• Journal of the Institute of Electronics Engineers of Korea SP
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• v.47 no.1
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• pp.159-168
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• 2010

In the recent years, power analysis attacks were widely investigated, and so various countermeasures have been proposed. In the case of block ciphers, masking methods that blind the intermediate results in the algorithm computations(encryption, decryption, and key-schedule) are well-known. The type conversion of masking is unavoidable since Boolean operation and Arithmetic operation are performed together in block cipher. Messerges proposed a masking type conversion algorithm resistant general power analysis attack and then it's vulnerability was reported. We present that some of exiting attacks have some practical problems and propose a new power analysis attack on Messerges's algorithm. After we propose the strengthen DPA and CPA attack on the masking type conversion algorithm, we show that our proposed attack is a practical threat as the simulation results.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.18 no.3
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• pp.273-287
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• 2016

White-box cryptography presented by Chow et al. is an obfuscation technique for protecting secret keys in software implementations even if an adversary has full access to the implementation of the encryption algorithm and full control over its execution platforms. Despite its practical importance, progress has not been substantial. In fact, it is repeated that as a proposal for a white-box implementation is reported, an attack of lower complexity is soon announced. This is mainly because most cryptanalytic methods target specific implementations, and there is no general attack tool for white-box cryptography. In this paper, we present an analytic toolbox on white-box implementations of the Chow et al.'s style using lookup tables. According to our toolbox, for a substitution-linear transformation cipher on n bits with S-boxes on m bits, the complexity for recovering the $$O\((3n/max(m_Q,m))2^{3max(m_Q,m)}+2min\{(n/m)L^{m+3}2^{2m},\;(n/m)L^32^{3m}+n{\log}L{\cdot}2^{L/2}\}\)$$, where $m_Q$ is the input size of nonlinear encodings,$m_A$ is the minimized block size of linear encodings, and $L=lcm(m_A,m_Q)$. As a result, a white-box implementation in the Chow et al.'s framework has complexity at most $O\(min\{(2^{2m}/m)n^{m+4},\;n{\log}n{\cdot}2^{n/2}\}\)$ which is much less than $2^n$. To overcome this, we introduce an idea that obfuscates two advanced encryption standard (AES)-128 ciphers at once with input/output encoding on 256 bits. To reduce storage, we use a sparse unsplit input encoding. As a result, our white-box AES implementation has up to 110-bit security against our toolbox, close to that of the original cipher. More generally, we may consider a white-box implementation of the t parallel encryption of AES to increase security.

• Journal of IKEEE
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• v.23 no.3
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• pp.971-977
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• 2019

This paper presents an experimental result showing the encryption and decryption times of the AES and LEA algorithms. AES and LEA algorithms are international and Korean standards for block ciphers, respectively. Through experiments, this paper investigates the applicability of the LEA algorithm for light weight IoT devices. In order to measure the encryption and decryption times, 256-bit and 128-bit secret keys were randomly generated for AES and LEA, respectively. Under our test environment using an Arduino microcontroller, the AES algorithm takes about 45ms for encryption and decryption processes, whereas the LEA algorithm takes about 4ms. Even though processing times of each algorithm may vary much under different implementation and test environments, this experimental result shows that the LEA algorithm can be applied to many light weight IoT devices for security goals.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.12 no.4
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• pp.77-85
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• 2002

We present the impossible differential cryptanalysis of the block cipher XTEA[7] and TEA[6]. The core of the design principle of these block ciphers is an easy implementation and a simplicity. But this simplicity dose not offer a large diffusion property. Our impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced-round versions of XTEA and TEA is based on this fact. We will show how to construct a 12-round impossible characteristic of XTEA. We can then derive 128-bit user key of the 14-round XTEA with $2^{62.5}$ chosen plaintexts and $2^{85}$ encryption times using the 12-round impossible characteristic. In addition, we will show how to construct a 10-round impossible characteristic or TEA. Then we can derive 128-bit user key or the 11-round TEA with $2^{52.5}$ chosen plaintexts and $2^{84}$ encryption times using the 10-round impossible characteristic.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.149-156
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• 2011

In the recent years, power analysis attacks were widely investigated, and so various countermeasures have been proposed. In the case of block ciphers, masking methods that blind the intermediate values in the en/decryption computations are well-known among these countermeasures. But the cost of non-linear part is extremely high in the masking method of block cipher, and so the countermeasure for S-box must be efficiently constructed in the case of AES, ARIA and SEED. Existing countermeasures for S-box use the masked S-box table to require 256 bytes RAM corresponding to one S-box. But, the usage of the these countermeasures is not adequate in the lightweight security devices having the small size of RAM. In this paper, we propose the new countermeasure not using the masked S-box table to make up for this weak point. Also, the new countermeasure reduces time-complexity as well as the usage of RAM because this does not consume the time for generating masked S-box table.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.21-28
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• 2009

