• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.85-119
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• 2013

This paper asks whether the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy should continue to focus on building ocean-going naval ships when it faces the threats of North Korean provocations in littoral areas. My position is that the ROK Navy should keep pursuing ocean-going capabilities. I provide explanations why it should do so from the perspectives of three important dimensions: capability, doctrine, and organizational identity. First, I argue that the distinction between a littoral navy and an ocean-going navy is an unnecessary dichotomy. It may lead to inefficiency in national security. The military posture should be designed in a way that it can address all external threats to national security regardless of whether they are from North Korea or not. Such capability is the one that the ROK Navy has tried to acquire with the 'Blue Water Navy' initiative since the 1990s. Second, also from the perspective of lately developed military doctrines that emphasize jointness and precision strike capability, ocean-going capabilities such as the mobile task fleet program have become a must, not an option, given today's security situations on and around the Korean peninsula. Lastly, I draw attention to the fact that the 'Blue Water Navy (BWN)' initiative meant more than just capability to the ROK navy. The BWN represents the ROK navy's organizational identity that the navy has defined since the 1980s as it emphasized promoting national interest and international standing as part of its organizational essence. Furthermore, the phrase 'blue water navy' took on symbolic meanings to the people that are associated with South Korean-ness including sovereignty, national pride, standing in the world and hopes for the future. Since 1990s, many scholars and experts have made the case for the necessity of improving South Korea's naval capability based on different rationales. They emphasized the protection of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), the economic value of the sea, the potential danger associated with territorial disputes over islands, and increasing naval power of neighboring countries since the end of the Cold War. This paper adds to this debate by trying to explain the matter with different factors including naval doctrines and organizational identity. Particularly, this paper constitutes a unique endeavor in that it incorporating constructivist elements (that is, identity politics) in explaining a national security matter.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.13
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• pp.687-738
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• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.236-261
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• 2014

The future role of nuclear extended deterrence in the security alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea is currently a central concern. The gradually lessening role of reliance on nuclear weapons in US security policies broadly, combined with increasing North Korean nuclear capabilities and belligerence, raise fresh questions about the sufficiency of the "nuclear umbrella" as a pillar of the US-ROK defense posture. This article addresses the current and future role of nuclear extended deterrence in Korea in this dynamic context. The article reviews the longstanding trend toward reducing the overall size of the US nuclear arsenal, and assesses developments in US-ROK outlooks toward extended deterrence in response to the Obama administration's nuclear policies and North Korea's recent smaller-scale aggressions. The analysis finds that the challenges of deterrence credibility and allied reassurance are difficult and long-term. The analysis explains how these challenges emerge less from a shrinking US numerical arsenal size than from the sufficiency of specific nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to meet emerging smaller-scale threats. The analysis also highlights the importance of broader strategic and political interaction in sustaining allied confidence in any joint security posture. The evaluation concludes that a strong US-ROK alliance relationship can be maintained while the size of the US nuclear arsenal continues to decline, in part because nuclear weapons in any deployment configuration are relatively ineffective means for deterring smaller-scale aggression. Nevertheless, continuing adjustment of the US-ROK extended deterrence posture to the evolving, complex and uncertain Korean peninsula security environment will remain an ongoing challenge. Finally, the article encourages further examination of the potential specific role ROK maritime forces might serve in enhancing deterrence of smaller-scale threats while minimizing risks of conflict escalation.

• Maritime Security
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.1-53
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• 2022

