• 전기학회논문지
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• 제66권1호
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• pp.16-22
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• 2017

In order to reduce costs of electricity energy at periods of peak demand, there has been an exponential interest in Demand Response (DR). This paper discusses the effect on the participants' behavior in response to DR. Under the assumption of perfect competition, the equilibrium point of the electricity market with DR is derived by modeling a DR curve, which is suitable for microeconomic analysis. Cournot model is used to analyze the electricity market of imperfect competition that includes strategic behavior of the generation companies. Strategic behavior with DR makes it harder to compute equilibrium point due to the non-differential function of payoff distribution. This paper presents a solution method for achieving the equilibrium point using the best response function of the strategic players. The effect of DR on the electricity market is illustrated using a test system.

• 전기학회논문지
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• 제59권12호
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• pp.2143-2149
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• 2010

Market price and curtailment amounts of the Demand Resource Market(DRM) are determined by competition between electricity consumers. An important aspect of the DRM involves the assessment of strategic behavior of participants for maximizing their profits. This paper presents economic equilibrium models for simulating imperfect competition among electricity consumers in the DRM and analyzes the models at Nash Equilibrium of Game Theory. The proposed demand functions and supply functions of DRM are based on the Demand Resource Market Rules in Korean electricity market. Simulation results show that the models are adequate for obtaining Nash Equilibrium of consumers' competitive curtailment.

• 조명전기설비학회논문지
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• 제23권2호
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• pp.182-189
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• 2009

경쟁적 전력시장에서 발전회사의 전략적 행위를 분석하기 위해서 일반적으로 내쉬균형(Nash equilibrium) 이론이 널리 사용되고 있다. 기존 연구에 의하면 송전제약이 있는 전력시장에서는 최적반응의 불연속으로 인해 순수전략내 쉬균형이 존재하지 않게 되고, 이때는 혼합전략 내쉬균형이 전력시장의 균형이 된다. 본 논문에서는 송전제약이 있는 2-지역 전력시장에서 혼합전략 내쉬균형을 유도하고, 송전용량이 혼합전략 내쉬균형에 미치는 영향을 해석하였다.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제54권9호
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• pp.461-466
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• 2005

This paper addresses the bidding strategies of a hydro generator in an electricity market, and their effect on the electricity market in accordance with some parameters: the water volume, the demand elasticity, and the hydro unit performance. The competition of a hydro generator is formulated as a hi-level optimization problem, and the solving scheme for the equilibrium condition is proposed as a set of nonlinear simultaneous equations. The equilibrium of the oligopolistic model is evaluated by comparison with that of a perfect competition model from the viewpoint of a market power. Simulation results show some parameters have an influence on the market power of an electricity market including a hydro generator.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• 제2권4호
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• pp.494-499
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• 2007

In this paper, we have investigated how transmission network constraints can be modeled in an electricity market equilibrium model. Under Cournot competition assumption, a game model is set up considering transmission line capacity constraints. Based on locational marginal pricing principle, market clearing is formulated as a total consumers# benefit maximization problem, and then converted to a conventional optimal power flow (OPF) formulation with a linearized transmission model. Using market clearing formulation, best response analysis is formulated and, finally, Nash equilibrium is formulated. In order for illustration, a numerical study for a four node system with two generating firms and two loads are presented.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• 제9권1호
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• pp.90-97
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• 2014

Nash Cournot Equilibrium (NCE) has been widely used in a competitive electricity market to analyze generation firms' strategic production quantities. Congestion on a transmission network may lead to a mixed strategy NCE. Mixed strategy is complicated to understand, difficult to compute, and hard to implement in practical market. However, Stackelberg model based equilibrium does not have any mixed strategy, even under congestion in a transmission line. A guide to understanding mixed strategy equilibrium is given by analyzing a cycling phenomenon in the players' best choices. This paper connects the concept of leader-follower in Stackelberg model with relations between generation firms on both sides of the congested line. From the viewpoint of social welfare, the surplus analysis is presented for comparison between the NCE and the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE).

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2005년도 제36회 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.775-777
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• 2005

In this paper, effects of the subsidy in the electricity market on the market equilibrium are analyzed. The generation competition markets are considered as the basic market structure. The market equilibrium with Cournot game model is derived, first. Then, the variation of Nash equilibrium is investigated when the subsidies to generation companies are provided. The market equilibrium with the subsidy in the electricity market, which is equivalent to the subgame perfect equilibrium, is analytically derived using Stackelberg game model and backward induction method. From this, how the provisions of subsidy to generation companies can affect the strategic behaviors of the generation companies and corresponding market equilibrium are explored, in this paper. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the basic idea of this paper.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제52권10호
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• pp.616-623
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• 2003

Competition among electric generation companies is a major goal of restructuring in the electricity industry, The trading system in an electricity market has been one of the most important issues in deregulated electricity market. This paper deals with comparisons of the major two types of the trading system: compulsory pool market and bilateral contract market. The two trading systems are compared quantitatively from the viewpoint of consumer's surplus and social welfare, This paper, also, proposes a unified model of Cournot and Bertrand for analyzing the mixed trading system of pool market and bilateral contract market. Nash equilibrium of the unified model is derived by criteria for participating in bilateral contract market. Numerical results from a sample case show that a mixed trading system of pool market and price-competitive bilateral market is beneficial to consumer from the view points of consumer's surplus.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• 제5A권4호
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• pp.396-402
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• 2005

In an electricity market with imperfect competition, participants devise bidding plans and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a market model combined by an energy market and an operating reserve market. The competition of the generation producers in the combined market is formulated as a gaming of selecting bid parameters such as intersections and slopes in bid functions. The Nash Equilibrium (NE) is analyzed by using bi-level optimization; maximization of Social Welfare (SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.

• 전기학회논문지
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• 제61권2호
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• pp.187-193
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• 2012

Nash Equilibrium (NE) is as useful tool for investigating a participant's strategic generation quantity in a competitive electricity market. Cournot model may give a mixed strategy NE instead of a pure strategy when transmission constraints are considered. A mixed strategy is difficult to compute, complicated to understand conceptually, and hard to implement in an electricity market practically. This paper presents that a mixed strategy does not appear in Stackelberg leader-follower model even under a transmission congestion. A solution method is proposed for the leader-follower model under a nondifferentiable space of a strategy variable. Based on the pure strategy NE with a transmission line congested, the merit of leader-follower model is shown from a social welfare point of view.