In the recent years, power attacks were widely investigated, and so various countermeasures have been proposed, In the case of block ciphers, masking methods that blind the intermediate values in the algorithm computations(encryption, decryption, and key-schedule) are well-known among these countermeasures. But the cost of non-linear part is extremely high in the masking method of block cipher, and so the inversion of S-box is the most significant part in the case of AES. This fact make various countermeasures be proposed for reducing the cost of masking inversion and Zakeri's method using normal bases over the composite field is known to be most efficient algorithm among these masking method. We rearrange the masking inversion operation over the composite field and so can find duplicated multiplications. Because of these duplicated multiplications, our method can reduce about 10.5% gates in comparison with Zakeri's method.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.33 no.2
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• pp.165-173
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• 2023

In this paper, we propose an optimal implementation of lightweight block ciphers, SIMECK and SIMON counter operation mode, on a 32-bit RISC-V processor. Utilizing the characteristics of the CTR operating mode, we propose round function optimization that precomputes some values, single plaintext optimization and two plaintext parallel optimization. Since there are no previous research results on SIMECK and SIMON on RISC-V, we compared the performance of implementations with and without precomputation techniques for single plaintext optimization and two plaintext parallel optimization implementations. As a result, the implementations to which the precomputation technique was applied showed a performance improvement of 1% compared to the implementations to which precomputation was not applied.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.28 no.11C
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• pp.1077-1087
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• 2003

In this paper, we proposed an architecture of a cryptosystem with various operating modes for the network security and implemented in hardware using the ASIC library. For configuring a cryptosystem, the standard block ciphers such as AES, SEED and 3DES were included. And the implemented cryptosystem can encrypt and decrypt the data in real time through the wired/wireless network with the minimum latency time (minimum 64 clocks, maximum 256 clocks). It can support CTR mode which is widely used recently as well as the conventional block cipher modes such as ECB, CBC and OFB, and operates in the multi-bit mode (64, 128, 192, and 256 bits). The implemented hardware has the expansion possibility for the other algorithms according to the network security protocol such as IPsec and the included ciphering blocks can be operated simultaneously. The self-ciphering mode and various ciphering mode can be supported by the hardware sharing and the programmable data-path. The global operation is programmed by the serial communication port and the operation is decided by the control signals decoded from the instruction by the host. The designed hardware using VHDL was synthesized with Hynix 0.25$\mu\textrm{m}$ CMOS technology and it used the about 100,000 gates. Also we could assure the stable operation in the timing simulation over 100㎒ using NC-verilog.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.29 no.6
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• pp.1259-1270
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• 2019

The upper bound of differential characteristic probability is mainly used to determine the number of rounds when constructing a block cipher. As the number of rounds affects the performance of block cipher, it is critical to evaluate the tight upper bound in the constructing process. In order to calculate the upper bound of differential characteristic probability, the previous searching methods for minimum number of active S-boxes constructed constraint equations for non-linear operations and linear operations, independently. However, in the case of BOGI design strategy, where linear operation is dependent on non-linear operation, the previous methods may present the less tight upper bound. In this paper, we exploit the properties of BOGI strategy to propose a new method to evaluate a tighter upper bound of differential characteristic probability than previous ones. Additionally, we mathematically proved the validity of our method. Our proposed method was applied to GIFT-64 and GIFT-128, which are based on BOGI strategy, and the upper bounds of differential characteristic probability were derived until 9 round. Previously, the upper bounds of differential characteristic probability for 7-round GIFT-64 and 9-round GIFT-128 were 2^-18.395 and 2^-26.885, respectively, while we show that the upper bounds of differential characteristic probability are more tight as 2^-19.81 and 2^-28.3, respectively.

• Journal of KIISE
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• v.43 no.11
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• pp.1245-1258
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• 2016

Cryptographic technologies providing confidentiality and integrity such as encryption algorithms and message authentication codes (MACs) are necessary for preventing security threats in the Internet of Things (IoT) where various kinds of devices are interconnected. As a number of encryption schemes that have passed security verification are not necessarily suitable for low-power and low-performance IoT devices, various lightweight cryptographic schemes have been proposed. However, a study of lightweight MACs is not sufficient in comparison to that of lightweight block ciphers. Therefore, in this paper, we reviewed various kinds of MACs for their classification and analysis and then, we presented a new way for future MAC development. We also implemented major MAC algorithms and performed experiments to investigate their performance degradation on low-end micro-controllers.