• Journal of Research and Publication Ethics
• /
• v.3 no.1
• /
• pp.1-5
• /
• 2022

Purpose: A conflict of interest is defined broadly as a scenario in which one's responsibilities and self-interest collide in a manner that has a significant probability of corrupting one's discernments, motivations, actions, desires, values, and judgments. This study aims to investigate various cases of conflict of interest. Research design, data and methodology: Our study used the preferred reporting items for systematic reviews and meta-analyses (PRISMA) to identify resources. The eligibility of selected prior studies thoroughly was investigated whether they are suitable for the topic of present study. Finally, we collected total 15 previous studies published between 2000 and 2021. Results: Research findings indicate that there are three main cases that might cause a conflict of interest and mandated research ethics education might provide researchers with the tools to identify and battle the temptations and biases provided by conflicts of interest. Researchers could likely be better prepared for conflicts of interest if they investigated the moral difficulties associated with them in advance. Conclusions: Researchers might evade deliberate or unconscious detriment of duties, and also objectivity loss because of the siren song of self-interest by escaping situations whereby they may be tempted to shirk their responsibilities, not to remark the hassles of unveiling conflicts.

• Informatization Policy
• /
• v.19 no.4
• /
• pp.27-45
• /
• 2012

Smart grid, which is a sort of convergence of numerous technologies, can be deployed only with cooperation and fair competition among various stakeholders. If the interest conflicts were not coordinated properly, related business and investment would become delayed and inactive. Therefore, this study analyzes the causes of interest conflicts and related issues in smart grid sector and suggests policy directions by issue. As the result of AHP analysis, the majority of respondents surveyed said that ambiguity of the role and authority is the key problem causing conflicts of interest in smart grid deployment process. Differences in values, communications problems, etc. are pointed as additional main reasons of the interest conflicts. To resolve interest conflicts in smart grids, the Korean government should enhance its leadership in the coordination of stakeholders' interests. Government should make efforts to coordinate the various interests in terms of the development of the smart grid market and win stakeholders' sympathy of their desirable roles in the smart grid market.

• Anxiety and mood
• /
• v.11 no.2
• /
• pp.114-119
• /
• 2015

A conflict of interest is usually defined as a set of circumstances that creates a risk that professional judgments or actions regarding a primary interest will be unduly influenced by a secondary interest. In general, a conflict of interest can be classified as either a financial or a non-financial one. A financial conflict of interest reportedly occurs frequently in medical (and psychiatric) research and practice and is associated with a greater likelihood of reporting results favorable to the intervention being studied. A non-financial conflict of interest may occur in psychiatric research and practice as a result of the so-called "allegiance effect." It is very important that clinicians and researchers in the field of psychiatry be aware that their field is vulnerable to both financial and non-financial conflicts of interest. Considering that it is impossible in modern psychiatry to be completely free from possible conflicts of interest, the best way to manage a conflict of interest is disclosure based on the principles of transparency. Actions that might lead to conflicts of interest should be avoided as much as possible.

• The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
• /
• v.19 no.1
• /
• pp.165-206
• /
• 2018

Researchers, Institutional Bioethics Committee(IBC)/Institutional Review Board (IRB) members, Research Institutions that have multiple interests in relation to research should ensure that conflicts of interest(COI) do not arise in making professional judgments. In other words, according to the role that must be performed or the obligation to fulfill it, the primary interest, which must be considered or should be prioritized, should not be affected by the secondary interest. Therefore, standards and methods should be prepared so as to prevent and solve the problems of COI that have arisen, and the basic matters on standards and methods should be clearly defined in terms of the law and policy so that all parties such as Researchers can understand and follow them. In order to establish a more realistic legal policy, it is necessary to grasp the current situation. Therefore, I have reviewed results of the questionnaire survey and interview conducted for the administrative staff of IBC/IRB to confirm their opinions on legal policy problems related to COI and countermeasures for resolving them. Also, I have reviewed the main contents of issued by the US Department of Health and Human Services in order to assist in the preparation of domestic legal policy about conflicts of interest. Finally, I have analyzed the present state of domestic legal policy in relation to the Researcher's COI, the IBC/IRB member's COI, and Institutional COI and suggested way to improve it.

• Journal of Korean Society of Forest Science
• /
• v.97 no.6
• /
• pp.669-679
• /
• 2008

Jirisan National Park was designated on December 29, 1967 as the first national park in Korea and that caused continuous conflicts between the violation of the right to hold property in this area due to several regulations following the designation and the nature preservation for the value of heritage for descendants. Thus, the objective of this study is to find a proposal for making decision based on the rationality that is able to solve these conflicts. To achieve the objective of this study, this study applies a game theory that supports a reasonable decision making process for solving these conflicts between interest groups around Jirisan National Park in which the component of this game consists of Jirisan National Park, residents, and interest groups. The Nash equilibrium obtained by the analysis of the strategy of interest groups for the use and preservation of forests and its rewards from the strategy as an nonecooperative game showed a behavior that chases their own benefits and causes lots of troubles. However, in the case of the results obtained from a cooperative game based on the strategy that includes some public interests accepted by interest groups and its rewards, it represented an aspect that solves conflicts through achieving a strategical set, which shows a win-win outcome even though the results of this cooperative game may present less rewards than that of the Nash equilibrium. Whereas, if there exists the public interests accepted by interest groups and truth for protecting such public interests, it is considered that it becomes a way that solves present structural troubles in the National Parks in Korea due to the fact that there exist uncertainties caused by the human rationality.

