• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2005년도 제36회 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.775-777
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• 2005

In this paper, effects of the subsidy in the electricity market on the market equilibrium are analyzed. The generation competition markets are considered as the basic market structure. The market equilibrium with Cournot game model is derived, first. Then, the variation of Nash equilibrium is investigated when the subsidies to generation companies are provided. The market equilibrium with the subsidy in the electricity market, which is equivalent to the subgame perfect equilibrium, is analytically derived using Stackelberg game model and backward induction method. From this, how the provisions of subsidy to generation companies can affect the strategic behaviors of the generation companies and corresponding market equilibrium are explored, in this paper. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the basic idea of this paper.

• 대한산업공학회지
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• 제22권2호
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• pp.189-207
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• 1996

In this paper, a market share competition model for two firms with asymmetric conditions is considered with. In the model, the asymmetry between two firms is given by the difference of market shares In the existing market and the change of market share is supposed to be occurred only through pioneering a new market. Since the timing decision of market pioneering is based on the continuous time domain, a super game structure which has infinitely many numbers of subgames is employed for the modeling. In the course of equilibrium finding, we show that there exists no subgame-perfect pure strategy equilibrium In this game. So, we apply a mixed strategy concept and find a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium behavior strategy. As a result of equilibrium analysis, we know that the relative sizes of pioneering Incentives between two firms are varying with parameter conditions. However, the global speed of market pioneering is proven to be independent with the level of asymmetry between two firms.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• 제2권4호
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• pp.494-499
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• 2007

In this paper, we have investigated how transmission network constraints can be modeled in an electricity market equilibrium model. Under Cournot competition assumption, a game model is set up considering transmission line capacity constraints. Based on locational marginal pricing principle, market clearing is formulated as a total consumers# benefit maximization problem, and then converted to a conventional optimal power flow (OPF) formulation with a linearized transmission model. Using market clearing formulation, best response analysis is formulated and, finally, Nash equilibrium is formulated. In order for illustration, a numerical study for a four node system with two generating firms and two loads are presented.

• 전기학회논문지
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• 제59권12호
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• pp.2143-2149
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• 2010

Market price and curtailment amounts of the Demand Resource Market(DRM) are determined by competition between electricity consumers. An important aspect of the DRM involves the assessment of strategic behavior of participants for maximizing their profits. This paper presents economic equilibrium models for simulating imperfect competition among electricity consumers in the DRM and analyzes the models at Nash Equilibrium of Game Theory. The proposed demand functions and supply functions of DRM are based on the Demand Resource Market Rules in Korean electricity market. Simulation results show that the models are adequate for obtaining Nash Equilibrium of consumers' competitive curtailment.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• 제9권1호
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• pp.90-97
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• 2014

Nash Cournot Equilibrium (NCE) has been widely used in a competitive electricity market to analyze generation firms' strategic production quantities. Congestion on a transmission network may lead to a mixed strategy NCE. Mixed strategy is complicated to understand, difficult to compute, and hard to implement in practical market. However, Stackelberg model based equilibrium does not have any mixed strategy, even under congestion in a transmission line. A guide to understanding mixed strategy equilibrium is given by analyzing a cycling phenomenon in the players' best choices. This paper connects the concept of leader-follower in Stackelberg model with relations between generation firms on both sides of the congested line. From the viewpoint of social welfare, the surplus analysis is presented for comparison between the NCE and the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE).

• 조명전기설비학회논문지
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• 제23권2호
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• pp.182-189
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• 2009

경쟁적 전력시장에서 발전회사의 전략적 행위를 분석하기 위해서 일반적으로 내쉬균형(Nash equilibrium) 이론이 널리 사용되고 있다. 기존 연구에 의하면 송전제약이 있는 전력시장에서는 최적반응의 불연속으로 인해 순수전략내 쉬균형이 존재하지 않게 되고, 이때는 혼합전략 내쉬균형이 전력시장의 균형이 된다. 본 논문에서는 송전제약이 있는 2-지역 전력시장에서 혼합전략 내쉬균형을 유도하고, 송전용량이 혼합전략 내쉬균형에 미치는 영향을 해석하였다.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제55권5호
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• pp.214-219
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• 2006

Oligopoly differs from perfect competition and monopoly in that a firm must consider rival firms' behavior to determine its own best policy. This interrelationship among firms is the issue examined in this paper. In the oligopoly market, the complete information market means that each producer has full information about itself, the market, and its rivals. That is, each producer knows the market demand function, its own cost function and the cost functions of rivals. On the other hand, the incomplete information market means that in general each producer lacks full information about the market or its rivals. Here, we assume that each firm doesn't know the cost functions and the strategic biddings of its rivals. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze firm' strategic behaviors and equilibrium in an electricity market with incomplete information. In the case study, the complete information market and the incomplete market are compared at the Nash Equilibrium from the viewpoints of market price, transaction quantities, consumer benefits, and Social Welfare.

• 전기학회논문지
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• 제66권1호
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• pp.16-22
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• 2017

In order to reduce costs of electricity energy at periods of peak demand, there has been an exponential interest in Demand Response (DR). This paper discusses the effect on the participants' behavior in response to DR. Under the assumption of perfect competition, the equilibrium point of the electricity market with DR is derived by modeling a DR curve, which is suitable for microeconomic analysis. Cournot model is used to analyze the electricity market of imperfect competition that includes strategic behavior of the generation companies. Strategic behavior with DR makes it harder to compute equilibrium point due to the non-differential function of payoff distribution. This paper presents a solution method for achieving the equilibrium point using the best response function of the strategic players. The effect of DR on the electricity market is illustrated using a test system.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제54권2호
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• pp.97-106
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• 2005

This paper presents a method for evaluating the nash equilibrium of the Cournot model for N-Gencos in wholesale electricity market. In wholesale electricity market, the strategies of N-Gencos can be applied to the game model under the conditions, which the Gencos determine their strategies to maximize their benefit. Generally, the Lemke algorithm has known as the approach to evaluate the mixed nash equilibrium in the only two-player game model. In this paper, we have developed the necessary condition for obtaining the mixed nash equilibrium of N-player by using the Lemke algorithms. However, it is difficult to find the mixed nash equilibrium of two more players by using the analytic method since those have the nonlinear characteristics. To overcome the above problem, we have formulated the object function satisfied with the proposed necessary conditions for N-player nash equilibrium and applied the modified particle swarm optimization (PSO) method to obtain the equilibrium for N-player. To present the effectiveness the proposed necessary condition and the evaluation approach, this paper has shown the results of equilibrium of sample system and the cournot game model for 3-players.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제54권9호
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• pp.461-466
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• 2005

This paper addresses the bidding strategies of a hydro generator in an electricity market, and their effect on the electricity market in accordance with some parameters: the water volume, the demand elasticity, and the hydro unit performance. The competition of a hydro generator is formulated as a hi-level optimization problem, and the solving scheme for the equilibrium condition is proposed as a set of nonlinear simultaneous equations. The equilibrium of the oligopolistic model is evaluated by comparison with that of a perfect competition model from the viewpoint of a market power. Simulation results show some parameters have an influence on the market power of an electricity market including a hydro generator.