An Optimal Strategy of 3G Mobile Handset Distribution by 3-Person Game

3자간게임모형에 의한 3G 이동통신단말기의 치적유통전략

  • 주영진 (충북대학교 경영학부) ;
  • 문형돈 (충북대학교대학원 경영학과/정보통신산업진흥원 전략기획단)
  • Published : 2009.12.31

Abstract

The USIM(universal subscriber identity module)-unlock introducing in July 1, 2008 might be led to a significant change that mobile service provider's dominance is considerably dispersed to the handset manufacturer and distributor. Under USIM-unlock environment, mobile service provider, handset manufacturer, and distributor have to make their decisions on their handset distribution channel strategies: the closed distribution channel strategy or the open distribution channel strategy. The change of distribution channel strategy between members in distribution channel can be understood as a matter of strategy choice, and we have developed a theoretical model and analyzed how to make a decision for the member's optimal distribution strategy based on 3-person game model between members of mobile phone distribution channel, under both of '1 subscriber-1 handset' and '1 subscriber-multiple handset' assumptions. Under '1 subscriber-1 handset' assumption, the closed strategy controlled by mobile service provider is all players' optimal solution because the maximum size of the mobile phone market is limited by subscribers. But, as total expected profit by the handset and distribution subsides is a deficit, mobile service provider have to choose the open strategy and consider the conversion to MNO(mobile network operator). Under '1 subscriber-multiple handset' assumption, mobile service provider is trying to find the way how to lock-in its service and mobile phone and how to maximize ARPU(average revenue per unit), while handset manufacturer and distributor have to look for the way how to maximize the mobile phone market using their own marketing efforts, because it is expected that total mobile handset demand for the open market is bigger than demand for the closed market under '1 subscriber-multiple handset' assumption.

Keywords

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