maritime threats South Korea faces today; maritime disputes on the EEZ boundary and Dokdo islet issues, North Korean threats, and international maritime security. Maritime disputes in the region are getting intensified and turned into a military confrontation after 2010. Now regional countries confront each other with military and police forces and use economic leverage to coerce the others. They are very eager to create advantageous de facto situations to legitimize their territorial claims. North Korean threat is also increasing in the sea as we witnessed in the Cheonan incident and Yeonpyoung shelling in 2010. North Korea resorts to local provocations and nuclear threats to coerce South Korea in which it may enjoy asymmetric advantages. The NLL area of the west sea would be a main hot spot that North Korea may continue to make a local provocation. Also, South Korean national economy is heavily dependent upon foreign trade and national strategic resources such as oil are all imported. Without an assurance on the safety of sea routes, these economic activities cannot be maintained and expanded. This paper argues that South Korea should make national maritime strategy and enhance the strength of naval forces. As a middle power, its national security strategy needs to consider all the threats and challenges not only from North Korea but also to maritime security. This is not a matter of choice but a mandate for national survival and prosperity. This paper discusses the importance of maritime security, changing characteristics of maritime threats and challenges, regional maritime disputes and its threat to South Korea's security, and South Korea's future security strategy and ways to enhance the role of naval forces. Our national maritime strategy needs to show middle and long term policy directions on how we will protect our maritime interests. Especially, it is important to build proper naval might to carry out all the roles and missions required to the military.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.18 no.2_spc
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• pp.261-273
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• 2020

North Korea conducted the sixth underground nuclear test on September 3, 2017 at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site (NTS). In contrast to the previous five nuclear tests, several induced earthquakes occurred around the NTS after the sixth nuclear test and this may have caused radioxenon leakages at the site. Considering these reported earthquakes, we performed atmospheric dispersion simulations on some radioxenon emission scenarios for this event using our Lagrangian Atmospheric Dose Assessment System (LADAS) model by employing the Unified Model (UM) based numerical weather prediction data produced by the Korea Meteorological Administration (KMA). To find out possible detection locations and times, we combined not only daily and weekly based delayed releases but also leakages after the reported earthquakes around the NTS to create emission scenarios. Our simulation results were generally in good agreement with the measured data of the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission and International Monitoring System (IMS) stations operated by the Comprehensive nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.33 no.3
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• pp.349-354
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• 2001

While the United Nations UN) agencies work to restrict the manufacture, sale, and use of land-mines worldwide, a massive clean-up effort is needed to find and destroy the estimated 100 million land-mines still buried around the world. Land-mines left behind from wars worldwide are one of the past century＇s main unsolved problems of war and remain the focus of humanitarian land-mine detection and removal primarily in Europe, Africa, Asia and Central and South America. For example, approximately 1 million anti-personnel mines and other various kinds which have been buried in the 249.4 km (155 miles) demilitarized zone (DMZ) of the Korean peninsular should be completely removed in historical process of the peaceful unification between South and North Korea. In this regard, the current trends of technologies linked to land-mine detection systems are surveyed.

• Strategy21
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• s.41
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• pp.232-260
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• 2017

The purpose of this paper is to open a debate about what kind of deterrent strategy the ROK military should pursue in the era of NK's weapons of mass destruction and missile threats. I argue that the ROK military needs a comprehensive deterrent strategy that reflects the international security situations and trends and that builds on clear understanding of the basic concepts and how deterrence operates. The paper starts with surveying the basic knowledge of deterrence from the perspectives of both theory and practice. Then, it provides explanations on why deterrence against NK can be particularly difficult given the security environment in and around the Korean peninsula. For example, South Korea and North Korea hardly share 'common knowledge' that serves as a basic element for the operation of deterrence. Deterrence against North Korea involves complex situations in that both deterrence and compellence strategies may be relevant particularly to North Korea's WMD and missile threats. It also involves both immediate and general deterrence. Based on the discussion, I suggest several ideas that may serve as guidelines for establishing a deterrent strategy against NK. First, our threats for deterrence should be the ones that can be realized, particularly in terms of the international norms. In other words, they must be considered appropriate among other nations in the international community. Second, there should be separate plans for the different kinds of threats: one is conventional, local provocations and the other is WMD/missile related provocations. Third, we should pursue much closer cooperative relations with the U.S. military to enhance the effectiveness of immediate deterrence in the Korean peninsula. Fourth, the ROK military should aim to accomplish 'smart deterrence' maximizing the benefits of technological superiority. Fifth, the ROK military readiness and structure should be able to deny emerging North Korean military threats such as the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Lastly, in executing threats, we should consider that the current action influences credibility and reputation of the ROK, which in turn affect the decisions for future provocations. North Korea's WMD/missile threats may soon become critical strategic-level threats to South Korea. In retrospect, the first debate on building a missile defense system in South Korea dates back to the 1980s. Mostly the debate has centered on whether or not South Korea's system should be integrated into the U.S. missile defense system. In the meantime, North Korea has become a small nuclear power that can threaten the United States with the ballistic missiles capability. If North Korea completes the SLBM program and loads the missiles on a submarine with improved underwater operation capability, then, South Korea may have to face the reality of power politics demonstrated by Thucydides through the Athenians: "The strong do what they have the power to do, the weak accept what they have to accept."

