• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.15 no.6_1
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• pp.33-42
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• 2015

According to the tentative agreement between Iran and Western countries on last July, the Iranian nuclear problem that has been discussed is resolving gradually. It has been discussed for long time. The reason we must observe the agreement process for the Iranian nuclear is that the Korean peninsular is also threatened by the North Korea's nuclear. When it comes to comparing the nuclear issue in two countries, there are very big differences such as political system, structure and the process of nuclear agreement between them. For this reason, some experts say that it is hard to find the implication for solving the North Korea's nuclear problem. However, the others say that we can find the positive factors that have an effect on the North Korea's nuclear problem. This research focuses on analyzing the Iranian nuclear agreement process and successful factors as well as trying to find out the implication to solve the North Korea's nuclear problem. In spite of large point of difference between I ran and the North Korea, the reason we have to find out the positive measure to solve the North Korea's nuclear problem is that this issue is directly related to the Korean peninsular's security.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.47-81
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• 2016

This paper has attempted to examine the political and operational contexts within which North Korea's latest acts of nuclear blackmail, its test-firing of an SLBM on April 23rd 2016 and its fourth nuclear test on January 6^th 2016, should be understood. Analysis of the KN-11 SLBM and the Sinpo-class SSB is based on official South Korean, US and others sources, especially the ROK MND, as well as other resources from South Korea, US and others. Unfortunately, the results of this exploration are inconclusive: there is simply not enough evidence available at present to either confirm or refute the existence of a functional North Korean SLBM and SSB. Nevertheless, the North Korean determination to possess such assets should not be taken lightly. But even accepting North Korea's claims about its SLBMs at face value, which is undermined by news of apparently unsuccessful follow-up test-firings in November, and probably December 2015, there is little proof that North Korea has yet succeeded in miniaturizing its nuclear warhead, so the most extravagant fears are not yet justified. Taken together with North Korea's latest announcement of a supposed successful SLBM ejection-test, on March 23^th 2016, the KN-11 SLBM claims should probably be seen as primarily about proving North Korea's status as a nuclear power, both to exert external political pressure and to bolster internal political support for Kim Jong-un's rule. In conclusion, this paper recommends formulating a preemptive anti-access strategy for the ROKN, proposes acquiring an ASW CV and SSNs to implement submarine strategic deterrent patrols, and urges extending the existing limited AORs to facilitate the preemptive anti-access strategy. Other deterrence options may be suggested, but it is surely significant that the ROKN has recently publically referred to the deployment of an ASW CV and SSNs for the first time.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.71-96
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• 2017

This study speculates on responses to the nuclear threats of North Korea and mutual assistance and cooperation between South Korea, the U.S. and China for the unification of the Korean Peninsula. As for the North Koreas nuclear issue and unification of the Korean Peninsula, South Korea is the subject of national division, the U.S. is a responsible country in international issues and does not have diplomatic ties with North Korea. China is a traditional socialist nation and a supporter of North Korea. As North Korea's strategic weapons including nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles are international issues, to defend against Kim Jung-Eun's unexpected acts, the three countries should actively cooperate with each other and develop countermeasures. However, with respect to the road map of the North Koreas issue, there are subtle differences between the U.S. and China in recognition of and sanctions against North Korea as a resolution of the U..N. Security Council. The U.S. has continued a deterrence policy and sanctions against North Korea based on joint threats between South Korea and the U.S. while China has showed a negative position in the process of solving the North Korean nuclear issue because of the unstable security derived from the U.S. 's intervention in the Korean peninsula. North Korea should change its diplomatic policy in a more concrete way towards world peace although it has continued trade of strategic weapons with Middle Eastern countries to maintain its political system. For example, to restart the summit talks and open multilateral security channels. Although the issue of unification of the Korean peninsula should be resolved by South and North Korea themselves, it is strange that South and North Korea depend on the logic of powerful countries for the resolution of a national problem. As for North Koreas nuclear and the Unification issues, peaceful solutions presented by South Korea seem more persuasive than the solution presented by North Korea which did not secure any international support. However, South Korea, the U.S. and China need to develop uni-directional two-tract strategies for sanctions against North Korea and talks with North Korea for peace on the Korean peninsula, and should continue to support the economic independence of North Korea.

