• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.59 no.7
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• pp.1226-1231
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• 2010

This paper looks at the influence of Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) on the market value(Social Welfare; SW) in the competitive electricity market. The transmission line constraints make it difficult to compute the Nash Equilibrium (NE) due to causing a mixed strategy NE instead of a pure strategy NE. Computing a mixed strategy is more complicated in a multi-player game. The aim of this paper are to compute a mixed strategy NE and analyze SW in power transaction with FTRs. This paper introduces a formula and a technique for solving NE of multi-player game with FTRs. In addition, it analyzes the influence of holding of FTRs by generation company on SW and it proposes the SW at NE is influenced by Power Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) where holder of FTRs are located. The assertion is verified by calculating the mixed strategy utilizing the Cournot model widely used for studies on FTRs.

• 제어로봇시스템학회:학술대회논문집
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• 1997.10a
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• pp.128-130
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• 1997

In the paper a problem of search for a moving robot by another moving robot is considered. The problem is formalized as minmax and maxmin task also as a game.

• Korean Management Science Review
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• v.25 no.2
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• pp.1-12
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• 2008

In the ultimatum game two players have to divide a certain amount of money between them. One player is the allocator and proposes a division of the money. The other is the recipient and can either accept or reject the proposed division. If the recipient accepts, the money is divided as proposed. If the recipient rejects, however, both players receive nothing. Purchase decisions could be classified on two basic factors (or dimensions) : involvement and think/feel in the FCB grid model. In this study we studied the influences of the two factors in purchase decisions on the choice of strategy (or propensity to fairness) in the ultimatum game. The empirical study showed that a decision maker chooses rational strategy more frequently when he (or she) is thinkful (or cognitive) in high involvement level.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.61-68
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• 1983

The traditional theories of games are based on an assumption that the payoffs have a single dimension. In reality, any alternative is likely to imply more than one payoff. This paper deals with the game against nature with vector payoffs. The purpose of this paper is to develop methods for finding the practical optimal strategy in the game against nature with vector payoffs. Under the assumption that a prior probability over the stats of nature is given, this paper shows that a practical optimal strategy in this game can be obtained by applying a entropy method in order to assess the payoff weight and by employing the concept of compromise solutions in order to reduce the non-dominated solutions. When subjective payoff weights are unknown as well as known, these methods can be used. A numerical example is given.

• Journal of Korea Multimedia Society
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• v.12 no.12
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• pp.1761-1768
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• 2009

In this paper, we implemented online real time strategy game using hand as the mouse in augmented reality. Also, we introduced the algorithm for detecting hand direction, finding fingertip of the index finger and counting the number of fingers for interaction between users and the virtual objects. The proposed method increases the reality of the game by combining the real world and the virtual objects. Retinex algorithm is used to remove the effect of illumination change. The implementation of the virtual reality in the online environment enables to extend the applicability of the proposed method to the areas such as online education, remote medical treatment, and mobile interactive games.

• Proceedings of the Korean Society of Computer Information Conference
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• 2020.07a
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• pp.685-688
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• 2020

본 논문에서는 게임 개발의 한 형태이자 새로 도입된 개발 형태 중에 가장 떠오르고 있는 얼리액세스 개발 형태에 대해 서술하며, 얼리액세스 개발 방식의 공통적인 성격과 성공했던 게임들의 사례를 통해 앞으로 게임 개발자들에게 지양해야 할 부분과 반영해야 할 부분을 통해 소비자들에게 어떤 방식으로 접근해야 효과적으로 다가갈 수 있으며, 어떤 방향의 개발을 거쳤던 게임이 흥행하지 못했는지를 연구, 분석을 통해 얼리액세스 만의 방식을 통해 개발자, 소비자 모두를 충족시킬 수 있는 전략을 제시하고자 한다.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.34 no.4
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• pp.185-204
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• 2009