One manifestation of the contemporary era of renewed great power competition has been the deepening relationship between China and Russia. Their strengthening military ties, notwithstanding their lack of a formal defense alliance, have been especially striking. Since China and Russia deploy two of the world's most powerful navies, their growing maritime cooperation has been one of the most significant international security developments of recent years. The Sino-Russian naval exercises, involving varying platforms and locations, have built on years of high-level personnel exchanges, large Russian weapons sales to China, the Sino-Russia Treaty of Friendship, and other forms of cooperation. Though the joint Sino-Russian naval drills began soon after Beijing and Moscow ended their Cold War confrontation, these exercises have become much more important during the last decade, essentially becoming a core pillar of their expanding defense partnership. China and Russia now conduct more naval exercises in more places and with more types of weapons systems than ever before. In the future, Chinese and Russian maritime drills will likely encompass new locations, capabilities, and partners-including possibly the Arctic, hypersonic delivery systems, and novel African, Asian, and Middle East partners-as well as continue such recent innovations as conducting joint naval patrols and combined arms maritime drills. China and Russia pursue several objectives through their bilateral naval cooperation. The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation lacks a mutual defense clause, but does provide for consultations about common threats. The naval exercises, which rehearse non-traditional along with traditional missions (e.g., counter-piracy and humanitarian relief as well as with high-end warfighting), provide a means to enhance their response to such mutual challenges through coordinated military activities. Though the exercises may not realize substantial interoperability gains regarding combat capabilities, the drills do highlight to foreign audiences the Sino-Russian capacity to project coordinated naval power globally. This messaging is important given the reliance of China and Russia on the world's oceans for trade and the two countries' maritime territorial disputes with other countries. The exercises can also improve their national military capabilities as well as help them learn more about the tactics, techniques, and procedures of each other. The rising Chinese Navy especially benefits from working with the Russian armed forces, which have more experience conducting maritime missions, particularly in combat operations involving multiple combat arms, than the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On the negative side, these exercises, by enhancing their combat capabilities, may make Chinese and Russian policymakers more willing to employ military force or run escalatory risks in confrontations with other states. All these impacts are amplified in Northeast Asia, where the Chinese and Russian navies conduct most of their joint exercises. Northeast Asia has become an area of intensifying maritime confrontations involving China and Russia against the United States and Japan, with South Korea situated uneasily between them. The growing ties between the Chinese and Russian navies have complicated South Korean-U.S. military planning, diverted resources from concentrating against North Korea, and worsened the regional security environment. Naval planners in the United States, South Korea, and Japan will increasingly need to consider scenarios involving both the Chinese and Russian navies. For example, South Korean and U.S. policymakers need to prepare for situations in which coordinated Chinese and Russian military aggression overtaxes the Pentagon, obligating the South Korean Navy to rapidly backfill for any U.S.-allied security gaps that arise on the Korean Peninsula. Potentially reinforcing Chinese and Russian naval support to North Korea in a maritime confrontation with South Korea and its allies would present another serious challenge. Building on the commitment of Japan and South Korea to strengthen security ties, future exercises involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States should expand to consider these potential contingencies.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.44 no.4
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• pp.169-176
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• 2021

Maritime monitoring requirements have been beyond human operators capabilities due to the broadness of the coverage area and the variety of monitoring activities, e.g. illegal migration, or security threats by foreign warships. Abnormal vessel movement can be defined as an unreasonable movement deviation from the usual trajectory, speed, or other traffic parameters. Detection of the abnormal vessel movement requires the operators not only to pay short-term attention but also to have long-term trajectory trace ability. Recent advances in deep learning have shown the potential of deep learning techniques to discover hidden and more complex relations that often lie in low dimensional latent spaces. In this paper, we propose a deep autoencoder-based clustering model for automatic detection of vessel movement anomaly to assist monitoring operators to take actions on the vessel for more investigation. We first generate gridded trajectory images by mapping the raw vessel trajectories into two dimensional matrix. Based on the gridded image input, we test the proposed model along with the other deep autoencoder-based models for the abnormal trajectory data generated through rotation and speed variation from normal trajectories. We show that the proposed model improves detection accuracy for the generated abnormal trajectories compared to the other models.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.28-53
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• 2018

