• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.113-120
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• 1994

A duopoly model is developed in order to examine the effect of imperfect competition on the price-setting behavior of competing providers in a congested market. Multiple Nash price equilibria are found and the implications of such multiple price equilibria are discussed.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.2 no.2
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• pp.143-162
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• 2018

This paper focuses on the policy framework about "Quantitative and Qualitative Easing (QQE)" of Japan, and analyzes reasons why the policy goal was not reached. The QQE was introduced by the Bank of Japan in 2013 with the purpose of meeting the price stability target of 2% and getting out of deflation that prevents sustained price decline. However, despite the implementation of the bold monetary easing policy unprecedented in the world, the policy goal was not achieved as of June 2018. As a result of analyzing the causes, the following three structural factors were confirmed. 1) The rise in prices by QQE was limited because Japan's consumer price is strongly depending on import price. 2) The effect is high degree of uncertainty and limited because theoretical framework of reflationist which adopted QQE depends on "expectation formation" by "self-fulfilling expectation" and "multiple equilibria". 3) It was confirmed that the expansion of the monetary base did not lead to money stock due to the existence of Japanese liquidity trap, long-term low interest rate policy.

• Transactions of the Korean Society for Noise and Vibration Engineering
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• v.26 no.7
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• pp.795-805
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• 2016

Nonlinear normal modes(NNMs) is a branch of periodic solution of nonlinear dynamic systems. Determination of stable periodic solution is very important in many engineering applications since the stable periodic solution can be an attractor of such nonlinear systems. Periodic solutions of nonlinear system are usually calculated by perturbation methods and numerical methods. In this study, numerical method is used in order to calculate the NNMs. Iteration of the solution is presented by multiple shooting method and continuation of solution is presented by pseudo-arclength continuation method. The stability of the NNMs is analyzed using Floquet multipliers, and bifurcation points are calculated using indirect method. Proposed analyses are applied to two nonlinear numerical models. In the first numerical model nonlinear spring-mass system is analyzed. In the second numerical model Jeffcott rotor system which has unstable equilibria is analyzed. Numerical simulation results show that the multiple shooting method can be applied to self excited system as well as the typical nonlinear system with stable equilibria.

• Economic and Environmental Geology
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.283-288
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• 1984

Projection method has been used in the phase equilibria study. The projection is made through the saturated phase on the smaller chemical system from larger system. This decreases the number of phases which are included in the larger chemical system. In multiple projection containing plagioclase as a projection phase, there is a difference in matrix calculation when plagioclase is treated as a single composite component and separately as an albite and anorthite. The matrix calculation is considered to be more usable and easier in multiple projection. The value of the A component in the AFM system, which is the smaller system projected from the larger one, is effected and varies according to the change in the An content in plagioclase that is examined as an example.

• Korean Journal of Soil Science and Fertilizer
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• v.28 no.3
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• pp.218-226
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• 1995

Ion exchange equilibria in bulk and rhizosphere soil collected from peach seedlings were studied to find exchange equations that could be used in chromatographic models dealing with movement and distribution of fertilizer ammonium and exchangeable cations in soil profiles. Soil samples were equilibrated with mixtures of $NH_4Cl$, KCI, and $CaCl_2$ solutions and then extracted with $Sr(NO_3)_2$ solution to determine exchangeable cation compositions at equilibrium. Exchange data were fitted to Vanselow's, Gapon's, and Kerr's equations, but those formulations did not adequately describe the equilibria. An empirical equation of the form : ${\frac{\alpha_i^m}{a_j^n}}=K{\frac{(iX)^{mPi}}{(jX)^{nPj}}}$ which has an exponent on each of the exchangeable cation concentrations could describe the equilibria very well over the range of treatments. In this equation ${\alpha}^i$ and ${\alpha}^j$ are activities of cation i and j with valences m and n respectively. (iX) and (jX) are concentrations of exchangeable cations. Mole or equivalent fractions can be considered as the exchangeable ion concentration unit. Arbitrary constants $P_i$ and $P_j$, and distribution coefficient K can be found with multiple regression for the logarithmic form of the equation.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.9 no.10
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• pp.3867-3886
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• 2015

This article investigates the problem of opportunistic spectrum access in dynamic environment, in which the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is time-varying. Different from existing work on continuous feedback, we consider more practical scenarios in which the transmitter receives an Acknowledgment (ACK) if the received SNR is larger than the required threshold, and otherwise a Non-Acknowledgment (NACK). That is, the feedback is discrete. Several applications with different threshold values are also considered in this work. The channel selection problem is formulated as a non-cooperative game, and subsequently it is proved to be a potential game, which has at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Following this, a multi-agent Q-learning algorithm is proposed to converge to Nash equilibria of the game. Furthermore, opportunistic spectrum access with multiple discrete feedbacks is also investigated. Finally, the simulation results verify that the proposed multi-agent Q-learning algorithm is applicable to both situations with binary feedback and multiple discrete feedbacks.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.675-685
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• 2013

