• 제목/요약/키워드: Maritime Threats

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A Study on Cyber Security Requirements of Ship Using Threat Modeling (위협 모델링을 이용한 선박 사이버보안 요구사항 연구)

  • Jo, Yong-Hyun;Cha, Young-Kyun
    • Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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    • 제29권3호
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    • pp.657-673
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    • 2019
  • As various IT and OT systems such as Electronic Chart Display and Information System and Automatic Identification System are used for ships, security elements that take into account even the ship's construction and navigation environment are required. However, cyber security research on the ship and shipbuilding ICT equipment industries is still lacking, and there is a lack of systematic methodologies through threat modeling. In this paper, the Data Flow Diagram was established in consideration of stakeholders approaching the ship system. Based on the Attack Library, which collects the security vulnerabilities and cases of ship systems, STRIDE methodologies and threat modeling using the Attack Tree are designed to identify possible threats from ships and to present ship cyber security measures.

An Application of Deep Clustering for Abnormal Vessel Trajectory Detection (딥 클러스터링을 이용한 비정상 선박 궤적 식별)

  • Park, Heon-Jei;Lee, Jun Woo;Kyung, Ji Hoon;Kim, Kyeongtaek
    • Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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    • 제44권4호
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    • pp.169-176
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    • 2021
  • Maritime monitoring requirements have been beyond human operators capabilities due to the broadness of the coverage area and the variety of monitoring activities, e.g. illegal migration, or security threats by foreign warships. Abnormal vessel movement can be defined as an unreasonable movement deviation from the usual trajectory, speed, or other traffic parameters. Detection of the abnormal vessel movement requires the operators not only to pay short-term attention but also to have long-term trajectory trace ability. Recent advances in deep learning have shown the potential of deep learning techniques to discover hidden and more complex relations that often lie in low dimensional latent spaces. In this paper, we propose a deep autoencoder-based clustering model for automatic detection of vessel movement anomaly to assist monitoring operators to take actions on the vessel for more investigation. We first generate gridded trajectory images by mapping the raw vessel trajectories into two dimensional matrix. Based on the gridded image input, we test the proposed model along with the other deep autoencoder-based models for the abnormal trajectory data generated through rotation and speed variation from normal trajectories. We show that the proposed model improves detection accuracy for the generated abnormal trajectories compared to the other models.

Nuclear Weapons and Extended Deterrence in the U.S.-ROK Alliance (핵무기와 한·미 핵 확장억제 능력)

  • Huntley, Wade L.
    • Strategy21
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    • 통권34호
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    • pp.236-261
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    • 2014
  • The future role of nuclear extended deterrence in the security alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea is currently a central concern. The gradually lessening role of reliance on nuclear weapons in US security policies broadly, combined with increasing North Korean nuclear capabilities and belligerence, raise fresh questions about the sufficiency of the "nuclear umbrella" as a pillar of the US-ROK defense posture. This article addresses the current and future role of nuclear extended deterrence in Korea in this dynamic context. The article reviews the longstanding trend toward reducing the overall size of the US nuclear arsenal, and assesses developments in US-ROK outlooks toward extended deterrence in response to the Obama administration's nuclear policies and North Korea's recent smaller-scale aggressions. The analysis finds that the challenges of deterrence credibility and allied reassurance are difficult and long-term. The analysis explains how these challenges emerge less from a shrinking US numerical arsenal size than from the sufficiency of specific nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to meet emerging smaller-scale threats. The analysis also highlights the importance of broader strategic and political interaction in sustaining allied confidence in any joint security posture. The evaluation concludes that a strong US-ROK alliance relationship can be maintained while the size of the US nuclear arsenal continues to decline, in part because nuclear weapons in any deployment configuration are relatively ineffective means for deterring smaller-scale aggression. Nevertheless, continuing adjustment of the US-ROK extended deterrence posture to the evolving, complex and uncertain Korean peninsula security environment will remain an ongoing challenge. Finally, the article encourages further examination of the potential specific role ROK maritime forces might serve in enhancing deterrence of smaller-scale threats while minimizing risks of conflict escalation.

