A SOLUTION CONCEPT IN COOPERATIVE FUZZY GAMES

  • TSURUMI, Masayo (Department of Electronics and Information Systems, Graduate School of Engineering, Osaka University) ;
  • TANINO, Tetsuzo (Department of Electronics and Information Systems, Graduate School of Engineering, Osaka University) ;
  • INUIGUCHI, Masahiro (Department of Electronics and Information Systems, Graduate School of Engineering, Osaka University)
  • Published : 1998.06.01

Abstract

This paper makes a study of the Shapley value in cooperative fuzzy games, games with fuzzy coalitions, which enable the representation of players' participation degree to each coalition. The Shapley value has so far been introduced only in an class of fuzzy games where a coalition value is not monotone with respect to each player's participation degree. We consider a more natural class of fuzzy games such that a coalition value is monotone with regard to each player's participation degree. The properties of fuzzy games in this class are investigated. Four axioms of Shapley functions are described and a Shapley function of a fuzzy fame in the class is given.

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