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.55 no.8
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• pp.2723-2733
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• 2023

Transuranic nuclides (such as ²³⁸Pu, ²⁵²Cf, ²⁴⁹Bk, etc.) have a wide range of application in industry, medicine, agriculture, and other fields. However, due to the complex conversion chain and remarkable fission losses in the process of transuranic nuclides production, the generation amounts are extremely low. High flux reactor with high neutron flux and flexible irradiation channels, is regarded as the promising candidate for producing transuranic nuclides. It is of great significance to increase the conversion ratio of transuranic nuclides, resulting in higher efficiency and better economy. In this paper, we perform an optimization design evaluation of producing transuranic nuclides in high flux reactor, which includes optimization design of irradiation target and influence study of reactor core loading. It is demonstrated that the production rate increases with appropriately determined target material and target structure. The target loading scheme in the irradiation channel also has a significant influence on the production of transuranic nuclides.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.39
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• pp.185-215
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• 2014

Since North Korea has used terror crime as a means of unification under communism against South Korea, South Korea has been much damaged until now. And the occurrence possibility of terror crime by North Korean authority is now higher than any other time. The North Korean terror crimes of Kim Il Sung era had been committed by the dictator's instruction with the object of securing governing fund. However, looking at the terror crimes committed for decades during Kim Jung Il authority, it is revealed that these terror crimes are expressed as a criminal behavior because of the conflict to accomplish the power and economic advantage non powerful groups target. This study focused on the power conflict in various causes of terror crimes by applying George B. Vold(1958)'s theory which explained power conflict between groups became a factor of crime, and found the aspect by ages of terror crime behavior by North Korean authority and responding plan to future North Korean terror crime. North Korean authority high-ranking officials were the Labor Party focusing on Juche Idea for decades in Kim Il Sung time. Afterwards, high-ranking officials were formed focusing on military authorities following Military First Policy at the beginning of Kim Jung Il authority, rapid power change has been done for recent 10 years. To arrange the aspect by times of terror crime following this power change, alienated party executives following the support of positive military first authority by Kim Jung Il after 1995 could not object to forcible terror crime behavior of military authority, and 1st, 2nd Yeongpyeong maritime war which happened this time was propelled by military first authority to show the power of military authority. After 2006, conservative party union enforced censorship and inspection on the trade business and foreign currency-earning of military authority while executing drastic purge. The shooting on Keumkangsan tourists that happened this time was a forcible terror crime by military authority following the pressure of conservative party. After October, 2008, first military reign union executed the launch of Gwanmyungsung No.2 long-range missile, second nuclear test, Daechung marine war, and Cheonanham attacking terror in order to highlight the importance and role of military authority. After September 2010, new reign union went through severe competition between new military authority and new mainstream and new military authority at this time executed highly professionalized terror crime such as cyber/electronic terror unlike past military authority. After July 2012, ICBM test launch, third nuclear test, cyber terror on Cheongwadae homepage of new mainstream association was the intention of Km Jung Eun to display his ability and check and adjust the power of party/military/cabinet/ public security organ, and he can attempt the unexpected terror crime in the future. North Korean terror crime has continued since 1980s when Kim Jung Il's power succession was carried out, and the power aspect by times has rapidly changed since 1994 when Kim Il Sung died and the terror crime became intense following the power combat between high-ranking officials and power conflict for right robbery. Now South Korea should install the specialized department which synthesizes and analyzes the information on North Korean high-ranking officials and reinforce the comprehensive information-collecting system through the protection and management of North Korean defectors and secret agents in order to determine the cause of North Korean terror crime and respond to it. And South Korea should participate positively in the international collaboration related to North Korean terror and make direct efforts to attract the international agreement to build the international cooperation for the response to North Korean terror crime. Also, we should try more to arrange the realistic countermeasure against North Korean cyber/electronic terror which was more diversified with the expertise terror escaping from existing forcible terror through enactment/revision of law related to cyber terror crime, organizing relevant institute and budget, training professional manpower, and technical development.

• Journal of the Economic Geographical Society of Korea
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.329-352
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• 2017

Since the late 2000s Korean foreign direct investors in North Korea and China border regions have gone through the closure of outward processing trade(OPT) networks and changes in their location due to UN security council resolution and Korean independent sanctions against North Korea's nuclear and missile tests. However, the introduction of new Chinese OPT policy has led to the invigoration of domestic market-based OPT networks towards North Korea. The main aim of this paper is to identify the exceptional characteristics of Dandong in Liaoning province, a North Korea and China border region by analyzing OPT networks towards North Korea. Fundamentally the establishment of OPT networks towards North Korea is likely to be based on the utilization of a plenty of low wages in North Korea. The main reasons for this are fallen into two perspectives: geo-economics and geo-politics. The first perspective is geo-economics centering on the consolidation of economic exchange between North Korea and China, and North Korean economic development. For example, the introduction of Chinese OPT in border region has enabled Chinese local firms based on domestic market to access a plenty of low wage in North Korea in formal and institutional contexts. The second is geo-politics for the stability of North Korean regime based on the means of geo-economics. As the invigoration of domestic market-based OPT networks might make North Korea possible promoting foreign money earning, it enable North Korea to be sustainable as a buffering region between capitalist and socialist regime for China. It shows Chinese geo-strategic attempts to deal with the economic and regime stability of North Korean as a buffering state. In other words, OPT networks in North Korea should be concerned with the discourse practice of geo-economics and geo-politics which might lead to various and contingent spatial economies in border region. As a consequence, North Korea and China border regions could defined as a space in which is applicable to exceptional institutions and policies, and an exploitative space in which create surplus and rents by utilizing a plenty of low wages in North Korea through OPT networks.