Why Should the ROK Navy Maintain the Course toward the Construction of a Mobile Task Fleet? : From the perspectives of Capability, Doctrine, and the Organizational Identity (한국해군 기동함대 전력건설방향의 당위성: 능력, 교리, 조직정체성을 중심으로)

  • Lee, Sang-Yup
    • Strategy21
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    • 통권31호
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    • pp.85-119
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    • 2013
  • This paper asks whether the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy should continue to focus on building ocean-going naval ships when it faces the threats of North Korean provocations in littoral areas. My position is that the ROK Navy should keep pursuing ocean-going capabilities. I provide explanations why it should do so from the perspectives of three important dimensions: capability, doctrine, and organizational identity. First, I argue that the distinction between a littoral navy and an ocean-going navy is an unnecessary dichotomy. It may lead to inefficiency in national security. The military posture should be designed in a way that it can address all external threats to national security regardless of whether they are from North Korea or not. Such capability is the one that the ROK Navy has tried to acquire with the 'Blue Water Navy' initiative since the 1990s. Second, also from the perspective of lately developed military doctrines that emphasize jointness and precision strike capability, ocean-going capabilities such as the mobile task fleet program have become a must, not an option, given today's security situations on and around the Korean peninsula. Lastly, I draw attention to the fact that the 'Blue Water Navy (BWN)' initiative meant more than just capability to the ROK navy. The BWN represents the ROK navy's organizational identity that the navy has defined since the 1980s as it emphasized promoting national interest and international standing as part of its organizational essence. Furthermore, the phrase 'blue water navy' took on symbolic meanings to the people that are associated with South Korean-ness including sovereignty, national pride, standing in the world and hopes for the future. Since 1990s, many scholars and experts have made the case for the necessity of improving South Korea's naval capability based on different rationales. They emphasized the protection of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), the economic value of the sea, the potential danger associated with territorial disputes over islands, and increasing naval power of neighboring countries since the end of the Cold War. This paper adds to this debate by trying to explain the matter with different factors including naval doctrines and organizational identity. Particularly, this paper constitutes a unique endeavor in that it incorporating constructivist elements (that is, identity politics) in explaining a national security matter.

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Eurasian Naval Power on Display: Sino-Russian Naval Exercises under Presidents Xi and Putin (유라시아 지역의 해군 전력 과시: 시진핑 주석과 푸틴 대통령 체제 하에 펼쳐지는 중러 해상합동훈련)

  • Richard Weitz
    • Maritime Security
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    • 제5권1호
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    • pp.1-53
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    • 2022
  • One manifestation of the contemporary era of renewed great power competition has been the deepening relationship between China and Russia. Their strengthening military ties, notwithstanding their lack of a formal defense alliance, have been especially striking. Since China and Russia deploy two of the world's most powerful navies, their growing maritime cooperation has been one of the most significant international security developments of recent years. The Sino-Russian naval exercises, involving varying platforms and locations, have built on years of high-level personnel exchanges, large Russian weapons sales to China, the Sino-Russia Treaty of Friendship, and other forms of cooperation. Though the joint Sino-Russian naval drills began soon after Beijing and Moscow ended their Cold War confrontation, these exercises have become much more important during the last decade, essentially becoming a core pillar of their expanding defense partnership. China and Russia now conduct more naval exercises in more places and with more types of weapons systems than ever before. In the future, Chinese and Russian maritime drills will likely encompass new locations, capabilities, and partners-including possibly the Arctic, hypersonic delivery systems, and novel African, Asian, and Middle East partners-as well as continue such recent innovations as conducting joint naval patrols and combined arms maritime drills. China and Russia pursue several objectives through their bilateral naval cooperation. The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation lacks a mutual defense clause, but does provide for consultations about common threats. The naval exercises, which rehearse non-traditional along with traditional missions (e.g., counter-piracy and humanitarian relief as well as with high-end warfighting), provide a means to enhance their response to such mutual challenges through coordinated military activities. Though the exercises may not realize substantial interoperability gains regarding combat capabilities, the drills do highlight to foreign audiences the Sino-Russian capacity to project coordinated naval power globally. This messaging is important given the reliance of China and Russia on the world's oceans for trade and the two countries' maritime territorial disputes with other countries. The exercises can also improve their national military capabilities as well as help them learn more about the tactics, techniques, and procedures of each other. The rising Chinese Navy especially benefits from working with the Russian armed forces, which have more experience conducting maritime missions, particularly in combat operations involving multiple combat arms, than the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On the negative side, these exercises, by enhancing their combat capabilities, may make Chinese and Russian policymakers more willing to employ military force or run escalatory risks in confrontations with other states. All these impacts are amplified in Northeast Asia, where the Chinese and Russian navies conduct most of their joint exercises. Northeast Asia has become an area of intensifying maritime confrontations involving China and Russia against the United States and Japan, with South Korea situated uneasily between them. The growing ties between the Chinese and Russian navies have complicated South Korean-U.S. military planning, diverted resources from concentrating against North Korea, and worsened the regional security environment. Naval planners in the United States, South Korea, and Japan will increasingly need to consider scenarios involving both the Chinese and Russian navies. For example, South Korean and U.S. policymakers need to prepare for situations in which coordinated Chinese and Russian military aggression overtaxes the Pentagon, obligating the South Korean Navy to rapidly backfill for any U.S.-allied security gaps that arise on the Korean Peninsula. Potentially reinforcing Chinese and Russian naval support to North Korea in a maritime confrontation with South Korea and its allies would present another serious challenge. Building on the commitment of Japan and South Korea to strengthen security ties, future exercises involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States should expand to consider these potential contingencies.

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The Construction Direction of the ROK NAVY for the Protection of Marine Sovereignty (국가의 해양주권 수호를 위한 한국해군의 전력건설 방향)

  • Shin, In-Kyun
    • Strategy21
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    • 통권30호
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    • pp.99-142
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    • 2012
  • Withe increased North Korea's security threats, the South Korean navy has been faced with deteriorating security environment. While North Korea has increased asymmetric forces in the maritime and underwater with the development of nuclear weapons, and China and Japan have made a large investment in the buildup of naval forces, the power of the Pacific fleet of the US, a key ally is expected to be weakened. The biggest threat comes from China's intervention in case of full-scale war with North Korea, but low-density conflict issues are also serious problems. North Korea has violated the Armistice Agreement 2,660 times since the end of Korean War, among which the number of marine provocations reaches 1,430 times, and the tension over the NLL issue has been intensifying. With tension mounting between Korea and Japan over the Dokdo issue and conflict escalating with China over Ieo do Islet, the US Navy has confronted situation where it cannot fully concentrate on the security of the Korean peninsula, which leads to need for strengthening of South Korea's naval forces. Let's look at naval forces of neighboring countries. North Korea is threatening South Korean navy with its increased asymmetric forces, including submarines. China has achieved the remarkable development of naval forces since the promotion of 3-step plan to strengthen naval power from 1989, and it now retains highly modernized naval forces. Japan makes an investment in the construction of stat of the art warship every year. Since Japan's warship boasts of its advanced performance, Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force is evaluated the second most powerful behind the US Navy on the assumption that submarine power is not included in the naval forces. In this situation, naval power construction of South Korean navy should be done in phases, focusing on the followings; First, military strength to repel the energy warship quickly without any damage in case of battle with North Korea needs to be secured. Second, it is necessary to develop abilities to discourage the use of nuclear weapons of North Korea and attack its nuclear facilities in case of emergency. Third, construction of military power to suppress armed provocations from China and Japan is required. Based on the above naval power construction methods, the direction of power construction is suggested as follows. The sea fleet needs to build up its war potential to defeat the naval forces of North Korea quickly and participate in anti-submarine operations in response to North Korea's provocations. The task fleet should be composed of 3 task flotilla and retain the power to support the sea fleet and suppress the occurrence of maritime disputes with neighboring countries. In addition, it is necessary to expand submarine power, a high value power asset in preparation for establishment of submarine headquarters in 2015, develop anti-submarine helicopter and load SLAM-ER missile onto P-3C patrol aircraft. In case of maine corps, division class military force should be able to conduct landing operations. It takes more than 10 years to construct a new warship. Accordingly, it is necessary to establish plans for naval power construction carefully in consideration of reality and future. For the naval forces to safeguard maritime sovereignty and contribute to national security, the acquisition of a huge budget and buildup of military power is required. In this regard, enhancement of naval power can be achieved only through national, political and military understanding and agreement. It is necessary to let the nation know that modern naval forces with improved weapon system can serve as comprehensive armed forces to secure the command of the sea, perform defense of territory and territorial sky and attack the enemy's strategic facilities and budget inputted in the naval forces is the essential source for early end of the war and minimization of damage to the people. If the naval power construction is not realized, we can be faced with a national disgrace of usurpation of national sovereignty of 100 years ago. Accordingly, the strengthening of naval forces must be realized.