Generation capacities and transmission line constraints in a competitive electricity market make it troublesome to compute Nash Equilibrium (NE) for analyzing participants' strategic generation quantities. The NE can cause a mixed strategy NE rather than a pure strategy NE resulting in a more complicated computation of NE, especially in a multiplayer game. A two-level hierarchical optimization problem is used to model competition among multiple participants. There are difficulties in using a mathematical programming approach to solve a mixed strategy NE. This paper presents heuristics applied to the mathematical programming method for dealing with the constraints on generation capacities and transmission line flows. A new formulation based on the heuristics is provided with a set of linear and nonlinear equations, and an algorithm is suggested for using the heuristics and the newly-formulated equations.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.35 no.4
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• pp.55-79
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• 2010

This study deals with a model for platform competition in a two-sided market. We suppose there are both direct and indirect network externalities between suppliers and users of each platform. Moreover, we suppose that both users and suppliers are distributed in their relative affinity for each platform type. That is, each user [supplier] has his/her own preferential position toward each platform, and users [suppliers] are horizontally differentiated over [0, 1]. And for analytical tractability, some parameters like direct and indirect network externalities are the same across the markets. Given the parameters and the pricing profile, users and suppliers conduct subscription game, where participants select the platform that gives them the highest payoffs. This game proceeds according to a replicator dynamics of the evolutionary game, which is simplified by properly defining gains from participant's strategy in the subscription game. We find that depending on the strength of these network effects, there might either be multiple stable equilibria, at which users and suppliers distribute across both platforms, or one unstable interior equilibrium corresponding to the market tipping in favor of either platform. In both cases, we also consider the pricing power of competing platform providers under the framework of the Stackelberg game. In particular, our study examines the possible effects of the type of competition between platform providers, which may constrain the equilibrium selection in the subscription game.

• YAKHAK HOEJI
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• v.25 no.4
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• pp.161-165
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• 1981

The binding of two cephalosporins, cephalothin and cefazoline to human serum albumin(HSA) was studied by difference spectrophotometry using a spectrophotometric probe, 2-(4'-hydroxybenzeneazo) benzoic acid. The probe is strong visible absorbing material which interacts with serum albumin to give characteristic spectrophotometric peaks and provides the basis for a convenient assay to measure free and bound amounts in the presence of serum albumin and competitive drugs. The results obtained showed that the probe and cephalosporin compete for the same binding site on human serum albumin; thus the probe can be used to gauge the displacement of cephalosporins from human serum albumin. The data were interpreted on the basis of theory of multiple equilibria. The number of binding sites of human serum albumin for 2-(4'-hydroxybenzeneazo) benzoic acid(HBAB), cephalothin and cefazoline appears to be 4. By using this technique the binding constants were found as follows: HSA-HBAB, $7.89{\times}10^{4}M^{-1}$; HSA-cephalothin, $1.09{\times}10^{3}M^{-1}$ ; HSA-cefazoline, $1.21{\times}10^{3}M^{-1}$.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.127-148
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• 1990

A Milgrom-Roberts style signalling model of limit pricing is developed to analyze the possibility and the scope of limit pricing in general, noncooperative oligopolies. The model contains multiple incumbent firms facing a potential entrant and assumes an information asymmetry between incombents and the potential entrant about the market demand. There are two periods in the model. In period 1, n incumbent firms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose quantities. At the end of period 1, the potential entrant observes the market price and makes an entry decision. In period 2, depending on the entry decision of the entrant, n' or (n+1) firms choose quantities again before the game terminates. Since the choice of incumbent firms in period 1 depends on their information about demand, the market price in period 1 conveys information about the market demand. Thus, there is a systematic link between the market price and the profitability of entry. Using Bayes-Nash equilibrium as the solution concept, we find that there exist some demand conditions under which incumbent firms will limit price. In symmetric equilibria, incumbent firms each produce an output that is greater than the Cournot output and induce a price that is below the Cournot price. In doing so, each incumbent firm refrains from maximizing short-run profit and supplies a public good that is entry deterrence. The reason that entry is deterred by such a reduced price is that it conveys information about the demand of the industry that is unfavorable to the entrant. This establishes the possibility of limit pricing by noncooperative oligopolists in a setting that is fully rational, and also generalizes the result of Milgrom and Roberts to general oligopolies, confirming Bain's intuition. Limit pricing by incumbents explained above can be interpreted as a form of credible collusion in which each firm voluntarily deviates from myopic optimization in order to deter entry using their superior information. This type of implicit collusion differs from Folk-theorem type collusions in many ways and suggests that a collusion can be a credible one even in finite games as long as there is information asymmetry. Another important result is that as the number of incumbent firms approaches infinity, or as the industry approaches a competitive one, the probability that limit pricing occurs converges to zero and the probability of entry converges to that under complete information. This limit result confirms the intuition that as the number of agents sharing the same private information increases, the value of the private information decreases, and the probability that the information gets revealed increases. This limit result also supports the conventional belief that there is no entry problem in a competitive market. Considering the fact that limit pricing is generally believed to occur at an early stage of an industry and the fact that many industries in Korea are oligopolies in their infant stages, the theoretical results of this paper suggest that we should pay attention to the possibility of implicit collusion by incumbent firms aimed at deterring new entry using superior information. The long-term loss to the Korean economy from limit pricing can be very large if the industry in question is a part of the world market and the domestic potential entrant whose entry is deterred could .have developed into a competitor in the world market. In this case, the long-term loss to the Korean economy should include the lost opportunity in the world market in addition to the domestic long-run welfare loss.