• 대한산업공학회지
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• 제28권4호
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• pp.379-389
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• 2002

In this paper, we study the competition between two kinds of suppliers, a bricks and mortars(B&M) and a clicks and mortars(C&M). Using the circular spatial market model, we derive and analyze the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria as a function of offline market share and efficiency of online channel of the C&M supplier. The result can be summarized as follows: (1) Stackelberg equilibrium is always superior to the Nash equilibrium, (2) Under certain conditions, the price of online channel can be higher than that of offline channel, (3) It is impossible for the C&M supplier to encroach on all of the B&M supplier's market, (4) In some cases, the C&M supplier has incentive to lower the efficiency of its online channel for more profit.

• 대한산업공학회지
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• 제27권2호
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• pp.181-189
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• 2001

The proliferation of the Internet and related technologies and applications has led to a new form of market place known as the electronic store. In this paper, we study competition between two shopping channels, an electronic store and traditional retailers. Based on the circular spatial market model, we derive the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria as a function of the efficiency of the electronic store. The result shows that the Stackelberg equilibrium is always superior to the Nash equilibrium for both channels. It is also shown that, in some cases, the electronic store has incentive to decrease its efficiency to gain more profit.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• 제8권4호
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• pp.675-685
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• 2013

Generation capacities and transmission line constraints in a competitive electricity market make it troublesome to compute Nash Equilibrium (NE) for analyzing participants' strategic generation quantities. The NE can cause a mixed strategy NE rather than a pure strategy NE resulting in a more complicated computation of NE, especially in a multiplayer game. A two-level hierarchical optimization problem is used to model competition among multiple participants. There are difficulties in using a mathematical programming approach to solve a mixed strategy NE. This paper presents heuristics applied to the mathematical programming method for dealing with the constraints on generation capacities and transmission line flows. A new formulation based on the heuristics is provided with a set of linear and nonlinear equations, and an algorithm is suggested for using the heuristics and the newly-formulated equations.

• Advances in robotics research
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• 제1권1호
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• pp.41-59
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• 2014

This paper deals with the problem of steering a group of mobile robots along a reference path while maintaining a desired geometric formation. To solve this problem, the overall formation is decomposed into numerous geometric patterns composed of pairs of robots, and the state of the geometric patterns is defined. A control algorithm for the problem is proposed based on the Nash equilibrium strategies incorporating receding horizon control (RHC), also known as model predictive control (MPC). Each robot calculates a control input over a finite prediction horizon and transmits this control input to its neighbor. Considering the motion of the other robots in the prediction horizon, each robot calculates the optimal control strategy to achieve its goals: tracking a reference path and maintaining a desired formation. The performance of the proposed algorithm is validated using numerical simulations.

• 대한교통학회지
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• 제23권4호
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• pp.37-45
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• 2005

본 연구는 Nash의 협력게임인 협상게임(bargaining game)과 Wardrop의 사용자 균형해와의 관계를 규명하는 데 목적이 있다. Wardrop의 균형은 다수의 운전자들이 교통상황을 정확히 알고 있고(perfect information), 동시에 합리적으로 경로를 선택(rationality)한다는 경직된 가정이 존재하는데, 이는 실제로 존재하는 운전자 상호간의 교류나 타협을 배제하고 있다. 이런 측면에서 운전자간의 교류와 조절과정을 Nash게임의 협상과정(bargaining process)으로 표현할 경우, Wardrop의 경직된 기본가정들을 어느 정도 완화할 수 있을 것으로 보인다. 이를 위하여 본 연구에서는 Nash의 협상게임에 대한 교통망측면의 검토와 Nash의 협상해(bargaining solution)가 Wardrop의 사용자 균형(user equilibrium)과 동일함을 정리(theorem)를 통하여 증명하고 몇 가지 예제로 이를 확인한다. 협상게임은 대표적인 2인 협조게임(two-person cooperative game)으로 본 연구에서도 주로 2인 게임에 대해서 기술하며, 향후 n-인게임(n-person game) 모형에 대해서는 간략히 언급토록 한다.

