• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제3권2호
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• pp.41-45
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• 1978

Duel models are frequently used in war game simulation. Both game-theoretic approach and stochastic approach are applied to duel situations in war game. Game-theoretic models are usually classified into three categories, noisy duel, silent duel, and duel of continuous firing. Stochastic duels are classified depending upon assumptions. In this paper formulation and a general solution for each model will be summarized.

• 한국국방경영분석학회지
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• 제5권1호
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• pp.137-153
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• 1979

The duel is an extreme case of game situations. The duel is of zero-sum type, but a infinite game. This duel situation appears not only in extreme competitive situations such as war, but also in economic situations such as bidding. The study on duel situations started from late 1940's, but considerable contributions have been made in 1960's by Ancker, Restrepo, Yanovskaya, Kimeldorf among others. Specially Kimeldorf recently has made big contribution in developing the theory of the game-theoretic duel. The purpose of this paper is to summarize and systemize the theory of the game-theoretic duel. In the first part, noisy duel situations shall be dealt with, and in the second part, silent duel shall follow. Finally these two situations shall be generalized in the form of continuous firing model.

• 산학경영연구
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• 제21권1호
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• pp.1-17
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• 2008

저공해차량의 최적구매행태를 분석하는 게임이론 모형을 설정하고 이를 분석한다. 현실적으로 적용가능한 게임이론 모형을 설정하기 위해 게임의 결과(outcome)에 대한 의사결정자의 서수적 선호관계를 현실에서 얻을 수 있는 자료를 이용하여 수치로 나타내는 문제를 고찰하고, 각 시나리오별 게임의 분석에는 게임분석도구인 GAMBIT을 이용하는 방법을 살펴본다.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 1999년도 하계학술대회 논문집 C
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• pp.1344-1346
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• 1999

This paper presents a game theoretic approach for power transactions analysis in a competitive market. The considered competitive power market is regarded as PoolCO model, and the participating players are restricted by only two generating entities for simplicity in this paper. The analysis is performed on the basis of marginal cost based relations of bidding price and bidding generations. That is, we assume that the bidding price of each player is determined by the marginal cost when the bidding generation is pre-determined. This paper models the power transaction as a two player game and analyzes by applying the Nash eauilibrium idea. The generalized game model for power transactions covering constant-sum(especially zero-sum), and nonconstant-sum game is developed in this paper. Also, the analysis for each game model are Performed in the case studies. Here, we have defined the payoff of each player as the weighted sum of both player's profits.

• 분석과 대안
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• 제1권2호
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• pp.2-12
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• 2017

Research on democratic transitions has relatively ignored the question of why some countries experience a regressive form of political pacts, while others do not. This paper develops a simple game-theoretic model to explain the phenomenon of collusive pacts in the process of democratization. Trasformismo is a term that refers to a system of political exchange based on informal clientelistic politics. The existing studies of the politics of trasformismo have emphasized the timing of industrialization and the tradition of strong state as conditions of the politics of trasformismo. However, not every late industrializers and not every strong states experienced some variants of collusive political pacts in their trajectories of democratization. In this paper, I contend that the politics of trasformismo is rather a generalizable pattern of political elites' behavior under particular circumstances. By developing a simple game theoretic model, this paper suggests the conditions under which political actors are likely to collude to a regressive form of political pacts. The model shows that the likelihood of collusion to a regressive form of political pacts is a function of a set of parameters. First, a higher level of incumbency advantage in electoral competition is likely to be associated with a higher probability of collusive political pacts. Second, a higher degree of the monopoly of political representation of political parties without a close link with a variety of societal forces is likely to induce collusive behavior among politicians. Third, the ruling party leader's expectations about the likelihood of a safe extrication are related to collusive political pacts. This paper then engages in a case study of the 1990 three-party merger in South Korea. The 1990 Korean case is interesting in that the ruling party created a new party after having merged with two opposition parties. This case can be considered a result of political maneuver in a context of democratization. The case study suggests the empirical relevance of the game-theoretic model. As the game of trasformismo and the case study of the 1990 three-party merger in South Korea have shown, the collusive political pact was neither determined by a certain stage of economic development nor by a particular cultural systems. Rather, it was a product of the art of trasformismo based on party leaders' rational calculations of the expected likelihood of taking governing power.

