• Honam Mathematical Journal
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• v.39 no.2
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• pp.297-305
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• 2017

Let ${\alpha}$ > 0 be a real number and $(s_{\alpha}(n))_{n{\geq}1}$ be the lexicographically greatest Sturmian word of slope ${\alpha}$. We investigate Dirichlet series of the form ${\sum}^{\infty}_{n=1}s_{\alpha}(n)n^{-s}$. To do this, a generalization of Euler's totient function is required. For a real ${\alpha}$ > 0 and a positive integer n, an arithmetic function ${\varphi}{\alpha}(n)$ is defined to be the number of positive integers m for which gcd(m, n) = 1 and 0 < m/n < ${\alpha}$. Under a condition Re(s) > 1, this paper establishes an identity ${\sum}^{\infty}_{n=1}s_{\alpha}(n)n^{-S}=1+{\sum}^{\infty}_{n=1}{\varphi}_{\alpha}(n)({\zeta}(s)-{\zeta}(s,1+n^{-1}))n^{-s}$.

• Bulletin of the Korean Mathematical Society
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• v.50 no.6
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• pp.1981-1988
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• 2013

We say a positive integer n satisfies the Lehmer property if ${\phi}(n)$ divides n - 1, where ${\phi}(n)$ is the Euler's totient function. Clearly, every prime satisfies the Lehmer property. No composite integer satisfying the Lehmer property is known. In this article, we show that every composite integer of the form $D_{p,n}=np^n+1$, for a prime p and a positive integer n, or of the form ${\alpha}2^{\beta}+1$ for ${\alpha}{\leq}{\beta}$ does not satisfy the Lehmer property.

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.20 no.8
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• pp.29-33
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• 2015

This paper proposes a discrete logarithm algorithm that remarkably reduces the execution time of Pollard's Rho algorithm. Pollard's Rho algorithm computes congruence or collision of ${\alpha}^a{\beta}^b{\equiv}{\alpha}^A{\beta}^B$ (modp) from the initial value a = b = 0, only to derive ${\gamma}$ from $(a+b{\gamma})=(A+B{\gamma})$, ${\gamma}(B-b)=(a-A)$. The basic Pollard's Rho algorithm computes $x_i=(x_{i-1})^2,{\alpha}x_{i-1},{\beta}x_{i-1}$ given ${\alpha}^a{\beta}^b{\equiv}x$(modp), and the general algorithm computes $x_i=(x_{i-1})^2$, $Mx_{i-1}$, $Nx_{i-1}$ for randomly selected $M={\alpha}^m$, $N={\beta}^n$. This paper proposes 4-model Pollard Rho algorithm that seeks ${\beta}_{\gamma}={\alpha}^{\gamma},{\beta}_{\gamma}={\alpha}^{(p-1)/2+{\gamma}}$, and ${\beta}_{{\gamma}^{-1}}={\alpha}^{(p-1)-{\gamma}}$) from $m=n={\lceil}{\sqrt{n}{\rceil}$, (a,b) = (0,0), (1,1). The proposed algorithm has proven to improve the performance of the (0,0)-basic Pollard's Rho algorithm by 71.70%.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.16 no.6
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• pp.2074-2093
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• 2022

RSA is known as one of the best techniques for securing secret information across an unsecured network. The private key which is one of private parameters is the aim for attackers. However, it is exceedingly impossible to derive this value without disclosing all unknown parameters. In fact, many methods to recover the private key were proposed, the performance of each algorithm is acceptable for the different cases. For example, Wiener's attack is extremely efficient when the private key is very small. On the other hand, Fermat's factoring can quickly break RSA when the difference between two large prime factors of the modulus is relatively small. In general, if all private parameters are not disclosed, attackers will be able to confirm that the private key is unquestionably inside the scope [3, n - 2], where n is the modulus. However, this scope has already been reduced by increasing the greatest lower bound to [d_il, n - 2], where d_il ≥ 3. The aim of this paper is to decrease the least upper bound to narrow the scope that the private key will remain within this boundary. After finishing the proposed method, the new scope of the private key can be allocated as [d_il, d_ir], where d_ir ≤ n - 2. In fact, if the private key is extremely close to the new greatest lower bound, it can be retrieved quickly by performing a brute force attack, in which d_ir is decreased until it is equal to the private key. The experimental results indicate that the proposed method is extremely effective when the difference between prime factors is close to each other and one of two following requirement holds: the first condition is that the multiplier of Euler totient function is very close to the public key's small value whereas the second condition is that the public key should be large whenever the multiplier is far enough.