• Korean journal of communication and information
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• v.56
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• pp.175-193
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• 2011

This study explored how South Korean newspapers covered North Korea's second nuclear test in May of 2009. Findings show that South Korean newspapers mostly reported North Korea's nuclear experiment in relatively negative tones. Their coverage mainly focused on the influences of nuclear threat from the North on the military, political and economic areas in South Korea. However, the media's agenda settings and frames were not similar in terms of each paper's political and ideological inclination. Whereas the progressive papers, such as the Hankyoreh and the Kyunghyang Shinmun, recognized that the current nuclear issue in Korean peninsula is getting worse because of South Korea's rigorous pressure on North Korea, the conservative papers, such as the Chosun Ilbo and the Donga Ilbo, see that the deadlock between North and South mainly comes from the system malfunction of North Korea. To prevent the current impasse, the left-side papers emphasized to develop the six-party talk in dealing with North Korean issue, while the right-wing papers paid attentions to the West's sanctions on North Korea and ensuring national security.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.57-84
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• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

• Journal of Radiation Industry
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.481-487
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• 2023

After conducting a hydrogen bomb test and launching an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in 2017, The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea, D.P.R.K.) declared the completion of its national nuclear capabilities. Currently, North Korea is refusing all nuclear inspections, but the possibility of nuclear inspections and the denuclearization process on the Korean Peninsula still exists. The Republic of Korea (South Korea, Rep. of Korea) has numerous reasons as a neighboring country to participate in North Korea's nuclear inspections and denuclearization, including technological capabilities, geographical proximity, and linguistic benefits. This study assumes nuclear inspections and verification within North Korea and aims to propose scenarios for the transportation and operation of personnel and equipment. The data and results compiled through this research are anticipated to serve as foundational information for future inspections and verifications on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, it is assessed that they could contribute to the development of strategies in preparation for participation in denuclearization efforts.

• Strategy21
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• s.37
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• pp.32-64
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• 2015

This paper examines the types and trends of North Korea's military provocations and regional maritime threats against South Korea, and is focusing on the Republic of Korea's naval development and modernizations by the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) on future actions, what directions of the ROKN has taken thus far in response, as well as an examination of how the ROKN might respond to vulnerabilities identified throughout modern history. Importantly, this paper does not consider the domestic, bilateral, multilateral, regional and global political dimensions of the situation on the Korean Peninsula; nor does it consider the North Korea's transitional power politics, but including North Korea's nuclear program and submarine-launched ballistic missile developments, as a caveat, this paper is based on open sources in Korean and English language, and thus information concerning provocations is indicative only.

• Journal of the Korean Professional Engineers Association
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• v.42 no.3
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• pp.35-40
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• 2009

After the yield of North Korea conducted underground the first nuclear test in 2006, which was less than a kiloton, it launched a vehicle on this April 9 again, which is believed to be a Taepo-dong 2 missile, defying international warnings that the move would violate U.N. resolutions, from Musudan-ni, North Korea. Its development and proliferation of ballistic missile and nuclear bomb technology pose a threat to the northeast Asian region and to international peace and security. In the other launching the missile, a newspaper reported that "While the launch was dubbed a failure by the U.S., it was an improvement over the North Koreans' July 2006 test of the Taepodong-2, said Green of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "It was definitely better than last time, but it's still not an operational system," Green said.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.16 no.3_2
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• pp.13-23
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• 2016

North Korea had recently conducted the fourth nuclear test and ICBM tests, dared nuclear provocation targeting the Korea and the international community. It is determined based on experiments of nuclear and missile in progress in North Korea that the technical level of nuclear force reached the completion stage of standardization, lightweight, and variation. It is expected to become reality that North Korea executes the nuclear provocation targeting the Korea and the international community in the near future. Nuclear bomb is an absolute weapon that the logic of counterattack after allowing the first strike of the other party cannot be applied due to its tremendous destructive power. Therefore, as the opponent to North Korea that it decided to hold the nuclear, the exercise of anticipatory self-defense in order to guarantee a minimum of right to life is not a choice, but the only essential correspondence concept. At the moment that the North Korean nuclear provocation is expected in the near future, it shall be provided with competence to strike the origin region of provocation by forming a national consensus of preemptive strike enforcement. Also, in preparation for the fifth nuclear test of North Korea, which is anticipated, the national competence must be mobilize to be able to ensure the 'Nuclear Option' from the international community.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.16 no.3_1
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• pp.107-114
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• 2016

The North Korean regime, Kim Jungun's foreign policy is changed frequently. And their military policy has no gravity. North Korea has developed nuclear weapons and long range missile. Now they have Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile. These activities redound a great threat in Korean peninsula. There are a no possibilities to give up its nuclear weapons and missile development. For the peace in Korean peninsula, we should make North Korea to abandon its nuclear himself through effective sanctions. Now China should effort to control North Korea. To reduce the threat we should coordinate the strategic interests of China and US. This study is to predict the North Korea military activities to analyze "military policies."