• Knowledge Management Research
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• v.11 no.3
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• pp.31-45
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• 2010

IT outsourcing studies have centered on the separate effect of formal contract and relational trust on IT outsourcing performance. In addition, previous studies ignored the importance of the relational capability that combine the formal contract and partnership can be able to deliver IT outsourcing effects. In this paper, we propose an IT governance commitment as a mediated role between relational capability and IT outsourcing performance. We collected data from 143 client companies of IT outsourcing and analyzed it using the PLS method. Our findings are revealed as following: At first, relational capability significantly and directly influence IT governance commitment as well as indirectly through formal contract and partnership. Secondly, IT governance commitment mediate between relational capability and IT outsourcing effect, and in turn affect IT outsourcing performance. The results and implications are further discussed.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.12
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• pp.39-64
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• 1999

Under the CISG, there is a unequitable factor in comparing buyer's remedy with seller's remedy. In my opinion, CISG is more unequitable remedy clause than UCC or UNIDROIT principle of International Commercial Contract(1994) between seller and buyer. First, buyer who accepted defect goods must give seller notice the facts that seller delivered defect goods in two years after accepting defect goods. The cap of two year is unreasonable in a position of aggrieved buyer. This is being provided as 'within reasonable time' in UCC and there is no such provision in UNIDROIT Principle. Second, Buyer can avoid contract when seller breached fundamentally contract or seller didn't set a additional performance period about breaching of contract. Accordingly if buyer would not set a additional performance period, although seller's breachment of contract, he could not avoid the contract. Therefore, From a viewpoint of aggrieved buyer avoidable right of contract is restrainted. Third, to compare seller's remedy with buyer's, seller have more opportunity to cure breachment of contract than buyer. Under the CISG buyer is relatively placed at disadvantage in remedy of aggrieved party. In connection with remedy of aggrieved party, 'UNIDROIT principle of international commercial contracts' instead seller and buyer of aggrieved party, so there is not unequitable factor in remedy of aggrieved parties.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.18
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• pp.189-218
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• 2002

The EPC/Turnkey Contract goes to the extreme in allocating risks to the contractor and depending on the types of project, this may be regarded as unacceptable. It has also gone to the extreme in the extent to which the contractor is responsible for the specification and design of the Works. The employer is not responsible for correctness of any information provided by him nor for correctness of any specification or other matter included in the Employer's Requirements, except the definition of the intended purpose and criteria for testing and performance. With such conditions it is surprising that the employer is entitled to interfere in the contractors performance to an extent that is close to what is norm for a construction contract with employer design and with normal risk allocation. The combination of risk allocation and inappropriate administrative provisions makes the EPC/Turnkey Contract a document that will meet severe resistance from contractors. It is also likely that employers will see the risks and difficulties from their own perspective. It is a fiction that the EPC/Turnkey Contract will give the employer a contact with a certainty of final price and completion date. It is not a fiction that the EPC/Turnkey Contract carries many seeds for disputes between the parties. The Orange Book has become an accepted document even if it clearly contains some weaknesses. Some of these have been corrected in the Plant Contract. In my opinion FIDIC should let users become more familiar with the Plant Contract as a follow up to the Orange Book.

• The Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business
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• v.14 no.9
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• pp.21-30
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• 2023

Purpose: Focusing on the role of the special contract to collaborate the supply chain operations, this study investigates how the revenue sharing contract affects the performance of Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI). Research design, data, and methodology: The optimization model is formulated to represent two stage supply chain system where the supplier and retailer manage the operations to maximize their own profits. Three supply chain models including the traditional system, VMI, and VMI with revenue sharing contract are compared in the numerical examples. Results: According to the numerical analysis, the entire supply chain system has greater profit under VMI than the traditional system, while VMI alone sacrifices the supplier's profit. With the proper sets of revenue share ratio and wholesale price discount rate, VMI with revenue sharing contract results in the increased profit for both supplier and retailer compared with VMI alone as well as the traditional system. Conclusions: The numerical examples imply that VMI, when it is combined with the revenue sharing contract, can be the effective collaboration program that satisfies every supply chain member. To make VMI with revenue sharing contract to be fair to all supply chain members, they need to agree on the appropriate contract content.