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.19 no.7
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• pp.71-76
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• 2014

There is to be virtually impossible to solve the very large digits of prime number p and q from composite number n=pq using integer factorization in typical public-key cryptosystems, RSA. When the public key e and the composite number n are known but the private key d remains unknown in an asymmetric-key RSA, message decryption is carried out by first obtaining ${\phi}(n)=(p-1)(q-1)=n+1-(p+q)$ and then using a reverse function of $d=e^{-1}(mod{\phi}(n))$. Integer factorization from n to p,q is most widely used to produce ${\phi}(n)$, which has been regarded as mathematically hard. Among various integer factorization methods, the most popularly used is the congruence of squares of $a^2{\equiv}b^2(mod\;n)$, a=(p+q)/2,b=(q-p)/2 which is more commonly used then n/p=q trial division. Despite the availability of a number of congruence of scares methods, however, many of the RSA numbers remain unfactorable. This paper thus proposes an algorithm that directly and immediately obtains ${\phi}(n)$. The proposed algorithm computes $2^k{\beta}_j{\equiv}2^i(mod\;n)$, $0{\leq}i{\leq}{\gamma}-1$, $k=1,2,{\ldots}$ or $2^k{\beta}_j=2{\beta}_j$ for $2^j{\equiv}{\beta}_j(mod\;n)$, $2^{{\gamma}-1}$ < n < $2^{\gamma}$, $j={\gamma}-1,{\gamma},{\gamma}+1$ to obtain the solution. It has been found to be capable of finding an arbitrarily located ${\phi}(n)$ in a range of $n-10{\lfloor}{\sqrt{n}}{\rfloor}$ < ${\phi}(n){\leq}n-2{\lfloor}{\sqrt{n}}{\rfloor}$ much more efficiently than conventional algorithms.

• The Journal of the Institute of Internet, Broadcasting and Communication
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.23-29
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• 2015

The baby-step giant-step algorithm seeks b in a discrete logarithm problem when a,c,p of $a^b{\equiv}c$(mod p) are already given. It does so by dividing p by m block of $m={\lceil}{\sqrt{p}}{\rceil}$ length and letting one giant walk straight toward $a^0$ with constant m strides in search for b. In this paper, I basically reduce $m={\lceil}{\sqrt{p}}{\rceil}$ to p/l, $a^l$ > p and replace a giant with an adult who is designed to walk straight with constant l strides. I also extend the algorithm to allow $2^k$ adults to walk simultaneously. As a consequence, the proposed algorithm quarters the execution time of the basic adult-walk method when applied to $2^k$, (k=2) in the range of $1{\leq}b{\leq}p-1$. In conclusion, the proposed algorithm greatly shorten the step number of baby-step giant-step.

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.18 no.8
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• pp.87-93
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• 2013

A baby-step giant-step algorithm divides n by n blocks that possess $m={\lceil}\sqrt{n}{\rceil}$ elements, and subsequently computes and stores $a^x$ (mod n) for m elements in the 1st block. It then calculates mod n for m blocks and identifies each of them with those in the 1st block of an identical elemental value. This paper firstly proposes a modified baby-step giant-step algorithm that divides ${\lceil}m/2{\rceil}$ blocks with m elements applying $a^{{\phi}(n)/2}{\equiv}1(mod\;n)$ and $a^x(mod\;n){\equiv}a^{{\phi}(n)+x}$ (mod n) principles. This results in a 50% decrease in the process of the giant-step. It then suggests a reverse baby-step giant step algorithm that performs and saves ${\lceil}m/2{\rceil}$ blocks firstly and computes $a^x$ (mod n) for m elements. The proposed algorithm is found to successfully halve the memory and search time of the baby-step giant step algorithm.

• The Journal of the Institute of Internet, Broadcasting and Communication
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• v.14 no.6
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• pp.25-31
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• 2014

When the public key e and the composite number n=pq are disclosed but not the private key d in an asymmetric-key RSA, message decryption is carried out by obtaining ${\phi}(n)=(p-1)(q-1)=n+1-(p+q)$ and subsequently computing $d=e^{-1}(mod{\phi}(n))$. The most commonly used decryption algorithm is integer factorization of n/p=q or $a^2{\equiv}b^2$(mod n), a=(p+q)/2, b=(q-p)/2. But many of the RSA numbers remain unfactorable. This paper therefore applies baby-step giant-step discrete logarithm and $2^k$-ary modular exponentiation to directly obtain ${\phi}(n)$. The proposed algorithm performs a reverse baby-step and $2^k$-ary adult-step. As a results, it reduces the execution time of basic adult-step to $1/2^k$ times and the memory $m={\lceil}\sqrt{n}{\rceil}$ to l, $a^l$ > n, hence obtaining ${\phi}(n)$ by executing within l times.