• International conference on construction engineering and project management
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• 2022.06a
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• pp.18-24
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• 2022

State highway agencies (SHAs) typically apply a competitive procurement procedure to select contractors for their design-bid-build projects. Since the level of competition affects construction bid prices and project outcomes, the Federal Highway Agency (FHWA) suggests SHAs seek ways to improve competition among contractors continuously. However, they rarely conduct an empirical assessment of the current competition level necessary to identify room for improvement. Besides the number of bidders on a project, other factors such as winning or losing rates among the contractors in previous projects can also indicate the degree of competition; only a few contractors may have won the majority of the projects in a specific region. However, few studies have investigated such factors. This paper proposes a network analysis-based approach to evaluating contractor competition levels of highway projects using historical bid tabulation data. The proposed method provides insights into overall competition levels, the determination of competitive contractors, and winning rate distribution among contractors.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.6
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• pp.417-425
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• 2020

This paper investigates the potential impact of external factors on bid/no-bid decision for supervision consultant service on construction project in Hanoi, the capital of Vietnam. The data used in this study are secondary data taken from annual reports and sourced from the Department of Public Procurement, Ministry of Planning and Investment in Hanoi. Besides, to identify the impact of external factors on bid/no-bid decision for supervision consultant service on construction project in Hanoi, the study collected data from 272 qualified questionnaires from bidders doing business in Hanoi. Cronbach's Alpha, EFA and regression model are used to explore the impact of each independent variable on bid/no-bid decision for supervision consultant service on construction project. The results show that three external determinants, including Project characteristic (PC), Legal codes (LC) and Competition (C) are affecting bid/no-bid decision for supervision consultant service on construction project in Hanoi. Among them, Project characteristic (PC) and Legal codes (LC) have positive relationships with bid/no-bid decision for supervision consultant service on construction project, whereas Competition (C) negatively affects bid/no-bid decision for supervision consultant service on construction project. It means the more contractors actually participate in a bid, the less bid/ no-bid decisions are made.

• International conference on construction engineering and project management
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• 2013.01a
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• pp.479-487
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• 2013

State Highway Agencies (SHAs) have started utilizing cost-plus-time bidding (A+B bidding) since Federal Highway Agency (FHWA) declared it operational on May 4, 1995. Although this technique has successfully accelerated many projects by incorporating construction time in the bidding competition, a framework to illustrate the interactions of incentive/disincentive (I/D) rates on the competitiveness of contractors participating in the bid competition is yet to be developed. In a previous research, authors indicated that for each bid competition there is an efficient cap for I/D rates which are dictated by the capabilities of contractors in project acceleration. However, the results of previous study were based on the assumption that there is a statistically significant relationship between cost and time. In this study, the entire cost-plus-time projects implemented by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation (ODOT) were investigated. Then the significance of relationship between cost and time were analyzed for each contractor utilizing Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) technique, and the price-time function of each contractor was determined by regression analysis. The results of the analysis indicate that there is a significant relationship between cost and time for the majority of contractors. However, a quadratic relationship is not always significant and for some contractors a linear price-time relationship is significant. The results of this project can be used not only by ODOT to optimize the incentive/disincentive rates but also by contractors to determine the most competitive strategies of other bid participants.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.333-339
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• 2003

Competition among electric generation companies is a major goal of restructuring in the electricity industry. In electricity market, a huge volume of commodities will be traded through competitive bidding. The choice between uniform and pay-as-bid pricing for electricity auction has been one of most important issues in deregulated electricity market. This paper proposes a constrained Bertrand model for analyzing the electricity auction market of price competition model. The issue of the two pricing rules of uniform and pay-as-bid is studied from the viewpoint of consumer's benefit. This paper also shows that transmission congestion depends on the pricing mechanism. Pay-as-bid pricing gives less possibility of transmission congestion by price competition, and less burden to consumers in the simulation results.

• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.12-20
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• 2020

To estimate collusion effects on bid award in Public Construction works, this paper uses Logit Model, which is a choice variable model. Price, design, competition, and other factors are included, with a special focus on collusion, as independent variables in the model. The empirical results are as follows. First, collusion has little effects on bid award, but great impacts on bidding behavior. Secondly, the score of design is the most important and significant factors among all variables. Thirdly, competition has also significant effects on bid award. Finally it is analyzed that institutional framework and characteristics of public work have some effects on bidding award.