• Journal of the Korean Dietetic Association
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.72-90
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• 2011

The following study was taken in the Seoul, Gyeonggi, Incheon, Kangwon, and Chungcheong areas to analyze the performance levels of safety management by characteristics of school foodservice. The following results were obtained from a survey conducted on 2,271 middle and high school dietitians in 808 schools. Out of the 808 schools surveyed, 513 schools (63.5%) were self-operated and 295 schools (36.5%) were managed by a contract. Regarding the performance level of the hygiene duties, contract-managed schools were rated as 4.02 points while self-operated schools were rated relatively higher (4.16 points). The self-operated schools had an average score of 3.60 points for the TQM-based HACCP system, and the areas that scored lower than the average were strategies, human resources, data and analysis. The average score of the contract-managed schools was 3.42 points, and such areas as leadership, human resources, data and analysis, and customer satisfactory level scored below the average. For the analysis of CCP performance level, the contract-managed schools scored 4.28 points while self-operated schools scored 4.34 points. Overall, the hygiene duties, CCP performance level, and TQM-based HACCP system performance of the contracted schools were lower than those of the self-operated schools. Therefore, it is advised that the contract-managed schools consider new measures to strengthen their performance level for improved safety of school foodservice.

• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.155-163
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• 2007

Multiple parties-owners, engineering and construction contractors, and suppliers involve the delivery process of capital facility projects in the construction industry, and each party obtains or provides their workforce, material, equipment, or service tied into specific contracts. Considering that construction projects are based on the contracted relationship between the parties and that contract types are one of the significant factors determining project success. it is critical for project stakeholder to select appropriate contract types for successful deliveries of projects. With these considerations, this paper assesses impacts of different contract types on project cost, schedule, safety, change, or rework. Analyzing data from real construction projects, the differences in project performance between two contract types, Cost Reimbursable and Lump Sum are measured and statistically tested to investigate if the differences are significant. For this analysis, performance metrics developed by Benchmarking and Metrics program, the Construction Industry Institute are used.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.12 no.3
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• pp.224-233
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• 2013

In supply chain management, the supply contract can induce collaboration and coordination among the supply chain members in order to optimize supply chain performance. Numerous supply contracts have been examined; however, some difficulties related to the application of these contracts still occur. One of the solutions is to apply the composite supply contract which can assist in the supply chain coordination. This research examines the composite contract of the revenue sharing and quantity flexibility contracts in a two-stage supply chain, which comprises a retailer and a supplier. In this research, a mathematical model of the composite contract is developed; then, the applicability of the proposed composite contract is examined by investigating its capability in terms of supply chain coordination and profit allocation. In the numerical experiments, the composite revenue sharing-quantity flexibility contract showed that it is superior to both component contracts in terms of supply chain coordination and profit allocation among supply chain members.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.42
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• pp.67-85
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• 2009

In English Law it seems that it is essential to apply the principle of equilibrium in the contract, however, it does not seemed to apply as the general rule of the principle of contract. Especially it seems that English Court didn't pay attention to the principle of equilibrium in 18th century. If one of the party do not appeal the equilibrium of the contract, it does not make any difference even today. However the Court may cancel or withdraw the construction of contract between the parties where the principle of equilibrium is damaged by fundamental problems like just-price. In French Law it seems that they have more wide definition of the principle of equilibrium. The French Court may consider that the application of good faith is the performance of condition of the contract between the parties and has no power to relieve of one party of his expressed obligations or warranty. In German Law, it seems that the principle of good faith is fundamental to take into account interest of the parties. They may agree to supply information or not to interfere with a commercial agent regarding performance and maintenance of the contract.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.19 no.8
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• pp.1-9
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• 2019

This research aims to empirically explore the link between evaluation management and performance of indefinite-term contract workers in local governments, perceived by public officials who are responsible for managing indefinite-term contract workers in local governments. In addition, this study examines the moderating effect of training for the relationship between evaluation management and performance. The results show the positive relationship between evaluation management and performance with the moderating effect of training for the link. This research contributes to expand the scope and level of the literature on indefinite-term contract workers through suggesting the empirical evidence among evaluation management, performance and training. Furthermore, the empirical results of this study have useful implications for local governments and public officials to construct management guidelines for indefinite-term contract workers.

• The Korean Journal of Franchise Management
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.1-25
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• 2012

The studies of franchise companies are underway with the development of the franchise industry. Franchisor performance, franchisee performance, and relationship characteristics on performance, financial performance, non-financial performance, including research on the topic or purpose of the franchise performance and related discussions from a variety of perspectives have been proposed. Presented so comprehensive a discussion regarding the existing performance of the franchise and qualitative aspects such as satisfaction, long-term orientation to emphasize the limits. Therefore, this study was conducted by the franchise company's performance than the need to be clearly presented. Propose a quantifiable and quantified to reflect the characteristics of the franchise quantitative performance indicators. Franchise contract management systematically analyze the status of the enterprise contract management(ECM) and proposed contract management, leverage as an indicator for a more quantitative analysis. Contract management leverage is the franchise as an indicator of the merchant and the growth of the contract showing any significant changes in the coming changes in the Franchisee's sales growth target analysis results, notable implications could be found. This study are new methodology for the practical dimensions of performance of franchise companies.