The U.S. has recently developed Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy and Distributed Lethality strategy based on a common perception that they are responding to China's threats. In the future, it is anticipated the following. Strengthen cooperation of the U.S.-India-Vietnam navy, Maximizing the combined combat power between the U.S. and regional navies, Improving its ability to restore damage control, Economic cooperation between the Pacific and Indian countries. The meanings given to the Korean navy are as follows. First, South Korea should pursue cooperation with the Indian Navy, which will grow into a regional balance on China's growth. The growth of the Indian navy is expected to increase cooperation with other Pacific countries. The government should seek ways to promote cooperation with india navy in various fields. Secondly, it is a joint drill between the U.S. Navy and the Korean Navy. Recently, the Korea-U.S. joint drill has not been conducted and many changes are expected to be made regarding the implementation of the joint drill in the future. Therefore, it is necessary to respond to possible changes in the naval relationship between Korea navy and the U.S. navy Also, due to distributed lethality strategy, preparations for operations and training with U.S.navy will be necessary. Lastly, it should contribute to cooperation among regional countries in preparation for maritime territorial disputes. The growth of the Chinese navy and the territorial disputes in the East and South China sea has raised the possibility of accidental military clashes at sea. Therefore, the government should make efforts to create multilateral security cooperation systems that can continue to promote the prevention of armed conflict.

• Maritime Security
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.103-128
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• 2024

The Nord Stream explosion and the damage to submarine cables in the Baltic Sea and Red Sea have raised interest in seabed warfare all the world. And each country is preparing response plans and strategy. However, although South Korea relies on submarine cables for most of its internet network and is vulnerable to threats from North Korea and neighboring countries, even the term Seabed Warfare is unfamiliar. This paper is the first domestic study to analyze the definition and characteristics of seabed warfare, the current status of each country, and suggest countermeasures. In order to respond to seabed warfare, I propose establishing a cooperative system based on Mini-multilateralism between countries that share an international rules-based order, and establishing governance with related domestic organizations and companies. And I propose a military response plan based on deterrence by denial and deterrence by retaliation

• Strategy21
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• s.30
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• pp.99-142
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• 2012

Withe increased North Korea's security threats, the South Korean navy has been faced with deteriorating security environment. While North Korea has increased asymmetric forces in the maritime and underwater with the development of nuclear weapons, and China and Japan have made a large investment in the buildup of naval forces, the power of the Pacific fleet of the US, a key ally is expected to be weakened. The biggest threat comes from China's intervention in case of full-scale war with North Korea, but low-density conflict issues are also serious problems. North Korea has violated the Armistice Agreement 2,660 times since the end of Korean War, among which the number of marine provocations reaches 1,430 times, and the tension over the NLL issue has been intensifying. With tension mounting between Korea and Japan over the Dokdo issue and conflict escalating with China over Ieo do Islet, the US Navy has confronted situation where it cannot fully concentrate on the security of the Korean peninsula, which leads to need for strengthening of South Korea's naval forces. Let's look at naval forces of neighboring countries. North Korea is threatening South Korean navy with its increased asymmetric forces, including submarines. China has achieved the remarkable development of naval forces since the promotion of 3-step plan to strengthen naval power from 1989, and it now retains highly modernized naval forces. Japan makes an investment in the construction of stat of the art warship every year. Since Japan's warship boasts of its advanced performance, Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force is evaluated the second most powerful behind the US Navy on the assumption that submarine power is not included in the naval forces. In this situation, naval power construction of South Korean navy should be done in phases, focusing on the followings; First, military strength to repel the energy warship quickly without any damage in case of battle with North Korea needs to be secured. Second, it is necessary to develop abilities to discourage the use of nuclear weapons of North Korea and attack its nuclear facilities in case of emergency. Third, construction of military power to suppress armed provocations from China and Japan is required. Based on the above naval power construction methods, the direction of power construction is suggested as follows. The sea fleet needs to build up its war potential to defeat the naval forces of North Korea quickly and participate in anti-submarine operations in response to North Korea's provocations. The task fleet should be composed of 3 task flotilla and retain the power to support the sea fleet and suppress the occurrence of maritime disputes with neighboring countries. In addition, it is necessary to expand submarine power, a high value power asset in preparation for establishment of submarine headquarters in 2015, develop anti-submarine helicopter and load SLAM-ER missile onto P-3C patrol aircraft. In case of maine corps, division class military force should be able to conduct landing operations. It takes more than 10 years to construct a new warship. Accordingly, it is necessary to establish plans for naval power construction carefully in consideration of reality and future. For the naval forces to safeguard maritime sovereignty and contribute to national security, the acquisition of a huge budget and buildup of military power is required. In this regard, enhancement of naval power can be achieved only through national, political and military understanding and agreement. It is necessary to let the nation know that modern naval forces with improved weapon system can serve as comprehensive armed forces to secure the command of the sea, perform defense of territory and territorial sky and attack the enemy's strategic facilities and budget inputted in the naval forces is the essential source for early end of the war and minimization of damage to the people. If the naval power construction is not realized, we can be faced with a national disgrace of usurpation of national sovereignty of 100 years ago. Accordingly, the strengthening of naval forces must be realized.