• International conference on construction engineering and project management
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• 2022.06a
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• pp.11-17
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• 2022

Design-bid-build (DBB) is the most common project delivery method among highway projects. State Highway Agencies (SHAs) usually apply a low-bid approach to select contractors for their DBB projects. In this approach, the Federal Highway Agency suggests SHAs heighten contractors' competition to lower bid prices. However, these attempts may become ineffective due to collusive bidding arrangements among certain contractors. One common strategy is the rotation of winning bidders of a group of contractors who bid on many of the same projects. These arrangements may also be specific to a particular region or vary in time. Despite the practices' adverse effects on bidding outcomes, an effective model to detect red-flag bidding patterns is lacking. This study fills the gap by proposing a novel framework that utilizes pattern mining techniques and statistical tests for unusual pattern detection. A case study with historical data from an SHA is conducted to illustrate the proposed framework.

• Proceeding of Spring/Autumn Annual Conference of KHA
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• 2009.04a
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• pp.211-216
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• 2009

Bidding systems in the domestic public construction work have been amended many times since the lowest-bidding system was implemented in 1951. However, this hasn't had much success. Competition in technical development among companies has declined as the contracts for buildings are given to company which submits the lowest price without considering traits of projects. In addition, as the construction market turns to the limitless competition system due to FTA(Free Trade Agreement), advanced techniques are needed to promote the national competitive power. Considering the needs of the times, Korean government announced that "Best Value Contract (Design-Bid-Build)" and "Bridging Contracts (Design-Build)" are included to 4 existing bidding systems in October 2007. Thus this study aims to suggest devised the evaluation criteria including major items for evaluating bidders, in order to establish and revitalize the best-value bid system successfully.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Building Construction Conference
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• 2015.05a
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• pp.111-112
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• 2015

Garak Market Modernization Project Phase 1, which is the public projects worth 1,75 billion won, was delivered by adopting modifiable bid of BOQ on the lowest price award system. The modifiable bid of BOQ system allows bidders to modify quantities based on their own drawings and construction specifications and requirements. It was initiated by the government for minimizing design error and for inducing technical competition between tenders by checking errors. At that time the bidding, it allowed modifying the BOQ all the works. In the construction phase, the responsibility for the design changes, due to mistakes and omissions on design documents and BOQ were disputed between the owner and the contractors. This study analyzed the problem of the system and addressed a need of improvement.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.36 no.4
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• pp.1-32
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• 2014

Auction is widely used in allocation and procurement of resources due to its desirable properties: efficiency and revenue maximization. It is well-known, however, that auction may fail to achieve efficiency when allocative externalities exist. Such a result may happen in the auction of the resources that are very scarce, for example, radio spectrum. This is because allocation of the resources has effects on competition of the firms in the aftermarket, and thus a firm that utilizes the resources less efficiently may make a higher bid to lessen competition. This paper shows first that efficient allocation may not be achieved by auction even when the number of bidders is 2, while it is shown in the literature that auction may result in inefficient allocation when the number of bidders is greater than or equal to 3. There exist 2 firms, who make a bid to win the scarce resources that increase the value or decrease the production cost of their own product. After the auction ends, the firms engage in Bertrand competition on the Hotelling line. Inefficient allocation may happen even under the second-price auction rule, and it happens only when the firms are different in the initial value or the initial cost of their products as well as in the value of the auctioned resources. The firm who has been the leader loses a large portion of the market if it fails to win the auction, and thus makes a high bid even when the other firm can use the resources more efficiently. Allocative efficiency Pareto improves when the smaller firm's bid counts more than the leader's bid. This paper suggests a modified rule that the smaller firm wins the auction when its bid multiplied by some constant is greater than the leader's bid. The multiplier can be calculated from the market shares. It is equal to 1 when the two firms are the same, and is increasing in the leader's market share. Allocation is efficient in a strictly larger set of parameters under the modified rule than under the standard second-price auction rule.

• International conference on construction engineering and project management
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• 2005.10a
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• pp.417-423
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• 2005

Contractor's opportunistic bidding behavior refers to contractor's deliberate low-bid, which cannot accord with the cost, and expectation for beyond-contractual reward (BCR), the compensation earned through cutting corners or claims after undertaking the construction project. This research applies System Dynamics to develop a model of contractor's pricing with consideration for dimensions of "cost", "market competition", and "BCR". Iterative computer simulations were performed to analyze the effects of contractor's pricing on the market price. The results were then examined by statistical analysis on data collected from 44 highway projects in Taiwan. It is found that the critical force driving the contractors to bid opportunistically is their excessive expectations in BCR under the current environment. Within the price competition mechanism, if the problem of BCR exists, even if the bidding system is further improved, contractors would still prefer opportunistic bidding behavior, and eventually make the whole construction industry operate ineffectively. Therefore, it is crucial to remedy the aforementioned BCR problem by more effective management policy.