• Journal of the Korean Institute of Illuminating and Electrical Installation Engineers
• /
• v.23 no.2
• /
• pp.182-189
• /
• 2009

Nash equilibrium is usually used to investigate a generator's strategic bidding in electricity markets. Some literatures show that the transmission constraints may induce no pure strategy equilibrium and make it hard to find the equilibrium. Using an analytical approach to find a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in electricity market with transmission constraints, we analyze the influence of transmission capacity on the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Finally, a simple numerical example is provided to support the claims of this paper.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
• /
• v.5 no.4
• /
• pp.107-126
• /
• 2006

The voluntary agreement between industries and government on the recycling of wastes has been analysed. The agreement is one of the threatened voluntary agreements. Theoretically these agreements make it possible to fulfill recycling goals with minimized cost. It is the objective of this paper to evaluate the efficiency of the voluntary agreement on recycling wastes by examining of Nash Equilibrium. In the first place, the equilibrium of a bilateral agreement between the representative of industries (association of firms) and government will be analysed to confirm if cost minimization strategies by the association result in a sub-game perfect Nash Equilibrium. This is followed by an analysis of a multilateral agreement among the members of the association to see how the equilibrium and efficiency conditions change. We tried to find some implications that the result of the analysis casts on the environmental policy matters.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
• /
• v.6 no.3
• /
• pp.91-114
• /
• 2007

The cooperative cost sharing scheme for Dust and Sand Storm(DSS) in North East Asia, as suggested in Song and Nagaki(2007), may not be feasible due to possible defection(s) of participating countries. If non-cooperative strategies are more plausible, Nash equilibrium can suggest possible outcomes of the cost sharing game. The result from the continuous strategy model shows that there exists an infinite number of Nash equilibrium such that the summation of investment from each country is always equal to the required budget of the ADS pilot project. It is also discussed that the discrete strategy model points to only 3 Nash equilibria in continuous strategy game outcome and the cooperative game solution may be just one of the infinite equilibria.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
• /
• v.23 no.4 s.82
• /
• pp.37-45
• /
• 2005

This paper presents a relationship between Nash bargaining game and Wardrop user equilibrium, which has been widely used in transportation modeling for route choice problem. Wardrop user equilibrium assumes that drivers in road network have perfect information on the traffic conditions and they choose their optimal paths without cooperation each other. In this regards, if the bargaining game process is introduced in route choice modeling, we may avoid the strong assumptions to some extent. For such purpose, this paper derives a theorem that Nash bargaining solution is equivalent to Wardrop user equilibrium as the barging process continues and prove it with some numerical examples. The model is formulated based on two-person bargaining game. and n-person game is remained for next work.

• Korean Management Science Review
• /
• v.26 no.1
• /
• pp.1-5
• /
• 2009

I study a solution concept which preserves the nice Nash equilibrium properties of two-person zero-sum games, and define a locally competitive equilibrium which is characterized by a saddle point with respect to the coordinates of strategies. I show that a locally competitive equilibrium shares the properties of uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs, interchangeablity of equilibrium strategies and convexity of the equilibrium set.

• Journal of the Korean hospital association
• /
• v.35 no.6 s.304
• /
• pp.4-6
• /
• 2006

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
• /
• v.14 no.2
• /
• pp.97-104
• /
• 1989

This paper extends the existence proofs of a Nash equilibrium to a more general class of differentila game models with constraints on the control spaces. With the assumptions of continuity, convexity, and compactness, the existence is proved using Kakutani Theorem and via a path-following approach. Furthermore, the proof for a period-by-period optimization of multi-period problems provides an insight to a numerical solution algorithm to differential game models with constraints.

• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
• /
• v.13 no.2
• /
• pp.201-207
• /
• 2009

Recently effective spectrum resource technologies have been studied using a game theorectical approach for cognitive radio networks. Radio resource management is required an effective scheme because the performance of a radio communication system much depends on it's effectiveness. In this paper, we suggest a game theoretical algorithm for adaptive power control which is required an effect scheme in cognitive radio networks. It will be a distributed network. In the network distributed cognitive radio secondary users require an adaptive power control. There are many results which are suggested some possibility of game theoretical approaches for communication resource sharing. However, we suggest a practical game algorithm to achieve Nash equilibrium of all secondary users using a Nash equilibrium theorem in this paper. Particularly, a game model was analyzed for adaptive power control of a cognitive radio network, which is involved in DSSS (Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum) techniques. In case of K=63 and N=12 in the DSSS network, the number of iteration was less than maximum 200 using the suggested algorithm.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
• /
• 2008.07a
• /
• pp.560-561
• /
• 2008

본 연구는 우리나라의 전력시장 운영규칙을 근간으로 경제학적 모형을 수립한다. SMP를 평균비용으로 고려하였으며 용량가격을 포함하여 발전사의 이득을 계산하였다. 그리고 제안한 모형에서 게임이론을 활용하여 경쟁의 균형인 내쉬균형을 계산하고 검증하였다. 또한, 경쟁의 균형에서 전력시장의 효율성을 최대로 하는 임계 용량가격을 계산하는 방법과 결과를 제시하였다.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
• /
• v.54 no.2
• /
• pp.97-106
• /
• 2005

This paper presents a method for evaluating the nash equilibrium of the Cournot model for N-Gencos in wholesale electricity market. In wholesale electricity market, the strategies of N-Gencos can be applied to the game model under the conditions, which the Gencos determine their strategies to maximize their benefit. Generally, the Lemke algorithm has known as the approach to evaluate the mixed nash equilibrium in the only two-player game model. In this paper, we have developed the necessary condition for obtaining the mixed nash equilibrium of N-player by using the Lemke algorithms. However, it is difficult to find the mixed nash equilibrium of two more players by using the analytic method since those have the nonlinear characteristics. To overcome the above problem, we have formulated the object function satisfied with the proposed necessary conditions for N-player nash equilibrium and applied the modified particle swarm optimization (PSO) method to obtain the equilibrium for N-player. To present the effectiveness the proposed necessary condition and the evaluation approach, this paper has shown the results of equilibrium of sample system and the cournot game model for 3-players.