• 한국수자원학회논문집
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• 제32권5호
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• pp.565-577
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• 1999

프랙탈 기하학은 불규칙적이고 복잡한 자연 현상을 수학적으로 나타낼 수 있는 방법을 제시해 줄 수 있으며, 자기상사성을 가지고 있는 하천의 형상을 비롯한 하도망의 구성은 프랙탈 차원을 가지고 있는 프랙탈 현상이라 할 수 있다. GIUH란 유역의 수문학적 응답인 IUH에 하천의 지형학적인 특성을 적용한 강우-유출 모형으로, Horton의 차수비를 이용하여 지형학적인 특성을 반영할 수 있으며 하천 유역에서 프랙탈 차원은 길이비, 면적비, 분기비 등 Horton의 차수비를 이용하여 산정할수 있다. 프랙탈 GIUH 모형을 제시하였다. 프랙탈 GIUH 모형은 Rosso(1984)가 제시한 GIUH-Nash 모형의 형상계수와 규모계수 등의 매개변수 산정시 유역의 자기상사성을 대변할 수 있는 프랙탈 차원을 직접 적용하였으며, 하천의 길이비와 분기비 만의 함수로 나타내었다.

• 한국물환경학회지
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• 제26권3호
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• pp.532-539
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• 2010

The synthetic unit hydrograph is developed and verified using Nash model and characteristic velocities considering geomorphological dispersion in this present study. Application watersheds are selected 5 subwatersheds of Bocheong basin. The mean and variance of hillslope and stream path length are estimated in each watershed with GIS. Characteristic velocities are calculated using estimated path lengths and moment characteristics of rainfall-runoff data. Characteristic velocities of random devised 7 ungauged watersheds are estimated through regional analysis of chracteristic velocities in guaged watershed. And Nash model parameters and IUH are derived using characteristic velocities and path length in the gauged and ungauged watershed. The result to compare of IUH about gauged watershed and random devised ungauged watershed in application watershed presents coherently hydrologic response characteristics that peak discharge is reduced and peak time is extended. In conclusion, Developed synthetic unit hydrograph in this study expects that it is useful method to estimate runoff discharge for managing of water pollution in ungauged watershed.

• 한국지리정보학회지
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• 제11권1호
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• pp.20-30
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• 2008

본 연구에서는 SWAT 모형을 이용하여 유역내 농업용 저수지의 운영이 유역 출구인 하천 지점에서의 유출에 미치는 영향을 분석하고자 하였다. 안성천 유역 공도수위관측소의 상류 유역을 대상으로, 유역내 고삼과 금광 농업용 저수지의 방류량 고려시와 미고려시에 대한 공도지점에서의 각각의 하천유출 거동을 분석하였다. SWAT 모형에서 저수지 물수지 분석모듈을 수정하여, 저수지의 일별 관측 저수위로부터 계산된 저수량과 수표면적을 이용하여 저수지의 일 방류량 자료를 생성하였다. 이를 이용하여 공도수위관측소의 5개년(1997~2001) 동안의 일별 하천 유출량 자료를 대상으로 모형의 보정(1997, 1998, 1999년)과 검증(2000, 2001년)을 실시하였다. 검증기간에 대한 Nash-Sutcliffe 모델효율은 0.55, RMSE는 2.33 mm/day로 나타났다. 한편, 두 저수지의 방류량을 고려하지 않은 상태에서의 모의결과는 한 결과, Nash-Sutcliffe 모델효율은 0.37로, RMSE는2.91 mm/day로 나타나 저수지 고려시의 결과와 비교하면 각각 0.18의 모델효율 저하, 0.58%의 오차증가를 보였다. 따라서 농업용 저수지가 있는 유역에서는 SWAT 모형의 활용시, 저수지 유역에서의 저수지에 의한 저류효과 및 방류 영향을 고려하여야 하는 것으로 나타났다.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• 제2권4호
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• pp.494-499
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• 2007

In this paper, we have investigated how transmission network constraints can be modeled in an electricity market equilibrium model. Under Cournot competition assumption, a game model is set up considering transmission line capacity constraints. Based on locational marginal pricing principle, market clearing is formulated as a total consumers# benefit maximization problem, and then converted to a conventional optimal power flow (OPF) formulation with a linearized transmission model. Using market clearing formulation, best response analysis is formulated and, finally, Nash equilibrium is formulated. In order for illustration, a numerical study for a four node system with two generating firms and two loads are presented.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• 제9권1호
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• pp.90-97
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• 2014

Nash Cournot Equilibrium (NCE) has been widely used in a competitive electricity market to analyze generation firms' strategic production quantities. Congestion on a transmission network may lead to a mixed strategy NCE. Mixed strategy is complicated to understand, difficult to compute, and hard to implement in practical market. However, Stackelberg model based equilibrium does not have any mixed strategy, even under congestion in a transmission line. A guide to understanding mixed strategy equilibrium is given by analyzing a cycling phenomenon in the players' best choices. This paper connects the concept of leader-follower in Stackelberg model with relations between generation firms on both sides of the congested line. From the viewpoint of social welfare, the surplus analysis is presented for comparison between the NCE and the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE).