• Journal of the Korean Mathematical Society
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• v.40 no.5
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• pp.883-899
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• 2003

In this paper, we will introduce the general concepts of generalized multiobjective game, generalized weight Nash equilibria and generalized Pareto equilibria. Next using the fixed point theorems due to Idzik [5] and Kim-Tan [6] , we shall prove the existence theorems of generalized weight Nash equilibria under general hypotheses. And as applications of generalized weight Nash equilibria, we shall prove the existence of generalized Pareto equilibria in non-compact generalized multiobjective game.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.5 no.3
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• pp.542-559
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• 2011

Most game-theoretic works of Aloha have emphasized investigating Nash equilibria according to the system state represented by the number of network users and their decisions. In contrast, we focus on the possible change of nodes' utility state represented by delay constraint and decreasing utility over time. These foregone changes of nodes' state are more likely to instigate selfish behaviors in networking environments. For such environment, in this paper, we propose a repeated Bayesian slotted Aloha game model to analyze the selfish behavior of impatient users. We prove the existence of Nash equilibrium mathematically and empirically. The proposed model enables any type of transmission probability sequence to achieve Nash equilibrium without degrading its optimal throughput. Those Nash equilibria can be used as a solution concept to thwart the selfish behaviors of nodes and ensure the system stability.

• Korean Management Science Review
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• v.26 no.1
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• pp.1-5
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• 2009

I study a solution concept which preserves the nice Nash equilibrium properties of two-person zero-sum games, and define a locally competitive equilibrium which is characterized by a saddle point with respect to the coordinates of strategies. I show that a locally competitive equilibrium shares the properties of uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs, interchangeablity of equilibrium strategies and convexity of the equilibrium set.

• Journal of the Chungcheong Mathematical Society
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.13-20
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• 2000

The purpose of this paper is to give a new existence theorem of a generalized weight Nash equilibrium for generalized multiobjective games by using the quasi-variational inequality due to Yuan.

• Journal of Computational Design and Engineering
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• v.2 no.3
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• pp.165-175
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• 2015

One of the current challenges in the domain of the multicriteria shape optimization is to reduce the calculation time required by conventional methods. The high computational cost is due to the high number of simulation or function calls required by these methods. Recently, several studies have been led to overcome this problem by integrating a metamodel in the overall optimization loop. In this paper, we perform a coupling between the Normal Boundary Intersection - NBI - algorithm with Radial Basis Function - RBF - metamodel in order to have a simple tool with a reasonable calculation time to solve multicriteria optimization problems. First, we apply our approach to academic test cases. Then, we validate our method against an industrial case, namely, shape optimization of the bottom of an aerosol can undergoing nonlinear elasto-plastic deformation. Then, in order to select solutions among the Pareto efficient ones, we use the same surrogate approach to implement a method to compute Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky equilibria.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2003.07a
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• pp.639-642
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• 2003

This paper presents a method for evaluating the mixed nash equilibria of the Cournot model for N-Gencos. in wholesale electricity market. In the wholesale electricity market, the strategies of N-Genco. can be applied to the game model under the conditions which the Gencos. determine their stratgies to maximize their benefit. Generally, the Lemke algorithm is evaluated the mixed nash equlibria in the two-player game model. However, the necessary condition for the mixed equlibria of N-player are modified as the necessary condition of N-1 player by analyzing the Lemke algorithms. Although reducing the necessary condition for N-player as the one of N-1 player, it is difficult to and the mixed nash equilibria participated two more players by using the mathmatical approaches since those have the nonlinear characteristics. To overcome the above problem, this paper presents the generalized necessary condition for N-player and proposed the object function to and the mixed nash equlibrium. Also, to evaluate the mixed equilibrium through the nonlinear objective function, the Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) as one of the heuristic algorithm are proposed in this paper. To present the mixed equlibria for the strategy of N-Gencos. through the proposed necessry condition and the evaluation approach, this paper proposes the mixed equilibrium in the cournot game model for 3-players.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.1
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• pp.62-67
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• 2003

An important aspect of the study of power system markets involves the assessment of strategic behavior of participants for maximizing their profits. In models of imperfect competition of a deregulated electricity system, the key task is to find the Nash equilibrium. In this paper, the bimatrix approach for finding Nash equilibria in electricity markets is investigated. This approach determines pure and mixed equilibria using the complementarity pivot algorithim. The mixed equilibrium in the matrix approach has the equal number of non-zero property. This property makes it difficult to reproduce a smooth continuous distribution for the mixed equilibrium. This paper proposes an algorithm for adjusting the quantization value of discretization to reconstruct a continuous distribution from a discrete one.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.113-120
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• 1994

A duopoly model is developed in order to examine the effect of imperfect competition on the price-setting behavior of competing providers in a congested market. Multiple Nash price equilibria are found and the implications of such multiple price equilibria are discussed.

• Journal of the Chungcheong Mathematical Society
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• v.23 no.4
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• pp.691-698
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• 2010

In this paper, we first introduce a new model of strategic Nash game with insatiability, and next give two social equilibrium existence theorems for general strategic games which are comparable with the previous results due to Arrow and Debreu, Debreu, and Chang in several aspects.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.6 no.3
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• pp.91-114
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• 2007

The cooperative cost sharing scheme for Dust and Sand Storm(DSS) in North East Asia, as suggested in Song and Nagaki(2007), may not be feasible due to possible defection(s) of participating countries. If non-cooperative strategies are more plausible, Nash equilibrium can suggest possible outcomes of the cost sharing game. The result from the continuous strategy model shows that there exists an infinite number of Nash equilibrium such that the summation of investment from each country is always equal to the required budget of the ADS pilot project. It is also discussed that the discrete strategy model points to only 3 Nash equilibria in continuous strategy game outcome and the cooperative game solution may be just one of the infinite equilibria.