The USIM(universal subscriber identity module)-unlock introducing in July 1, 2008 might be led to a significant change that mobile service provider's dominance is considerably dispersed to the handset manufacturer and distributor. Under USIM-unlock environment, mobile service provider, handset manufacturer, and distributor have to make their decisions on their handset distribution channel strategies: the closed distribution channel strategy or the open distribution channel strategy. The change of distribution channel strategy between members in distribution channel can be understood as a matter of strategy choice, and we have developed a theoretical model and analyzed how to make a decision for the member's optimal distribution strategy based on 3-person game model between members of mobile phone distribution channel, under both of '1 subscriber-1 handset' and '1 subscriber-multiple handset' assumptions. Under '1 subscriber-1 handset' assumption, the closed strategy controlled by mobile service provider is all players' optimal solution because the maximum size of the mobile phone market is limited by subscribers. But, as total expected profit by the handset and distribution subsides is a deficit, mobile service provider have to choose the open strategy and consider the conversion to MNO(mobile network operator). Under '1 subscriber-multiple handset' assumption, mobile service provider is trying to find the way how to lock-in its service and mobile phone and how to maximize ARPU(average revenue per unit), while handset manufacturer and distributor have to look for the way how to maximize the mobile phone market using their own marketing efforts, because it is expected that total mobile handset demand for the open market is bigger than demand for the closed market under '1 subscriber-multiple handset' assumption.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.112-122
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• 2016

In line with the increase in consumer demand for mobile games, game companies face stiff competition. For a more successful marketing strategy, many game companies actively adopt Cross Promotion. The Cross Promotion marketing strategy in the mobile game is regarded as a low cost and high efficiency marketing method because the game companies provide new experiences to game users by utilizing existing game infrastructure and absorbing current users of game companies. Despite the advantages of Cross Promotion, there has been little practical study on the relationship between Cross Promotion and mobile game acceptance. Accordingly, the aim of this study was to determine the influential factors of Cross Promotion on the acceptance of mobile games. After reviewing previous research, a structural model was established, a survey was performed and the model was analyzed. The managerial implications are suggested along with the concluding remarks.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.13 no.10
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• pp.5260-5275
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• 2019

In the process of constructing the traditional offensive and defensive game theory model, these are some shortages for considering the dynamic change of security risk problem. By analysing the critical indicators of the incomplete information game theory model, incomplete information attack and defense game theory model and the mathematical engineering method for solving Bayes-Nash equilibrium, the risk-averse income function for information assets is summarized as the problem of maximising the return of the equilibrium point. To obtain the functional relationship between the optimal strategy combination of the offense and defense and the information asset security probability and risk probability. At the same time, the offensive and defensive examples are used to visually analyse and demonstrate the incomplete information game and the Harsanyi conversion method. First, the incomplete information game and the Harsanyi conversion problem is discussed through the attack and defense examples and using the game tree. Then the strategy expression of incomplete information static game and the engineering mathematics method of Bayes-Nash equilibrium are given. After that, it focuses on the offensive and defensive game problem of unsafe information network based on risk aversion. The problem of attack and defense is obtained by the issue of maximizing utility, and then the Bayes-Nash equilibrium of offense and defense game is carried out around the security risk of assets. Finally, the application model in network security penetration and defense is analyzed by designing a simulation example of attack and defense penetration. The analysis results show that the constructed income function model is feasible and practical.

• Management Science and Financial Engineering
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.31-36
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• 2013

We propose a war-game model that is appropriate for a raid-type warfare in which, a priori, the maneuver of the attacker is relatively certain. The model is based on a multi-weapon extention of the Lanchester's law. Instead of a continuous time dynamic game with the differential equations from the Lanchester's law, however, we adopt a multi-period model relying on a time-discretization of the Lanchester's law. Despite the obvious limitation that two players make a move only on the discrete time epochs, the pragmatic model has a manifold justification. The existence of an equilibrium is readily established by its equivalence to a finite zero-sum game, the existence of whose equilibrium is, in turn, well-known to be no other than the LP-duality. It implies then that the war-game model dictates optimal strategies for both players under the assumption that any strategy choice of each player will be responded by a best strategy of her opponent. The model, therefore, provides a sound ground for finding an efficient reinforcement of a defense system that guarantees peaceful equilibria.