• Strategy21
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• s.32
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• pp.36-70
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• 2013

Waegu(倭寇)'s invasion in the Late Goryeo(高麗) Dynasty was huge damage for Goryeo's local society. And It was shock that Goryeo government's basic foundation of rules. Invasion background of waegu for Kyeong-in-yeon(庚寅年, 1350) was Kyushyu(九州)'s political divide because of Nihon(日本) government's confusion. Waegu was huge damage for Goryeo's Jo-wun(漕運, the shipping system of grain paid as a tax) system. So, government started military response, but it was turn out a failure and had great damage. When execution of military operations failed, Goryeo government sent diplomatic delegation to request the prevent of waegu, but the invasion continued. Since waegu invasion, Goryeo was got nowhere with defence of waegu. So, some people demanded for a new understanding of the ocean defence in the government. Lee-Saek(李穡), Woo-Hyeonbo(禹玄寶), Lee-Hee(李禧) and Jung-Ji(鄭地) were representatives of a new understanding of the ocean defence. Their demands were received attention when all operations had been failed. Therefore, Goryeo government began to reorganization of the naval forces and set up a special committee of gunpowder manufacturing named Hwa-tong-do-gam(火筒都監). This administrative reform was achieved substantial results since then. In 1380, the naval battle at Jin-po(鎭浦) was a big event that first gunpowder attack the waegu. Since Jin-po, Goryeo's naval forces gain confidence. In 1389, Dae-ma-do(對馬島) was attacked by Park-Wi(朴葳). It was meant that Goryeo's naval forces had huge offense power. Goryeo's defence system was focused on a northern race before 14th century waegu's invasion. So they were neglected their ocean defence. But after military operation of waegu's invasion was failure, they focused on the ocean defence. A new understanding of the ocean defence was foundation of that. It means to us to a new understanding of the ocean defence. Now, East Asia has maritime disputes. And we have high exposure to potential threats. So, we have a new understanding of importance of the ocean defence. And we fight for 21th century's ocean threats as foundation of sense of national security.

• Maritime Security
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.151-184
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• 2021

Global warming due to climate change is one of the biggest challenges in the 21st century. Global warming is not only a disaster that threatens the global ecosystem but also an opportunity to reduce logistics costs and develop mineral resources by commercializing Arctic routes. The Arctic paradox, in which ecological and environmental threats and new economic opportunities coexist, is expected to have a profound impact on the global environment. As the glaciers disappear, routes through the Arctic Ocean without passing through the Suez and Panama Canals emerged as the 'third route.' This can reduce the distance of existing routes by 30%. Global warming has also brought about changes in the geopolitical paradigm. As Arctic ice begins to melt, the Arctic is no longer a 'constant' but is emerging as the largest geopolitical 'variable' in the 21st century. Accordingly, the Arctic, which was recognized as a 'space of peace and cooperation' in the post-Cold War era, is now facing a new strategic environment in which military and security aspects are emphasized. After the Cold War, the Arctic used to be a place for cooperation centered on environmental protection, but it is once again changing into a stage of competition and confrontation between superpowers, heralding 'Cold War 2.0.' The purpose of this study is to evaluate the strategic value of the Arctic Ocean from geopolitical and geoeconomic perspectives and derive strategic implications by analyzing the dynamics of the New Cold War taking place in the Arctic region.