• International Commerce and Information Review
• /
• v.9 no.4
• /
• pp.265-288
• /
• 2007

This study analyzed which conflict management norm was preferred according to unique cultural difference of nation and such conflict management norm influences on conflict management type in solving real conflict when conflict in organization occurs and such conflict norm had a preference and influence on conflict management type in solving real conflict through such conflict management norm. As the result, first, Korean managers showed still high attitude on group interest and aimed to negotiation. But they highly depended on control. Canada managers showed discussion norm of individual interest and performed conflict management laying stress on unity and negotiation. second, as for conflict management of negotiation, both Canada and Korea performed it on the based of his or her interest discussion and as for plural agenda unity positively influenced to unity conflict management in Korea but in Canada, attitude for the future negatively influenced.

• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
• /
• v.6 no.6 s.28
• /
• pp.193-204
• /
• 2005

Conflict is aroused when different people having different interest work together for fulfilling same the objectives. As the construction field is large, complex, volatile and requires tremendous capital, there are always greater challenges and possibility of risks of conflicts. Poor management practices in construction site and trying to protect risks and threats by contracting parties are the cited sources of the construction conflicts. The best management practice is to resolve the problems before these cultivate as conflicts. This paper has identified six dispute avoidance factors-Convince, Coordination, Consideration, Compromise, Consolation and Coercion. Six 'C' factors described in this paper are the mantra (formula) to execute a conflict free construction project. The conflict avoidance factors have been verified through a successfully executed project called TEVT development project (Technical Education and Vocational Training) during 1993-1998 in Nepal. The results show that the six 'C' factors 'C' considered during the implementation of the project, construction conflicts would be controlled or minimized effectively.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
• /
• v.26 no.2
• /
• pp.45-66
• /
• 2016

The FAA provides that a district court may make an order vacating an arbitration award upon the application of any party to the arbitration where there was evident partiality on the arbitrator's behalf. The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Commonwealth Coatings Corp. held that arbitrators must disclose to the parties "any dealing that might create an impression of possible bias." Justice White attempted to limit the scope of evident partiality to instances where an arbitrator has a "substantial interest" in the dispute before disclosure is required. The Second Circuit held that if an arbitrator thinks that a nontrivial conflict of interest might exist, the arbitrator must either (i) conduct an investigation into the potential conflict, or (ii) disclose to the parties why he or she thinks there could be a conflict. Further, the arbitrator must disclose his or her intent not to investigate the matter. By utilizing a reasonable impression of partiality standard, the Ninth Circuit held that evident partiality can exist despite an arbitrator's actual acknowledgement of a conflict, and if an arbitrator fails to discharge his or her duty to investigate potential conflicts of interest, his or her constructive knowledge of the conflicts can give rise to evident partiality.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
• /
• v.35 no.2
• /
• pp.133-166
• /
• 2013

This study analyzes the relationships between soft dollar(brokerage commission) and characteristics of funds, and between brokerage commission and return on funds, using the data on equity funds of Korea from June 2008 to November 2011. The result confirms a statistically significant negative relationship between management & sales fees and brokerage commission, meaning that rather than raising management & sales fees, which could be easily recognized by investors, it is through brokerage commission, a hidden cost, which asset management firms indirectly compensate for their services. Meanwhile, the analysis on the relationship between brokerage commission and return on funds reveals that higher brokerage commissions lead to lower return on funds, meaning at least in short-term no contribution to increasing returns in the future. These results suggest the need for streamlining the system to alleviate conflicts of interest between investors and management firms in addition to effectively controlling for principal-agent problems.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
• /
• v.38 no.2
• /
• pp.179-196
• /
• 2013

This paper examines the difference in compensation structure between family firms and non-family firms in Korea. A manager's compensation is an important means of motivating a manager to make decisions for shareholders by mitigating conflicts of interest between them. However, the role of a manager's compensation can be weakened in family firms for the following reasons. First, a family member manager has fewer conflicts of interest, compared to a non-family member manager. Second, a family member manager has an intrinsic incentive to increase a firm's value (i.e., family wealth). Finally, a family member manager can monitor non-family member managers more effectively. For the reasons, the agency problem will be less severe in family firms and subsequently the role of compensation will be reduced. The empirical results show that pay-performance sensitivity is smaller in family firms than in non-family firms. The main result is robust to variations such as changes in family ownership, the definition of a family firm, and control variables. Furthermore, this paper compares the pay-performance sensitivity of Chaebol family firms with that of other firms. The result shows that the sensitivity is higher for Chaebol family firms, compared to that in other family firms and non-family firms.