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A Discretization Algorithm for Bi-Matrix Game Approach to Power Market Analysis  

이광호 (단국대 전기전자컴퓨터공학과)
Publication Information
The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A / v.52, no.1, 2003 , pp. 62-67 More about this Journal
Abstract
An important aspect of the study of power system markets involves the assessment of strategic behavior of participants for maximizing their profits. In models of imperfect competition of a deregulated electricity system, the key task is to find the Nash equilibrium. In this paper, the bimatrix approach for finding Nash equilibria in electricity markets is investigated. This approach determines pure and mixed equilibria using the complementarity pivot algorithim. The mixed equilibrium in the matrix approach has the equal number of non-zero property. This property makes it difficult to reproduce a smooth continuous distribution for the mixed equilibrium. This paper proposes an algorithm for adjusting the quantization value of discretization to reconstruct a continuous distribution from a discrete one.
Keywords
Market Analysis; Nash Equilibrium; Bi-matrix Game; Mixed Strategy; Discretization; Lemke Algorithm;
Citations & Related Records
Times Cited By KSCI : 1  (Citation Analysis)
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