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A Critical Review and Legislative Direction for Criminal Constitution of Piracy (해적행위의 범죄구성요건에 대한 비판적 고찰과 입법 방향)

  • Baeg, Sang-Jin
    • Journal of Legislation Research
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    • 제55호
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    • pp.167-191
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    • 2018
  • Despite international cooperation, piracy has not yet been eradicated in major waters around the world. From the perspective of South Korea, which is absolutely dependent on exporting and importing, it's a lifeline for us to secure safe maritime traffic so it is a situation we have to be vigilant about maritime safety and security. However, criminal law on punishment of piracy is still insufficient and legislative consideration is needed. Since pirates are regarded as enemies of humankind, all nations can punish pirates regardless of their damage. The international community has done its best in cooperation from hundreds of years ago to secure maritime trade through this universal jurisdiction and marine transportation in international waters which is an essential space for military activities, particularly in the Gulf of Aden, the advanced nations have dispatched fleets to combat maritime security threats through joint operations to crack down on Somali pirates. Even if universal jurisdiction is allowed for piracy in accordance with the International Convention on Human Rights and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, it is difficult to effectively deal with piracy if it not fully complied with a domestic legal system for this purpose or is stipulated as different from international regulations. In other words, universal jurisdiction corresponding to international norms and constitution of piracy should be defined in criminal law in accordance with criminal statutory law. If the punishment of pirates by unreasonably applying our criminal law without prejudice to such work can lead to diplomatic disputes in violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or other international norms. In South Korea, there is no provision to explicitly prescribe piracy as a crime, but punish similar acts like piracy in criminal law and maritime safety law. However, there is a limit to effective piracy punishment because we are not fully involved in internationally accepted piracy. In this study, we critically examine the proposals of the constitutional elements of piracy, propose the legislative direction, and insist on the introduction of globalism to pirate sins.

Wide Integrated Surveillance System of Marine Territory Using Multi-Platform (다중플랫폼을 이용한 해양영토 광역통합감시 시스템)

  • Ryu, Joo-Hyung;Lee, Seok;Kim, Duk-jin;Hwang, Jae Dong
    • Korean Journal of Remote Sensing
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    • 제34권2_2호
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    • pp.307-311
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    • 2018
  • It is necessary to establish wide integrated surveillance system of marine territory to reduce damage caused by maritime security threats, marine pollution and accidents for safe and clean marine use and efficient development of marine resources. For marine surveillance, the information characteristics of space-time specific, accuracy and operability are required, and real-time information about the wide area should be provided at all times. This special issue has been published to identify the characteristics of each platform, evaluate its usability for the establishment of a wide integrated surveillance system, and present the direction for future convergence studies between platforms. Since 2015, KIOST and cooperative research team have been performing the project, "Base research for building wide integrated surveillance system of marine territory using multi-platform" that detect vessels and red tide etc. near real time by using satellite, UAV and HF Ocean Radar. The objective of this special issue is to introduce the significance for an integrated system for maritime surveillance and to create a forum for discussion on recent advances in remote sensing technology and applications for marine disasters, pollution, and accident surveillance.

