• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.34 no.4
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• pp.123-138
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• 2009

This study examined the first- and second-best pricing by stable dynamics in congested transportation networks. Stable dynamics, suggested by Nesterov and de Palma (2003), is a new model which describes and provides a stable state of congestion in urban transportation networks. The first-best pricing in user equilibrium models introduces user-equilibrium in the system-equilibrium by tolling the difference between the marginal social cost and the marginal private cost on each link. Nevertheless, the second-best pricing, which levies the toll on some, but not all, links, is relevant from the practical point of view. In comparison with the user equilibrium model, the stable dynamic model provides a solution equivalent to system-equilibrium if it is focused on link flows. Therefore the toll interval on each link, which keeps up the system-equilibrium, is more meaningful than the first-best pricing. In addition, the second-best pricing in stable dynamic models is the same as the first-best pricing since the toll interval is separately given by each link. As an effect of congestion pricing in stable dynamic models, we can remove the inefficiency of the network with inefficient Braess links by levying a toll on the Braess link. We present a numerical example applied to the network with 6 nodes and 9 links, including 2 Braess links.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.25 no.5
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• pp.183-193
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• 2007

Traditionally, a congestion charge based on first-best congestion pricing theory, namely, the theory of marginal cost pricing theory, is equal to the difference between marginal social cost and marginal private cost. It is charged on each link so as to derive a user equilibrium flow pattern to a system optimal one. Based on this theory this paper investigates on the characteristics of first-best congestion pricing of multiple user class on road with variable demand, and presents two methods for analysis of social and spatial equity. For these purposes, we study on the characteristics of first-best congestion pricing derived from system optimal in time and in monetary unit, and analyze equity from this congestion pricing with an example network.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.17-24
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• 1990

The first-best pricing rule which achieves economic efficiency is to equate price with marginal cost. Since public transport demand is derived from some other demand, the user cost as well as the producer cost are considered in its pricing. The optimal price is derived from a derivative of the total social cost with respect to demand. In case of the bus, if there is enough capacity for demand increase, the optimal price is determined by the marginal producer cost resulting from bus sped decrease and by the marginal user cost resulting from journey time increase. Both are caused by boarding and fare collecting time of an additional passenger. Because of the budget constraints, the marginal cost pricing cannot be applied in practice. Then price discrimination as the second-best pricing is introduced. The Ramsey pricing, to charge different prices for different demand elasticities, and nonuniform prices such as travelcards can be applied. However, there is practical difficulty in implementing these prices because of great informational requirements, the costs of administration and the ease to users.

• The Journal of The Korea Institute of Intelligent Transport Systems
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• v.7 no.5
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• pp.159-169
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• 2008

The aim of this paper is to research the changes of social welfare by internalizing external cost, especially the maintenance cost. Main target of this paper is the Cheonan$\sim$Nonsan Line, where private capital highway, national highway and local road are competing against each other. Considering the realistic difficulties in applying the First Best pricing, this paper applied the Second Best pricing, applying the maintenance cost, in lieu of the already mentioned. The demand functions of the toll roads were built through regression analysis. By reflecting the maintenance cost to the toll fee, It was able to confirm the variation of social welfare deriving from the traffic assign change but also the aspects of toll revenue at the same time. Result of applying the Second Best pricing shows merely a small change in social welfare. However, in the aspect of finance, it is analyzed that there will be about 13 billion won worth of financial effectiveness which will contribute to the reduction of the national financial support.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.27 no.2
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• pp.145-155
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• 2009

This paper compares the relative performances of area and cordon tolls as opposed to the first-best congestion tolls with respect to alleviation of traffic congestion and social welfare. The comparison is done in the monocentric city where all the jobs are located at the city center. The study shows that the size of charging zones is similar in the two second-bests, but that the optimal toll level is higher in area pricing than in cordon pricing. Area pricing schemes turn out to perform better than cordon pricing schemes as measured by average speeds and daily average travel time. Accordingly, the former is shown to increase the social welfare more than the latter. In the case of the cordon tolls, the residents at the charging zones are exempted from the tolls. In this way, cordon tolls invite people into the most congested areas over the optimal level while partially negating the whole spirit of the congestion tolls.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.16 no.7
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• pp.146-153
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• 2016

