• Journal of the Korean Data and Information Science Society
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• v.25 no.4
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• pp.745-753
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• 2014

Parrondo paradox is the counter-intuitive situation where individually losing games can combine to win or individually winning games can combine to lose. In this paper, we compare the history-dependent Parrondo games and the space-dependent Parrondo games played cooperatively by the multiple players. We show that there is a probability region where the history-dependent Parrondo game is a losing game whereas the space-dependent Parrondo game is a winning game.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.40 no.1
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• pp.61-71
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• 2018

In this study, we developed hybrid control algorithms in smart base stations (SBSs) along with devised communication, caching, and computing techniques. In the proposed scheme, SBSs are equipped with computing power and data storage to collectively offload the computation from mobile user equipment and to cache the data from clouds. To combine in a refined manner the communication, caching, and computing algorithms, game theory is adopted to characterize competitive and cooperative interactions. The main contribution of our proposed scheme is to illuminate the ultimate synergy behind a fully integrated approach, while providing excellent adaptability and flexibility to satisfy the different performance requirements. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed approach can outperform existing schemes by approximately 5% to 15% in terms of bandwidth utilization, access delay, and system throughput.

• Hwankyungkyoyuk
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.38-50
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• 2000

We are evidently Home Economicus, egoistic rational utility maximiger, and all the capitalism economic situation make us adapt to such life, and recognize that it is rational to act like that. This can be demonstrated in Prisoner′s Dilemma(PD) which always select the non-cooperative choice for free rider in rational selection process of public goods. This paper notice the "what is problem\ulcorner"The problem is not in free rider itself but in free rider egoism. The practical behavior of free rider egoism can be explained by way of Prisoner′s Dilemma. In PD situation, the prisoner makes a rational choice, non-cooperative alternative, but he doesn′arrive at preto-optimality. It is dilemma. Why can′t he arrive \ulcorner Because he is isolated from other prisoner. So we call it prisoner′s dilemma. The PD situation can be compared with our real economic life, which, we think, have kept by rational choice of the public goods. We actually have made our life as an individual one although we organized communities of capitalism. Of course, we know each others as members of same society, but each individual being can′t secure the belief, which has composed basis of community. So, it is very similar and common between PD situation and our real economic life in the production of public goods. We conclude that this non-cooperative process of PD situation can be utilized as instrument of EE. So this non-cooperative process can show us the effectiveness of EE as follows. \circled1 Game situation life PD can be used as good instrument for explaining the rational selection dilemma(error) to Homo-Economicus, the rational agent, with the optimal and rational language. \circled2 We can show that the selection result is dilemma, not arrive pareto - optimality. \circled3 The dilemma can be resolved with accomplishing the good communal life based on the belief, not on the isolation.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.5A no.1
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• pp.85-92
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• 2005

In this paper, Nash equilibriums of generation markets are investigated using a game theory application for simplified competitive electricity markets. We analyze the characteristics of equilibrium states in N-company spot markets modeled by uniform pricing auctions and propose a new method for obtaining Nash equilibriums of the auction. We assume that spot markets are operated as uniform pricing auctions and that each generation company submits its bids into the auction in the form of a seal-bid. Depending on the bids of generation companies, market demands are allocated to each company accordingly. The uniform pricing auction in this analysis can be formulated as a non-cooperative and static game in which generation companies correspond to players of the game. The coefficient of the bidding function of company-n is the strategy of player-n (company-n) and the payoff of player-n is defined as its profit from the uniform price auction. The solution of this game can be obtained using the concept of the non-cooperative equilibrium originating from the Nash idea. Based on the so called residual demand curve, we can derive the best response function of each generation company in the uniform pricing auction with N companies, analytically. Finally, we present an efficient means to obtain all the possible equilibrium set pairs and to examine their feasibilities as Nash equilibriums. A simple numerical example with three generation companies is demonstrated to illustrate the basic idea of the proposed methodology. From this, we can see the applicability of the proposed method to the real-world problem, even though further future analysis is required.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.9 no.6
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• pp.1996-2013
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• 2015

This paper considers a scenario that more D2D users exist in the cell, they compete for cellular resources to increase their own data rates, which may cause transmission interference to cellular users (CU) and the unfairness of resource allocation. We design a resource allocation scheme for selfish D2D users assisted by cooperative relay technique which is used to further enhance the users' transmission rates, meanwhile guarantee the QoS requirement of the CUs. Two transmission modes are considered for D2D users: direct transmission mode and cooperative relay transmission mode, both of which reuses the cellular uplink frequency resources. To ensure the fairness of resource distribution, Nash bargaining theory is used to determine the transmission mode and solve the bandwidth allocation problem for D2D users choosing cooperative relay transmission mode, and coalition formation game theory is used to solve the uplink frequency sharing problem between D2D users and CUs through a new defined "Selfish order". Through theoretical analysis, we obtain the closed Nash bargaining solution under CUs' rate constraints, and prove the stability of the formatted coalition. Simulation results show that the proposed resource allocation approach achieves better performance on resource allocation fairness, with only little sacrifice on the system sum rates.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1998.06a
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• pp.669-673
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• 1998