• 한국정보과학회논문지:정보통신
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• 제37권4호
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• pp.312-316
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• 2010

본 논문에서는 기지국 채널 자원을 MNO(Mobile Network Operator)와 MVNO(Mobile Virtual Network Operator)가 공유할 경우 사업자들에게 채널 자원을 공정하고 효율적으로 할당하기 위한 게임 이론적 모델을 제안한다. 제안 모델은 협상(Bargaining) 게임 이론을 이용하며 MNO와 MVNO의 입력 부하를 고려하여 이들 사이의 기지국 채널 자원을 할당한다. 제안 기법은 사업자별 입력 부하가 비대칭적인 경우 입력 부하가 낮은 사업자보다 입력 부하가 높은 사업자에게 보다 많은 양의 채널을 할당하여 기지국의 채널 이용율을 증가시키며 또한 한 사업자의 과도한 입력 부하로 인해 타 사업자의 서비스 품질이 저하되는 것을 방지한다.

• 한국항행학회논문지
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• 제13권1호
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• pp.87-96
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• 2009

본 논문에서는 무선통신에서 유한개의 전략집합을 갖는 전력제어 문제를 게임이론을 통하여 분석하였다. 기존의 게임이론을 이용한 전력제어에서는 개방루프 제어에서와 같이 초기전송 전력을 결정하는 연속적인 게임 모델에 국한된 반면, 본 논문에서는 폐루프 전력제어에서와 정해진 전력제어 step size 만큼 전력을 올리거나 내리는 전력제어 문제를 게임 이론의 전형적인 모델 중의 하나인 죄수 딜레마 모형을 이용하여 분석하였다. 분석결과 전력을 올리는 전략이 내쉬 균형임을 증명하였고, 따라서 이와 같은 상황에서는 모든 단말기가 자신의 전력을 향상시키려고 시도하기 때문에 전체 시스템 측면에서는 효율적이지 못하다. 본 논문에서는 인접 셀 간 간섭이 심각한 환경에서 효율적인 전력제어 알고리즘을 구현하기 위하여 게임모형의 효용함수를 새롭게 정의하였고, 그 결과 모든 단말이 자신의 효용함수를 최대화 하려고 노력한다고 하더라도 자신의 송신 전력이 일정한 수준으로 유지될 수 있는 알고리즘을 개발하였다.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제9권10호
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• pp.3810-3830
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• 2015

In this paper, we investigate the differential game theoretic approach for distributed dynamic cooperative power control in cognitive radio ad hoc networks (CRANETs). First, a payoff function is defined by taking into consideration the tradeoff between the stock of accumulated power interference to the primary networks and the dynamic regulation of the transmit power of secondary users (SUs). Specifically, the payoff function not only reflects the tradeoff between the requirement for quickly finding the stable available spectrum opportunities and the need for better channel conditions, but also reveals the impact of the differentiated types of data traffic on the demand of transmission quality. Then the dynamic power control problem is modeled as a differential game model. Moreover, we convert the differential game model into a dynamic programming problem to obtain a set of optimal strategies of SUs under the condition of the grand coalition. A distributed dynamic cooperative power control algorithm is developed to dynamically adjust the transmit power of SUs under grand coalition. Finally, numerical results are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm for efficient power control in CRANETs.

• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제31권3호
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• pp.107-125
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• 2006

We introduce a two-stage game theoretic model to support decision making processes for product Positioning and pricing in competitive environment. In the first stage, firms decide on entry and product position, in the second stage, firms compete with price. 'Alpha rule' is used as a choice model. Demand parameters of the choice model are estimated by conjoint analysis. We investigate conditions for the existence of Nash price equilibria in the pricing game. Nash equilibria in the entry and positioning game are produced using a concept of stable sets. An example of the online game industry in Korea is examined.

• 산업경영시스템학회지
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• 제32권3호
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• pp.168-177
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• 2009

The proliferation of the internet and electronic commerce has given the manufacturers the opportunity of direct marketing. This study analyzes the decision of manufacturers regarding whether to sell the products through independent sales company or to sell the products to the consumer directly. To do this, a new demand function is proposed and sub and super games are modeled and analyzed based on the demand function. By analyzing the Nash equilibria, it is shown that the manufacturers' decision of direct or indirect marketing not only depends on the competitiveness between the products but the absolute and relative marketing capabilities of the manufacturers. It is also shown that, in some cases, the manufactures have incentive to rise the competitiveness between the products to maximize the channel profit.