This work studies the equilibrium behavior of customers and optimal pricing strategies of the sever in a continuous-time M/M/1 queueing system. In this work, we consider two pricing models. The first one is called the ex-ante payment scheme where the server charges a flat price for all services, and the second one is called the ex-post payment scheme where the server charges a price that is proportional to the time a customer spends in the system. In each pricing model, the departing customer receives the reward that is inversely proportional to his/her sojourn time. The server should make the optimal pricing decisions in order to maximize its expected profit per unit time in each payment scheme. This work also investigates customer's equilibrium joining or balking behaviors under server's optimal pricing strategies. Numerical experiments are conducted to help the server best select one between two pricing models.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.31 no.3
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• pp.74-85
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• 2013

We analyze the efficiency of congestion pricings and transit subsidies in the spatial micro-economic model based on a general equilibrium environment. In this setting, we decompose the total welfare change into component factors and identify the reason of the change in the efficiency caused by policy instruments; these component factors are divided into indirect factors and direct factors including of origin-destination and mode choices. We set up the model as adding mode choice to the standard format in the fashion of Anas and Kim (1996) and extend the methodology proposed by Yu and Rhee (2011) and Rhee (2012) for deriving theoretical and analytical solution. Most of welfare gain comes from the modal shift from car to bus. The relative efficiency of subsidies in relation to the first-best pricing is lower than it of congestion pricings although the change in bus share by subsidies is similar to it by congestion pricing. Subsidies give rise to more modal shift from a car to a bus for long-distance commuting than it caused by congestion pricings. As the increase of bus share for long-distance commuting leads to the increase of cross-commuters passing through CBD, the welfare gain by subsidies is lower than it by congestion pricings.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.34 no.6
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• pp.510-522
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• 2016

In studies involving public transport, social welfare improvement is simply explained by the increase in public transport demand. However, the increase in the demand for public transport is mostly observed by the change in the frequency of public transport service, and in-vehicle crowding in public transport has not been an object of concern. This study examines and tries to reveal the cause of the changes of the social welfare and in-vehicle crowding of the changing public transport from imposing congestion pricing. We observe that congestion pricing increases in-vehicle crowding in public transport. This predictable phenomenon is more exacerbated in case of not operating bus-only lane. It should be noted that in-vehicle crowding is more increased in suburban, but in First-best toll system it tends to get worse less than it in other congestion pricing systems. We identify that the change of in-vehicle crowding is affected by the change of proximity of the housing to workplace, the number of commuting trips, and unpredictable distortion effect of the congestion charge.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.31-46
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• 1978

Consider a time interval during which the demand for trips is fixed (e.g. the rush hour period). The traveller has a choice between various public modes, whose travel times and fares are fixed, and the automobile mode, for which travel time and cost depend on the volume of traffic flow on those roads, which are subject to congestion. We consider the equilibrium in terms of a representative travellerm, who choses for any trip the mode and route with the least combined money and time cost. When several (parallel) model or routes are chosen, then the combined cost of money and time must be equal among these. Our problem is first, to find the optimal flows of cars and of public mode carriers on the various links of their networks and second the optimal fares for trips by the variousmodes. The object is to minimize the total operating costs of the carriers and car plus the total time costs to travellers. The optimal fares are related to, but not identical with the dual variables of the underlying Nonlinear Program. They are equal to these dual variables only in the case, when congestion tolls on trips or on the use of specific roads are collected from automobile users. When such tolls are not collected, they must be passed on as subsidies to travellers using competing modes. The optimal fares of public modes are then reduced by the amounts of these subsidies. Note that subsidies are not a flat payment to public carriers, but are calculated on the basis of tickets sold. Fares and subsidies depend in general on tile period considered. They will be higher during periods of higher demand. When the assumption of fixed trip demand is relaxed, this tare system is no longer best, but only second best since too much traffic will, in general, be generated. The Free Rider Theorem states the following : Suppose road tolls can be charged, so that a best pricing system for public modes is posssible. Then there may exist free rides on some routes and modes, but never on a complete round trip.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.35 no.4
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• pp.17-31
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• 2010

This study investigates two-stage return policy and recycling issues in an e-marketplace supply chain consisting of consumers, a retailer and a manufacturer. The manufacturer, a focal company in the e-marketplace supply chain, considers the recycling of commercial returns so offers the retailer a buy-back contract of which transfer payment consists of a wholesale price and a buy-back price. Then, under the given contract offer, the retailer determines a selling price and a return policy to control consumers' demand and return requests. We consider the retailer's opportunistic behavior and supply chain coordination issues based on the principal-agent paradigm. We compare the first-best and second-best optima and conduct comparative static analyses to evaluate the performance results of the buy-back contract and provide important managerial implications.