This paper makes a study of the Shapley value in cooperative fuzzy games, games with fuzzy coalitions, which enable the representation of players' participation degree to each coalition. The Shapley value has so far been introduced only in an class of fuzzy games where a coalition value is not monotone with respect to each player's participation degree. We consider a more natural class of fuzzy games such that a coalition value is monotone with regard to each player's participation degree. The properties of fuzzy games in this class are investigated. Four axioms of Shapley functions are described and a Shapley function of a fuzzy fame in the class is given.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.13 no.4
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• pp.1904-1921
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• 2019

In this paper, we investigate the problem of secure communications in multiple-input-multiple-output interference networks from the perspective of physical layer security. Specifically, the legitimate transmitter-receiver pairs are divided into different categories of active and inactive. To enhance the security performances of active pairs, inactive pairs serve as cooperative jammers and broadcast artificial noises to interfere with the eavesdropper. Besides, active pairs improve their own security by using joint transceivers. The encoding of active pairs and inactive pairs are designed by maximizing the difference of mean-squared errors between active pairs and the eavesdropper. In detail, the transmit precoder matrices of active pairs and inactive pairs are solved according to game theory and linear programming respectively. Experimental results show that the proposed algorithm has fast convergence speed, and the security performances in different scenarios are effectively improved.

• Environmental Engineering Research
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• v.21 no.4
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• pp.420-426
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• 2016

Climate change imposes a huge treat on the sustainability of our environment. One of the major reasons for the increasing impacts of climate change is the emission of greenhouse gases. Therefore, cooperative greenhouse gas emission reduction schemes with a general consensus are needed in order to reduce the impacts of climate change. Due to the strong link between greenhouse gas emission and economic development there is disagreement among countries on the designing and implementation of emission reduction plans. In this paper the authors proposed a two-stage concession game to analyze emission reduction plans and determine a balanced emission range that improves the utilities of the bargaining parties. Furthermore the game was applied to a hypothetical example. Our results from the case study indicated that even though the utilities of the bargaining parties is highly affected by emission reductions, after making concessions their utilities can be improved given their emission reductions are within in a certain desirable range. The authors hope that this article provides insights which could be useful for understanding emission reduction plans and their consequences on the negotiating parties.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.9 no.8
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• pp.2854-2874
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• 2015

This paper presents a game theoretic approach to analyze the public goods (PGs) allocation in peer-to-peer (p2p) networks. In order to reduce the free-riders and promote the cooperation among peers, we propose an incentive mechanism with cooperation-based game theory. In this paper, we regarded the contributed resources by cooperators as public goods (PGs). We also build the PGs allocation in P2P networks to be the optimization problem, and the optimal solution of PGs allocation satisfies the Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson equilibrium. Firstly, based on the subscriber mechanism, we analyze the feasibility and prove the validity, which can achieve Nash equilibrium. However, this strategy cannot meet to Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson equilibrium as the free-riders do not pay with their private goods for consuming the PGs. Secondly, based on the Walker mechanism, we analyze the feasibility and prove the validity for the same allocation problem, which meets to Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson equilibrium and achieves Pareto efficiency within cooperative game. Simulations show that the proposed walker mechanism can significantly improve the network performance of throughout, and effectively alleviate free-riding problem in P2P networks.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 2003.09a
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• pp.166-169
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• 2003

Reinforcement learning if a kind of machine learning. It aims to adapt an agent to a given environment with a clue to a reward and a penalty. Q-learning [8] that is a representative reinforcement learning system treats a reward and a penalty at the same time. There is a problem how to decide an appropriate reward and penalty values. We know the Penalty Avoiding Rational Policy Making algorithm (PARP) [4] and the Penalty Avoiding Profit Sharing (PAPS) [2] as reinforcement learning systems to treat a reward and a penalty independently. though PAPS is a descendant algorithm of PARP, both PARP and PAPS tend to learn a local optimal policy. To overcome it, ion this paper, we propose the Multi Best method (MB) that is PAPS with the multi-start method[5]. MB selects the best policy in several policies that are learned by PAPS agents. By applying PS, PAPS and MB to a soccer game environment based on the SoccerBots[9], we show that MB is the best solution for the soccer game environment.