Development Plan of R.O.K. Naval forces to prepare Tasks in the Arctic Ocean: Based on Operational Environment(SWOT) Analysis (한국 해군의 북극해 진출과 발전방안에 대한 고찰: 작전환경(SWOT) 분석을 중심으로)

  • Ji, Young
    • Maritime Security
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    • 제1권1호
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    • pp.311-343
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    • 2020
  • Because of the global warming, the Arctic Ocean is expected to be ice-free by the year 2035. When the Arctic Ocean will be opened, a number of national interests will become more salient as experiencing a shortened sailing distance and decreasing navigation expense, possibility of natural resources transport by sea from Arctic Circle, and indirect-profit making by building a herb port in Asia. To secure the national interests and support the free activities of people in this region, R.O.K government is trying to make advanced policies. In order to carry out the naval tasks in the Arctic Ocean, using the operational characteristics(mobility, flexibility, sustainability, presence of capabilities, projection) is necessary. To this end, ROK Navy should analyze the operational environment (O.E.) by its capability(weakness and strength), opportunity, and threat. R.O.K. Navy should make an effort over the following issues to implement the tasks in the Arctic Ocean: first, Navy needs to map out her own plan (Roadmap) under the direction of government policies and makes crews participate in the education·training programs in home and abroad for future polar experts. Third, to develop the forces and materials for the tasks in cold, far operations area, Navy should use domestic well-experienced shipbuilding skills and techniques of the fourth industrial revolution. Next, improving the combined operations capabilities and military trust with other countries in the Arctic region to cover the large area with lack of forces' number and to resolve the ports of call issues. Lastly, preparation in advance to execute a variety of missions against military and non-traditional threats such as epidemics, HA/DR, SOLAS, in the future operation area is required.

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The Return of Great Power Competition to the Arctic (북극해 일대에서 본격화되기 시작한 강대국 경쟁)

  • Hong, Kyu-dok;Song, Seongjong;Kwon, Tae-hwan;JUNG, Jaeho
    • Maritime Security
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    • 제2권1호
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    • pp.151-184
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    • 2021
  • Global warming due to climate change is one of the biggest challenges in the 21st century. Global warming is not only a disaster that threatens the global ecosystem but also an opportunity to reduce logistics costs and develop mineral resources by commercializing Arctic routes. The Arctic paradox, in which ecological and environmental threats and new economic opportunities coexist, is expected to have a profound impact on the global environment. As the glaciers disappear, routes through the Arctic Ocean without passing through the Suez and Panama Canals emerged as the 'third route.' This can reduce the distance of existing routes by 30%. Global warming has also brought about changes in the geopolitical paradigm. As Arctic ice begins to melt, the Arctic is no longer a 'constant' but is emerging as the largest geopolitical 'variable' in the 21st century. Accordingly, the Arctic, which was recognized as a 'space of peace and cooperation' in the post-Cold War era, is now facing a new strategic environment in which military and security aspects are emphasized. After the Cold War, the Arctic used to be a place for cooperation centered on environmental protection, but it is once again changing into a stage of competition and confrontation between superpowers, heralding 'Cold War 2.0.' The purpose of this study is to evaluate the strategic value of the Arctic Ocean from geopolitical and geoeconomic perspectives and derive strategic implications by analyzing the dynamics of the New Cold War taking place in the Arctic region.

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